

For Reference

NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

Ex LIBRIS
UNIVERSITATIS
ALBERTAEÆSIS





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2020 with funding from
University of Alberta Libraries

<https://archive.org/details/Fox1980>

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR ...Bonnie.Fox.....
TITLE OF THESIS ...Women's Domestic Labour and Their Involvement....
...in Wage Work: Twentieth-Century Changes in the...
...Reproduction of Daily Life.....
.....
DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTEDPhD.....
YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED1980.....

Permission is hereby granted to THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
LIBRARY to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend
or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific
research purposes only.

The author reserves other publication rights, and
neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be
printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written
permission.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

WOMEN'S DOMESTIC LABOUR AND THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN WAGE WORK:
TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHANGES IN THE REPRODUCTION OF DAILY LIFE

by



Bonnie Fox

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1980

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled WOMEN'S DOMESTIC LABOUR AND THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN WAGE WORK: TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHANGES IN THE REPRODUCTION OF DAILY LIFE submitted by Bonnie Jean Fox in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology.

Date

13/8/80

ABSTRACT

Nothing less than a social history of the changing relationship between the household and capitalist commodity production will provide an explanation of married women's growing involvement in wage work since World War II. In attempting to outline the key components of this history, we address a question scarcely raised in discussions of married women as a "reserve army of labour": how changes in capital's needs for female labour make themselves felt in the household to stimulate a move of housewives into the labour market.

Capitalism's primary definitive impact on the household (through proletarianization) involved the commoditization and eventual mass production of the means of domestic production. This historical trend meant a shift in much of the labour necessary for the reproduction of daily life, from the household to capitalist production and the state sector. We document this process. As well, we discuss the generally inflating requirements for the production of the commodity labour power, which have meant increases in the necessary labour time of household workers and

wage workers, with respect to services such as education.

The progressive commoditization of the means of household production indicates a key way in which the capitalist economy affects domestic labour. That same historic process, we argue, involved a redefinition of what the housewife is responsible for (i.e., the product of domestic labour), such that both increased cost and less opportunity for homemade substitutes resulted. Therefore, focusing on the means of domestic production and the product expected of the domestic labourer, and assuming that the housewife is ultimately responsible for reproducing daily life, we discuss the changing allocation of women's time between wage work and household work without making the unrealistic assumption that housewives are rational producers who allocate their time so as to maximize their output.

An examination of census data shows that married women from all income groups, in Canada and the United States, increased their involvement in wage work over the last several decades. A class analysis, which examines the changing material conditions of both working-class and middle-class housewives is thus attempted. Following detailed comparisons of twentieth-century changes in men's wages and minimum

family budget standards, we conclude that as many as half of all households have needed a second wage earner throughout the century. A changing demand for female labour thus found a ready reserve of labour in working-class households.

For middle-class housewives, a content analysis of Ladies Home Journal indicated resistance to the commoditization of means of subsistence. However, as North American budgets increasingly came to comprise durable commodities for which there were no homemade substitutes, middle-class housewives came to desire wage work.

Changing demand for female labour is, we argue, a direct consequence of the development of monopoly capitalism. Finally, we argue that welfare policies in Britain, Canada, and especially the United States have served to maintain working-class women as a cheap labour reserve. Changes in labour laws, however, have scarcely affected women's labour force involvement.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

When a dissertation is written in Toronto and Ann Arbor, for a committee in Edmonton, by someone unaffiliated with any university in either place of residence, only the firm commitment and constant support of friends in all locations allows the successful completion of the project. Rosalind Sydie, my committee chairperson, encouraged me, read and criticized my work, travelled across the country to do so, and (most importantly) always answered my letters. The dissertation would not have been completed without her. I wish her a very special thanks. I wish to thank Michael Gillespie for implicit faith in my ability, and for support at crucial points in the process of writing the thesis. Arthur K. Davis has been both supportive and critical, and I thank him for serving on my committee all those years. Finally, I wish to thank Ann Marie Decore for joining the committee, upon the death of Richard Frucht.

Many of the strengths of this dissertation are a product of Richard's influence. The particular combination of criticism, inspiration, and active support which Richard consistently offered me had an

inestimable effect on my original conceptualization of both the problem and the answers. And the final product suffered from his irreplaceable absence.

Although I have not directly involved my friends in the writing of this thesis, they have had a tremendous influence on my work. Susan Berkowitz Luton, Harry Luton, Meg Luxton, Emily Blumenfeld, Bill Johnston, Judy Oleniuk, Wally Seccombe, Susan Mann, Harriet Rosenberg, Pat Chuchryk, Thelma McCormack, Jane Springer, Bruce Curtis and Linda Briskin (many of whom worked with me on the collection of essays on domestic labour that will appear as Hidden in the Household: Women's Domestic Labour Under Capitalism) have composed, for me, an intellectually stimulating community of friends. Another friend, Michael Ornstein, deserves special mention for listening, evaluating, and encouraging me at some crucial points during the writing of the dissertation. As well, I should like to thank Jim Moore for generously making available some of the facilities in the Small Groups Lab at York University, when I was typing the thesis.

My friends and especially the women at The Women's Press provided the active encouragement I needed especially at the beginning of the project. To them, my deepest thanks. Finally, for shouldering much of

the domestic labour and, at the end, some of the typing, I thank my husband, John. Not only did he stay by my side through these somewhat crazy years, he also turned his seemingly limitless skills and perpetually sharp intelligence to my concerns more than once during the research for the dissertation.

To my parents and to Joe and Diana Fox, I apologize for my inadequacies as a daughter this last year.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
The Development of Capitalism in Western Europe.....	7
Early Changes in Household Production in North America.....	24
The Production of Labour Power.....	40
2. THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF WORK AMONG THE HOUSEHOLD, "THE ECONOMY," AND THE STATE.....	48
Shelter.....	53
Meals.....	69
Clothing.....	85
Other Production Necessary for Daily Life.....	95
Conclusion.....	102
3. EXPLANATIONS OF THE TREND AND AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK.....	108
Overview.....	108
The Social Scientists' Explanations.....	112
Marxist Explanations.....	143
An Alternative Framework.....	161
4. THE INCREASING INVOLVEMENT OF MARRIED WOMEN IN WAGE WORK IN THE UNITED STATES: A CLASS ANALYSIS.....	179
The Timing and Composition of the Influx.....	179
Working-Class Women.....	186

	Middle-Class Women.....	219
	Conclusion.....	242
5.	THE HISTORICAL TREND IN THE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF CANADIAN WOMEN.....	252
	The Households Contributing to the Influx.....	258
	Changes in Real Income and the Cost of Living.....	260
	An Analysis of Time-Series Data.....	264
	A Test of the "Women as Reserve Army" Hypothesis.....	272
	Conclusion.....	275
6.	A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE GROWING DEMAND FOR WOMEN'S LABOUR.....	277
	A Look at the Occupations Women Have Entered.....	278
	The Growth of Certain White-Collar Occupations.....	285
	Conclusion.....	295
7.	THE STATE AND MARRIED WOMEN'S INVOLVEMENT IN WAGE WORK: LABOUR LEGISLATION AND WELFARE POLICIES IN BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA.....	297
	Nineteenth-Century Britain: Protective Labour Legislation.....	302
	Nineteenth-Century Britain: Welfare Policies.....	328
	Labour Legislation in the United States.....	341
	Welfare Policies in the United States.....	359
	Canada: Labour Legislation.....	366
	Canada: Welfare Policies.....	378

Changes in Canada and the United States with Respect to Biological Reproduction and Assistance with Child Rearing.....	384
Conclusion.....	389
8. CONCLUSION.....	396
Directions for Future Research.....	409

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	481
APPENDIX A. Content Analysis Methodology.....	499
APPENDIX B. Women's Labour Force Participation as Measured Through the Years by the United States Census.....	501
APPENDIX C. The Construction of the Revised Price Index, Canada, 1935 to 1975.....	509
APPENDIX D. The Time Series Data, Canada, 1935 to 1970.....	511

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Women's Rates of Participation in Gainful Occupation or the Labour Force, by Marital Status, the United States, 1890 to 1970	412
2. Women's Rates of Participation in Gainful Occupation or the Labour Force, by Marital Status, Canada, 1931 to 1971	413
3. Women's Labour Force Participation Rates by Age, the United States, 1930 to 1970	414
4. Married Women's Labour Force Participation Rates and Numbers of Married Women in the Labour Force, by Age and Presence of Children, the United States, Selected Years from 1948 to 1970	415
5. Urbanization in the United States	416
6. Urbanization in Canada and Its Provinces: Percentage of the Population in Urban Places Over 1,000 in Size	417
7. Facilities in Urban Dwelling Units, Canada and the United States, 1940 to 1971	418
8. Household Means of Production: Their Availability on the Market as Evidenced by Advertisements in <u>Ladies Home Journal</u> , 1890 to 1970	420
9. Percentage of Nonfiction Articles on Home Production in <u>Ladies Home Journal</u> that Discuss Food, 1890 to 1970	421
10. Indexes of the Manufacture of Selected Foods, in Selected Years from 1899 to 1947, the United States	422
11. Indexes of the Manufacture of Selected Foods, in Selected Years from 1917 to 1957, Canada	423

12. Restaurant Sales, Canada, 1930 to 1971	424
13. Percentage of Nonfiction Articles in <u>Ladies Home Journal</u> with Instructions for Home Production of Useful Items that are Durable - Mostly Clothing, 1890 to 1970	425
14. Ratio of Materials for Home Production of Clothing to Women's Readymade Clothing Available in Stores, in Advertisements in <u>Ladies Home Journal</u> , 1890 to 1970	426
15. Workers in Commercial Cleaners and Laundries, Canada, 1931 to 1971	427
16. Proposed Series of Married Women's Rates of Participation in Wage Work, the United States, 1890 to 1970	428
17. Wives' Labour Force Participation by Husbands' Relative Income, the United States, 1940 to 1970	429
18. Percentage Distributions of Families, by Husbands' Income and by Wives' Labour Force Participation, the United States, 1940, 1960, 1970	430
19. Minimum Budget Standards for a Family of Five, the United States in the Early Part of the Twentieth Century	432
20. Average Men's Wage or Salary Income: Median Income for 1939, 1950-70, Mean Income for 1910-60, the United States	435
21. Modest but Adequate Budget Standard for a Family of Four, the United States in the Period Since World War II	437
22. School Attendance: Percentages of People in School, by Age and Sex, the United States, 1910 to 1970	438
23. Percentage of Young Adults Working for Wages, the United States, 1910 to 1970	440

24. Percentage of Households with Lodgers and Subfamilies, the United States, 1930 to 1970	441
25. Percentage of American Households with Two or More, and Three or More, Wage or Salary Workers, 1930 to 1970	442
26. Percentage of American Families with Installment Debt, by Amount of Debt, 1952 to 1970	443
27. The Frequency of Appearance of Specific Themes in Nonfiction Articles in <u>Ladies Home Journal</u> , 1890 to 1960	444
28. Wives' Labour Force Participation by Husbands' Relative Income, Canada, 1931 and 1971	445
29. Earnings of Male Heads of Households, Canada, 1941 to 1971	446
30. Cost of Living for a Family of Four, Toronto, Selected Years from 1939 to 1972	447
31. Canadian Gallup Poll Results: Percentages of People Who Think Prices will be Higher Next Year	448
32. Time Series Data, Canada, 1949 to 1975	449
33. Correlation Matrix	450
34. Results of the Time Series Analysis	451
35. Results of the Log Linear Analysis	452
36. Percentage of the Total Labour Force in Major Occupational Groups, Canada, 1901 to 1971	454
37. Women as a Percentage of the Total Labour Force in Each Major Occupational Group, Canada, 1901 to 1971	455
38. Percentage of the Female Labour Force in Major Occupational Groups, Canada, 1901 to 1971	456

39. A. Estimated Female Labour Force in Canada in 1971, Based on 1901, 1941, and 1971 Distributions of the Total Labour Force, and the Percentage Female in Each Occupation as of 1901	458
B. Estimated Female Labour Force in Canada in 1971, Based on 1901 Distribution of the Total Labour Force, and the Percentage Female in Each Occupation in 1941 and 1971	
40. A. Estimated Female Labour Force in 1971, based on 1971 Distribution of the Total Labour Force, and the Percentage Female in Each Occupation as of 1941	460
B. Estimated Female Labour Force in 1971, based on 1941 Distribution of the Total Labour Force, and the Percentage Female in Each Occupation as of 1971	
41. Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1901 to 1970	461
42. Strike Issues, Canada, for Selected Years	464
43. Married Women's Rates of Participation in Wage Work or Work in the Family Business: Census Figures and Revisions, the United States, 1890 to 1970	467
44. The Food Index for the Revised Price Index	468
45. The 1935-50 Component of the Housing Index for the Revised Price Index	470
46. The Housing Index for the Revised Price Index	471

47. The Components of the Revised Price Index	472
48. The Weights for Revised Price Index	474
49. The Revised Consumer Price Index	475

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Women's Rates of Participation in Gainful Occupation or the Labour Force, by Marital Status, the United States, 1890 to 1970	476
2. Women's Rates of Participation in Gainful Occupation or the Labour Force, by Marital Status, Canada, 1931 to 1971	477
3. Women's Labour Force Participation Rates by Ages, the United States 1930 to 1970	478
4. Ridge Trace for Time Series Regression Analysis	479
5. Women's Labour Force Participation Rates (Logit Scale) by Age and Period, Canada	480

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Married women's involvement in wage work has risen since the late nineteenth century in both Canada and the United States. Assuming that there has not been a growing inclusiveness in the census enumeration of wage-earning women, the most substantial movement of married women into the paid work force has occurred in the last few decades. (See graphs 1 and 2, and tables 1 and 2.) Moreover, it was married women who were responsible for the growing labour force participation of all women, in both countries. While the participation rates of single, divorced, and widowed women in the work force were about the same in the early 1970s as they had been as early as 1890 in the United States and at least as early as 1931 in Canada, the labour force participation rates for married women rose in both countries especially after the early 1940s. In the United States, in 1940 15.6% of married women were in the work force and by 1970, after a monotonic rise in their rates of participation, over

40% were in the work force. Similarly, in Canada in 1941 fewer than 5% of married women were "gainfully occupied," but in 1951 11.2% of married women were in the labour force, and by 1971 37% of married women were in the labour force.

Married women's growing involvement in wage work is not accounted for by a rise in the rates of marriage for young women (who typically have the highest labour force participation rates). In fact, the rises in paid employment were greatest over time for older women, those 35 to 64 years of age, in both countries. (See graph 3 and table 3, and table 35.) So, it was older married women whose involvement in wage work rose especially after World War II.

The factors underlying the growing importance of paid employment in the lives of married women were apparently quite compelling. First, the trend occurred in a period of rising birth rates. And the presence of young children is the chief inhibitor of married women's entry into the work force (Cain, 1966). Despite this fact, the trend we have described affected women with small children as well as other married women. (See table 4.) In the United States, between 1948 and 1970 the labour force participation rates of women without children younger than 18 years of age

(and living at home) rose 48%, those of women with children 6 to 17 years of age rose 89%, and those of women with children younger than six years of age rose fully 181%. That is, in the United States at least, women with young children increasingly approximated the labour force behaviour of all married women.

Second, while financial need is obviously a key promoter of married women's entry into paid employment, the trend we have described took place during a period of rising real income. (See chapter 5 for documentation.) Given the strong negative relationship between husband's income and married women's labour force participation at any point in time, as well as the significant percentages of wage-earning women who point to financial need in explaining why they work, the trend, as an essentially economic change, thus seems paradoxical. However, we believe that a social-historical analysis which is economic in a broad sense - in that it focuses on changes in production in the privatized domestic sphere and the socialized commodity-producing sphere - should resolve some of the puzzles characterizing the trend. That is our project here. In examining some key historical changes, we shall see, for example, that economic compulsion is involved in the rising assumption of wage work by

married women, despite the fact that real income rose during the 1950s and 1960s.

Our approach will be to focus on the work necessary for the reproduction of daily life. That is, we shall ask what is essential for a family to subsist, at an accepted standard of living, considering both biological requirements and those that arise from living in an advanced capitalist society. The latter mostly involve activities centred on the generational and daily reproduction of labour power (or the capacity for work), the commodity most households must sell in order to survive. Our attention will be specifically directed towards determining the location of various types of productive activities essential to the reproduction of daily life, and shifts of such work between the household and the sphere of commodity production. In this chapter, we shall take a brief look at developments in Britain and North America before the twentieth century, to assess major changes that occurred with the development of capitalism.

In chapter 2, we shall detail the twentieth-century changes in the work of reproducing daily life, from the vantage point of the individual household and with an emphasis on shifts in the location of necessary work among the household, "the

economy," and the state. In chapter 3, after a critical review of past explanations of the trend of married women's growing involvement in wage work, we turn to a theoretical question which must be addressed before an explanation of the trend can be offered: what is the relationship between the household, and the privatized work that occurs within it, and the capitalist economy? We assume that married women's primary responsibilities arise out of the roles of mother, wife, and housewife. Therefore, increased demand for female labour must have made itself felt somehow through, or arisen in conjunction with, changes in the household. The key theoretical issue is whether we assume that domestic labour reproduces labour power and is therefore a form of commodity production linked to the rest of the economy through the response of the labour market to its product, or that domestic labour is use value production and therefore linked only indirectly to the rest of the economy.

In chapter 4, we shall make use of our theoretical understanding of the way in which capitalist production exerts an influence on the work the woman does in the household, to study changes that occurred in the twentieth century in the United States which changed the relationship between the household and "the

economy." These changes, we argue, explain the growing desire for wage work on the part of many married women. For other married women, a study of the relationship between the man's wage and the costs of subsistence explains the influx into the paid labour force. Our assumption throughout this explanation of the activation of the married female labour reserve latent in the household is that, while the societal changes affecting households have been the same for all, the effects have been different in working-class and middle-class households, and therefore the reasons these women have increasingly sought wage work have been different. Having focused on how the female labour reserve has been activated over time, we extend the explanation to Canada and also statistically test some hypotheses about the notion that women are a "reserve army of labour."

Explaining the growing demand for female labour is not our primary task here, but because the question is so central to an understanding of the trend, we address it briefly in chapter 6. There, we attempt to show the key change in the sphere of commodity production that led to the growth of certain types of jobs. Finally, chapter 7 is an historical discussion of the role of the state in promoting the influx of married women into

wage work. We ask how changes in labour laws may have encouraged women to find wage jobs, and also whether changing welfare policies contributed to the maintenance of the population of married women as a labour reserve.

The Development of Capitalism in Western Europe

Although our focus in these first two chapters will be on changes in the production of daily life (i.e., the production of the means of subsistence) and the location of that work in the twentieth century, and our area of interest will be North America, we must at least briefly consider developments over a longer period of time in Western Europe as well as in North America. The dramatic structural changes that lie behind shifts in the location of necessary production - especially shifts between the household and "the economy" - occurred before the twentieth century. In fact, much of the relocation of productive activities occurred before the twentieth century. Relatively recent changes are largely continuations and elaborations of a basic trend established earlier. A brief historical sketch of major changes in Britain, where the process is most clear, followed by a summary of what we know about early centuries in the United

States and Canada, will thus introduce our discussion of Canada and the United States in the twentieth century.

There were two components to the dramatic reorganization of production in Western Europe which, though related, did not necessarily occur in tandem: (1) the progressive concentration of the means of the production of subsistence in the hands of a minority (who became further and further removed from the labour process) and the corresponding proletarianization of the producer, and (2) the centralization of commodity production. Because these developments transformed the way in which daily life was reproduced,* they changed the character of the work occurring in the domestic sphere. (Consequently, they provide the material basis of women's inequality under capitalism - both directly in their effects on domestic labour, and indirectly through their effects on the nature of child bearing.)

Prior to the development of capitalist social relations, when the production of use values and simple commodities by peasants and artisans was dominant in Britain, the household was the unit of production and

 *"Reproduction" means production on a continuing basis, throughout the dissertation.

the family the production team. Because individual households typically possessed the means of their production (especially land, to which they at least held customary rights), their members were able to produce or acquire through the exchange of their products the means of their subsistence. This mode of production, known as "independent commodity production," which rested on individual possession of the means of production, actually existed as one among many types of productive organization. In feudal times, the household labour force was typically involved in both production for themselves and compulsory labour for the lord. The degree of self-sufficiency attained by individual households within the same village no doubt varied from household to household; and, for a village as a whole, probably depended greatly on the relative strength of the local feudal lord vis-a-vis his peasants - determining how much time they could work for themselves. Nevertheless, peasant households characteristically had rights to the use of the land and owned their primitive tools. Thus, the self-sufficient production of their subsistence was at least a possibility.*

*See Bennett, 1938, Homans, 1941, Dobb, 1947, Laslett,

Households did, in fact, produce much of their subsistence. In peasant households, the married couple was a production team which maintained a simple division of labour. (And there is strong reason to believe that this division of labour entailed little status differential (Scott and Tilly, 1975)). The man typically worked in the fields and the woman in the garden and orchard, and with the dairy and poultry; apparently, he more typically did the weaving while she did the spinning. In the homes of town artisans, the husband and his wife were involved in an economic partnership similar to that in peasant households. The man worked at his craft, while the woman managed the business accounts and the household (Clark, 1919). Whatever the social and legal position of women during feudal times, it is clear that adult women were responsible for a major part of the production of human subsistence. Because this role in production was crucial to the household, women apparently only organized and managed the performance of more mundane daily household chores, which were carried out by children and young adults (Clark, 1919, Aries, 1962).

 1965, and Aries, 1962, for descriptions of feudal households and daily life. See Wolf, 1966, for a discussion of the peasant mode of production.

(Moreover, because the separation between household and community was fluid, because peasant villages were tightly knit, and because custom and personal interaction governed daily life, women probably were able to have a fair degree of influence in community affairs.)

Child rearing was not distinct from the production of family subsistence. Because childhood was not viewed as a stage of life separate from adulthood, requiring distinct treatment (Aries, 1962), there was little work, above and beyond that involved in procuring subsistence, that went towards the raising of children. (However, child bearing itself was most oppressive for peasant women, who were forced into endless years of pregnancy and caring for infants, apparently because children represented an economic asset in an agricultural, family-farm economy.) In fact, children were part of the family production team; from an early age they worked alongside their parents. Therefore, socialization occurred entirely within the family, though not necessarily in the family of origin.*

 *Often children, at the age of seven, were apprenticed to another household where they learned practical domestic skills, through daily service. Schools for

As their land rights were whittled away by an emergent capitalist class (which required land for sheep and cattle pastures), peasant households increasingly reproduced themselves through their home production of textiles for the market. Moreover, they gradually came to depend upon suppliers of the raw materials of this production. "Cottage industry," dependent on the supply of the means of production by merchant capitalists, eventually degraded women's productive role, along with that of their husbands, to that of wage labourer. Dependence on wages meant family reproduction was precarious, since competition among producers could beat wages down severely. In fact, dependence on wages, following peasants' loss of land rights, was accompanied by tremendous population upheaval. With the destruction of the economic arrangements that had sustained peasant households in the past, families had to struggle to stay together. Possessing only their labour power, men were frequently forced to travel through the countryside to find work (Pinchbeck, 1930). In time, wages came to be paid to the individual rather than the family. As a

the education of some children were developed only after about the fifteenth century, in Western Europe (Aries, 1962).

consequence, women and men were often forced to compete with each other for work. Moreover, because wages were so low, family reproduction frequently required that children work, often away from their families.

For families staying together, in cottage industry, the relative dominance of production for the market over direct production for the family probably grew as competition among households forced into this semi-proletarian condition rose, and wages declined. That is, the separation between household production for family consumption and (wage) work for the market, minimal though it probably was, may be said to have begun with cottage industry.* For families torn apart, household production of use values had, of course, already become virtually nonexistent.

The eventual centralization of textile production in factories concretized the split between domestic labour and wage labour. In fact, industrial production represented the dominance of wage work and commodity production over household work for consumption. First, since factory work was generally resorted to only after total dispossession of their means of production, families thus employed were dependent upon commercially

*Linda Briskin, lecture, February, 1979.

produced means of subsistence. Industrialization signified the beginning of the transfer of the production of subsistence goods from the household to "the economy." Second, women and children made up a large proportion of early factory workers. They spent the major part of their waking day (e.g., 12 hours) toiling for wages. The household production of use values for family consumption was thus relegated to the edges of each day, and the possibilities for home life became as meager as can be imagined for families in the industrial work force (see Engels, 1858). (In fact, the working-class family was virtually destroyed in the process of industrialization: because many married women worked, infant mortality rates skyrocketed in factory areas, and older children were either left at home unsupervised or were sent into the factories (Engels, 1858, Hewitt, 1958).)

In addition to separating domestic labour and labour that produces commodities, industrialization elaborated and solidified the sexual division of labour. as well. In the early factories, families apparently worked together and may have received a family wage, as was traditional under cottage industry (Smelser, 1959). However, the increased specialization of tasks, which attended factory mechanization, led to

the separation of family members in the work place, the deskilling of jobs, and a preference for women and child workers. The preference was understandable, not only because of the greater tractability of these workers, but also because the tradition of paying family wages lasted only a short time in factories, and the individual wages paid to women and children were considerably lower than those paid men (Pinchbeck, 1930, Marx, 1954).

In the precapitalist homes of artisans and retail traders, women's position as husbands' partner depended upon the location of production in the household, where women informally learned the trade from their husbands. They apparently learned the trade well enough that widows, not sons, carried on family businesses after their husbands' death (Clark, 1919, Pinchbeck, 1930). However, as commercial capital accumulated, the conditions of trade changed such that the scale of business increased and production began to concentrate on the premises of master craftsmen. Producer journeymen, who traditionally could look forward to the assumption of master craftsman status and the establishment of businesses in their own households, found it increasingly difficult to leave positions that came to resemble those of wage labourers. This end of

the pattern of scattered, small-scale production - the withdrawal of production from the individual household - meant for women an end to the informal learning of a craft, and partnership in a family business. In addition, formal restrictions on the entry to and practise of the craft, promoted by journeymen to protect their weakening position, made certain the exclusion of women, who had traditionally been formally barred from membership in most guilds (Clark, 1919). These formal restrictions, in some trades, and the competition presented by the increased concentration of capital, in others, led to the disappearance of those independent businesswomen typical of the Middle Ages.

In sum, then, the forced dependence of former peasant and artisan families on wage work meant the destruction of the unity of work and family life, the separation of family members during hours of work, and their individual remuneration. Proletarianization was a process that not only forced reliance on wages, it forced individual dependence on wage work. It was an historical process that progressively set the individual on his or her own personal resources. Moreover, the commoditization of the means of subsistence was concomitant with proletarianization

(although it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that mass-produced subsistence goods were available in Britain).^{*} Consequently, women's piece work at home or their wage work in the factory were more important than any unpaid work they did in the home that contributed to family maintenance.

In contrast with the unending toil characterizing the lives of proletarian women, and unlike the wives of feudal landlords, bourgeois women were increasingly idle during the centuries of capitalist development. Men who devoted their efforts to the accumulation of capital were divorced from the production process. Therefore, their wives were not needed as business partners. Moreover, the idle wife and the large home were symbols of individual wealth. As well, because the bourgeois family was disentangling itself from immersion in an extended family network, children - especially male heirs - assumed new importance. Not surprisingly, then, in the nineteenth century, motherhood was defined as women's sole occupation

^{*}By "commoditization," we mean production for market exchange, rather than for direct consumption. The commoditization of the means of subsistence refers to their production being typically aimed at the market, rather than for direct use.

(Neff, 1929). Middle-class wives, in contrast, who could not afford idleness or exclusive attention to mothering, worked long hours carrying out necessary domestic chores (Branca, 1974). Moreover, if their households needed more money than the man could earn, middle-class women were confined to a few occupations respectable enough for them to take on (e.g., needlework, teaching).

The dispossession of family producers of their means of production, and the eventual centralization of production, changed the work of married women, especially by altering the nature of work done in the household. The forces behind these crucial changes must also be described, lest the changes appear the result of an inevitable unfolding of time. Specifically, let us examine why the organization of production was revolutionized with the development of capitalist social relations.

Merchant capitalism, which involves profiting from buying cheap and selling dear, was necessarily a temporary phenomenon in history. As Marx (1954) argued, commercial activities cannot create value: they simply involve the global redistribution of existing value.* (Even from the perspective of the

*Value is simply a characteristic of a commodity; it

individual, gain resulting from high prices at the point of sale is temporary, since survival requires that all sellers must also enter other transactions in which they are buyers.)

Nevertheless, the essence of capitalism is self-expansion: buying in order to sell, so that more value will be in hand at the end of the circuit than at the beginning. Capital must therefore ultimately rely on the purchase of a commodity that actually creates value. Marx (1954) convincingly argued that this commodity is labour power (i.e., the capacity for work). Its use, labour, is the source of value, according to Marx. (See pp. 43-48 in Capital, volume I, for Marx's (1954) labour theory of value argument.) To argue that labour is the source of value, Marx described market exchange, which requires some element, common to all commodities, that can be quantified so that the commodities can be compared. Labour is the only such element, and the time in which it is expended an obvious calculus. Therefore, the value that a commodity embodies depends upon the amount of time that

is the amount of labour time socially necessary (i.e., given existing technology and average human skills) for its production.

is socially necessary for its production, given the average level of workers' skills in a society and the most advanced technology in use.

The value inherent in a commodity is expressed as a particular market exchange value (i.e., the proportions in which that commodity exchanges for others, on the market; the universal equivalent, money, is the characteristic unit of expression). Prices fluctuate around commodities' exchange values. Consequently, if a producer takes longer to make his or her commodity than is socially necessary, he or she will not realize the commodity's full value on the market. Competition among producers ensures that the law of value operates, in other words, by forcing individual producers to continually reduce their labour time to equal the social average and enticing them to reduce it below the social average.

The most obvious and impelling consequence of the fact that labour creates value is that capital must involve itself with production: it must purchase this special commodity, labour power, and put it to work. The creation of a landless work force, without the means of production and with only its labour power to sell, was central to the development of capitalism, but not, however, the result of a rational plan by an

emergent capitalist class. It was, at least at first, a consequence of the acquisitiveness of merchant capitalists. Peasants' rights to the use of common lands were gradually whittled away over the centuries as more and more pasture land was in demand for the commercial raising of sheep.

With respect to production, the involvement of capital in the labour process is of benefit to capital only if more value is produced than is represented in the wage paid to the labourer. Marx divided the work day into two parts: that which he called "necessary labour time," in which value is produced equal to the value represented by the wage and equal to that embodied in the necessary means of subsistence; and "surplus labour time" in which additional value ("surplus value") is produced, and appropriated by capital. This surplus value is the basis of capitalist accumulation. It represents the appropriation of labour that is unpaid. Capital continually struggles to expand this portion of labour time relative to that for which it pays.

Capital's early involvement in production, represented by both cottage industry and early manufacture, did not entail a reorganization of the labour process: the family remained the production

team, and the division of labour remained primitive. Pressures to increase surplus value were expressed as severe depressions of wages, or extensions of the workday. (Marx called lengthening the workday the source of "absolute surplus value.") Both means of increasing surplus value were intrinsically unsatisfactory because they entailed the premature exhaustion of labour power and the need for greater increases to the supply of labour than the normal biological reproduction of the population allowed. These problems are avoided, however, when surplus value is increased instead through reductions in "necessary labour time." (Marx called reductions in the length of necessary labour time relative to surplus labour time the creation of "relative surplus value.") Increases in productivity increase surplus value, by reducing necessary labour relative to surplus labour. They are thus basic to production shaped by the needs of capital.

The immediate cause of increases in productivity in capitalist production is the continual pressure market competition exerts on capitalists to reduce their production time. Consequently, with the development of capitalism, production was socialized: workers were brought together under one roof and the

division of labour among them elaborated. Socialized production, in turn, allowed a technological revolution in the means of production. Thus, the Industrial Revolution occurred, whereby the division of labour was concretized through mechanization.

The introduction of machinery, and the general decrease in the level of skills required of the work force which accompanied it, was a chief reason for the increased demand for female and child labourers. Lengthening the workday, increasing productivity, and using cheap labour were all ways in which capital initially boosted its accumulation. (Because the problems inherent in lengthening the workday and paying wages below what was necessary for family reproduction were problems for capital only in the long run, and individual capitalists were motivated by short-run gain, these measures, which entailed endless suffering for the proletariat, continued to be taken at the same time as more effective productivity increases were brought about.)

Thus, the historic process of the growing domination of commodity production, which is characteristic of capitalism, involved the centralization of the production process and the progressive elaboration of the division of labour in

the work place. The former meant a gradual removal of the production of the means of subsistence from the household, and the latter involved a rigidification and widening of the gap between women's and men's wage work. The counterpart of these revolutionary changes in the production process was the cultivation of "family life" or "personal life," and the accompanying development of motherhood as women's vocation, among the bourgeoisie. Throughout the dissertation, we shall discuss the consequences of the commoditization of means of subsistence, and the continuing changes in the relationship between the household and the sphere of commodity production, especially as it entails changes in women's household role. First, let us trace early changes in the production of daily life in North America.

Early Changes in Household Production in North America*

In North America, households were rooted in the land until much later than they were in Western Europe.

 *In the sketch here we use the term "North America" because of the similarity of the basic organization of production (i.e., family farms) in both Canada and the United States. Leo Johnson (1974) is the only writer on early changes in women's productive role in Canada and, while much of what he describes about Ontario coincides with our account, we quote from American sources exclusively because Johnson has not documented his generalizations.

Consequently, few people in the nineteenth century were dependent upon commodities as their means of subsistence, and were thus compelled to sell their labour power for wages. Nearly half of American families lived on farms as late as 1890 (Smuts, 1959); this could be said of Canada until even later, no doubt. It was not until 1920 in the United States (Warner, 1975) and 1930 in Canada (Stone, 1967) that the majority of the population lived in urban centers. Let us briefly review what is known about women's household work on family farms, and changes in the lives of city dwellers in North America, before the twentieth century.

Colonial women represented the essential other half of the household labour force which produced and reproduced family subsistence. The sexual division of labour must have been limited when families first cleared the land and set up their households. However, after sons became available to help their fathers in the fields, women probably "confined" their efforts to tending the kitchen garden; caring for pigs, cattle, and poultry; making household supplies; and keeping their families clothed and fed. Working in the most primitive conditions, women produced much of what was required for daily living: they provided heat (by

tending the fire), light (by making candles), water (by hauling in and out what was required for cooking, laundering and bathing), and essentials like soap, food, and clothing. In 1780, a Pennsylvania farmer who had lost his wife advertised for a housekeeper to fill her place; the skills he listed as essential included "'raising small stock, dairying, marketing, combing, carding, spinning, knitting, sewing, pickling, preserving, etc'" (quoted in Earle, 1898, 252).

Prior to the nineteenth century, "homemade was an adjective that might be applied to nearly every article in the house" (Earle, 1898, 166). A paper published in the American Museum in 1737 (and quoted in Earle, 1898, 158) gave a farmer's report of his household's production:

At this time my farm gave me and my whole family a good living on the produce of it, and left me one year with another one hundred and fifty silver dollars, for I never spent more than ten dollars a year which was for salt, nails, and the like. Nothing to eat, drink or wear was bought, as my farm provided all. (emphasis added)

Feeding and clothing a growing family must have involved an endless sequence of difficult tasks. Alice Morse Earle, writing in 1898, provided careful descriptions of the production of many basic foods in colonial times. According to accounts she found (1898,

150), making cheese was

an unending care from the time the milk was set over the fire to warm and then to curdle; through the breaking of the curds in the cheese-basket; through shaping into cheeses and pressing in the cheese-press, placing them on cheese ladders, and constantly turning them and rubbing them.

She noted (1898, 152-53) that

preserving was a very different art from canning fruit today. There were no hermetically sealed jars, no chemical methods, no quick work about it... Even their cakes, pies and puddings were most complicated, and humble households were lavish in the various kinds they manufactured and ate.

Nevertheless, the woman did not carry out her household production alone. She at least had the assistance of her children, and often had the help of other household members, including her husband, and even at times shared her work with neighbour women. The early, heavy stages of wool and flax preparation, before it was cleaned, spun, and dyed, were carried out by the men of the household. And though women generally did the spinning, the whole family shared much of the work involved in the production of textiles and clothing.

Often by the bright firelight in the early evening every member of the household might be seen at work on the various stages of wool manufacture or some of its necessary adjuncts... The old grandmother, at light and easy work, is carding the wool into fleecy rolls, seated next the fire... The

mother, stepping lightly as one of her girls, spins the rolls into woollen yarn on the great wheel. The oldest daughter sits at the clock-reel... A little girl at a small wheel is filling quills with woollen yarn for the loom, not a skilled work; the irregular sound shows her intermittent industry. The father is setting fresh teeth in a wool-card, while the boys are whittling hand-reels and loom-spools. (Earle, 1898, 203-4)

In fact, according to Earle (1898, 261), "even before they could spin girls were taught to knit, as soon as their little hands could hold the needles. Sometimes girls four years of age could knit stockings. Boys had to knit their own suspenders." Consequently, as was the case in peasant households in Europe, child rearing involved little time aside from that spent producing daily subsistence and training the young workers. If for no other reason, primitive work conditions, requiring hard and long hours of labour by the housewife, left little time for concern for children and their particular needs.*

Neighbours cooperated as well as family members, in subsistence production. Heavy jobs like the construction of buildings or the clearing of fields clearly demanded and fostered collective efforts. But

*This observation came from Meg Luxton (1980), who interviewed three generations of Flin Flon, Manitoba housewives.

there apparently was also considerable cooperation among women in the performance of jobs less demanding. The making of soap, candles and rugs was greatly eased when women came to each others' homes to help out - and the loneliness of colonial life diminished at the same time. According to Earle (1898, 417):

Even those evil days of New England households, the annual house-cleaning, were robbed of some of their dismal terrors by what was known as a 'whang', a gathering of a few friendly women neighbors to assist one another in that dire time, and thus speed and shorten the hours of misery.

Although rural households and family farms were capable of producing most of the means of their subsistence in the centuries prior to the nineteenth, it would be incorrect to think of them as self-sufficient. For most of the early years of settlement, British manufactured goods were available in both the United States and Canada, and there is evidence (Tryon, 1917) that people preferred many manufactured goods to homemade ones. Nevertheless, most households were capable of virtual self-sufficiency: between 1776 and 1810, during the Embargo Acts, Americans were denied British manufactures and apparently many households supported themselves (Tryon, 1917). Yet, by 1815, in the United

States at least, factory goods of almost all kinds were available, and by 1860 had probably replaced many home-produced goods such as household supplies, furniture and some clothing, in many American households (Tryon, 1917).

In many rural American households, however, and no doubt on many Canadian family farms, pioneer conditions continued into the 1890s, despite the fact that manufactured goods were available. According to Smuts (1959, 8), "on a typical Kansas farm [in the 1890s] the work of women provided almost all that was necessary for keeping house, feeding, clothing, and otherwise sustaining the family." As in colonial times, the work of many farm women, even as late as the 1890s,

included the entire care of the kitchen garden and much of the work of caring for cattle, pigs, and poultry - herding cows to pasture and back, hauling well water for animals as well as for kitchen and laundry, feeding pigs, hens, and calves, milking and churning and doctoring. Most of what she needed for housekeeping she had to provide herself. She made brooms, mattresses and floor mats from straw and corn husks; soap, from lye and tallow; lye, from stove ashes... She made almost all the clothing...first by hand and later with a sewing machine.

The family's food supply depended largely on her efforts. Vegetables, fruits, berries, and melons she grew or gathered in spring and summer and preserved in fall for winter use. The butter she churned and the eggs she gathered served not only as food for the family but as currency to trade for cloth and the few foods and other necessities the

farm did not produce. (Smuts, 1959, 7-8)

To the extent that factory production replaced household production, it was no doubt largely because farm wives could more easily produce commodities for the market (e.g., poultry, dairy products) and, in turn, purchase soap and candles than make these essentials. Furthermore, through the nineteenth century in North America, women in rural areas at least continued to make most of their families' food and clothing.*

Though we know little about the household work of women living in towns, we have evidence that, as in precapitalist Britain, up to the mid-nineteenth century, many town women had careers other than those associated with the domestic sphere. As in Britain, this was probably partly related to the location of commercial production in private households, and the business partnership that resulted between husbands and wives. Historian Sam Bass Warner (1968, 6), described eighteenth-century Philadelphia as a town of

*In fact, a random sample of farm families studied in 1929 in the United States showed that from one-third to half of the total value of family living was furnished by farm produce, including over half of the food (Kirkpatrick, 1929).

entrepreneurs, independent contractors, and artisan shopkeepers, men who worked in their own shops "with the aid of [their] family or servant." Moreover, "Philadelphia blocks continued the old tradition of mixed work and residence characteristic of American and English country towns" (Warner, 1968, 11). "Eighteenth century Philadelphia was largely a town of small houses, where most houses also served as stores" (Warner, 1968, 19). As we would expect, there is evidence that women represented a significant proportion of merchants and shopkeepers, artisans (especially in the case of widows), and innkeepers (Dexter, 1924, 1950). Women were also generously represented among school teachers, midwives, writers, ministers, and landed proprietors (Dexter, 1924, 1950). The pattern of mixed residence and shop did not, of course, prevail in the neighbourhoods of workingmen's families, which were apparently quite segregated. And, unfortunately, history leaves us no hint about the productive role of working-class women.

With respect to household production of family subsistence, it is not clear what occurred in preindustrial towns. Density was extremely high, before the building of street railways, so there may have been little space for households to keep poultry

or grow vegetables. Warner (1968, 19) claimed that "the ordinary housewife shopped daily, going to the baker's oven for her bread, and taking her meat and pies to the baker's oven to be cooked. Street pedlars called her out for fish, eggs, and produce." The multiplicity of craftspeople in the city indicates that many household needs were met commercially. But Warner (1968, 19) also referred to "the ordinary housewife...sewing and spinning," and Earle (1898, 149) mentioned that "the care of cream and making of butter was in the eighteenth century the duty of every good wife and dame in the country, and usually in the town." Probably, women living in towns in preindustrial Canada and the United States typically bought the raw materials of meals and clothes, but worked through the considerable number of stages of manufacture necessary to produce the finished products.

With nineteenth-century industrialization, the union of workshop and household typical of city life disappeared. This change had the same consequences with respect to opportunities for nondomestic occupations for women in North America as it had in Britain: women's involvement in crafts, trade, and the professions appears to have declined; and low-paid, unskilled factory work became the chief opportunity for

nondomestic work. (Dexter, 1950). Women made up a much larger proportion of the industrial work force in the United States and Canada than they did in Britain, largely because men were not forcibly thrown off the land as they were in Britain. Only after several depressions in the United States and the end of the availability of free land for new settlers in Canada, around the mid-nineteenth century, did a male proletariat form in both places. This development, coupled with immigration which made available cheap male labour, led to a decrease in the proportion of the industrial labour force that was female. Industrialization proceeded quickly after the mid-nineteenth century, in the United States and what was to be Canada.

With the upheaval of industrialization, many formerly artisanal families were proletarianized, while other, fewer families became petty bourgeois or professional. The work women did in their households no doubt varied, and depended upon their family's class position and its resources. For example, after the electric streetcar allowed middle-class families to move out from the center city, there may have followed a trend towards less dependence on purchased food stuffs and the household production of some of the raw

materials of family meals. According to Smuts (1959, 12),

Though only a few miles from the center of the greatest metropolis in the land, Queens County and much of Brooklyn were still semirural in 1890, and many families were as dependent on small-scale agriculture as on the industrial or commercial employment of the men of the family. North of what is now the midtown area, Manhattan itself was more bucolic than urban, and pigs and goats were often seen along the East River as far south as Forty-second Street. At a time when men worked ten or twelve hours a day, six days a week, much of the care of urban livestock and gardens inevitably fell to women - quite apart from the fact that such tasks were theirs by tradition.

Whether it was middle-class households, with a backyard, or the more crowded working-class households, which kept chickens and a garden, we can be sure that throughout the nineteenth century, for all urban households, "most processed foods came into the urban home in their natural, unprocessed, uncanned, unpackaged state. Perhaps the majority of wives undertook a strenuous annual bout of preserving, pickling, canning, and jelly-making, and most baking was done in the family kitchen" (Smuts, 1959, 12). Moreover, "no respectable home in 1890 was without a well-used sewing machine... Most men's clothing was bought, but most of the clothing of women and children was still made at home." (Smuts, 1959, 12-13).

In summary, then, although clothing and (partially processed) food were both available in North America by the turn of the century, rural household workers produced and prepared their families' food, made their clothes, and manufactured other things of daily necessity. Urban housewives also made substantial material contributions to family maintenance, and probably more so the better their household facilities. Consequently, although most basic subsistence goods were produced commercially, their household production continued to be typical through the last decade of the nineteenth century.

With respect to child rearing, we have already indicated that with crude household technology and endless hours of necessary household chores, women spent little time attending exclusively to the needs of their children. Moreover, aside from concern about meeting material needs and instilling moral principles, adults did not perceive children to have special requirements. However, for most adult occupations - for men and women - necessary skills and knowledge could be passed down from father to son and mother to daughter. Consequently, the reproduction of labour power on a generational basis took place in the normal course of daily living, as children and young adults

assisted their parents in their work.

Only the children of the wealthy were assured of a formal education outside the home, before the nineteenth century. Any formal education other children may have received came in schools established through the philanthropic efforts of community members, or as part of an apprenticeship to another family (Philips, 1957). Furthermore, the education upper-class children received, in the expensive Latin grammar schools or private schools they attended, was largely devoid of practical value (Butts and Cremin, 1953, Phillips, 1957).

There developed in the late eighteenth century, with the rising merchant class, the beginnings of schools ("academies") that taught utilitarian subjects (Butts and Cremin, 1953). With industrialization, the needs of the economy for labour meant that in the early nineteenth century, in both Canada and the U.S., the rising bourgeoisie came to believe that the "public school would have to undertake certain important social tasks that could no longer be haphazardly entrusted to the family, the church, or even simple participation in the life of the community" (Butts and Cremin, 1953, 194). Thus, in Canada by about 1840 philanthropic attempts to provide schools had ended. Community

schools, open to all children and supported by government grants, began to supplant other types of schools. By the beginning of the twentieth century, in all the provinces of Canada, local governments supported, through taxes, both elementary and secondary public schools. These were cheap, if not everywhere free, and often (in the case of elementary schools) compulsory. In the United States, government assumption of education generally occurred earlier than in Canada. By 1918, attendance in elementary school was compulsory across the United States, and over 87% of high schools were under public control (Butts and Cremin, 1957).

In Canada, it is estimated that an average of about five months were spent altogether in school by children growing up around 1830 (including those not attending school), about 10 months in 1850, about 30 months in 1870, and about 55 by 1910 (Phillips, 1957, 186). Gains in average years of education per person, up to 1870, occurred because increasingly higher percentages of children attended school; gains after then were the result of longer school years (i.e., they increased from about six months to over nine months). In the United States, 57% of children 7 to 13 years of age attended school in 1870, and over 75% of children

this age did so by 1918. The average number of days of attendance was less than 45 in 1870, and over 90 in 1918 (Butts and Cremin, 1957, 408). So, by the early twentieth century, the education of children in North America was the responsibility not only of the family but also of the state.

Discussing historical changes in child rearing raises the theoretical question of the importance of the reproduction of labour power (on a generational as well as a daily basis) as the product of domestic labour that links it to work performed in the sphere of capitalist commodity production. Let us now discuss the production and reproduction of this special commodity, which is of particular relevance to women's work in the home (whether or not it does indeed provide the key to understanding the relationship between the household and "the economy"). Before we can understand the movement of married women into wage work, we must discuss the twentieth-century shifts in the location of work essential to the reproduction of daily life, including the reproduction of labour power - shifts among the household, "the economy," and the state. (These twentieth-century transfers in the location of work will be discussed in chapter 2.) And before we can do that, we must have a clear understanding of the work

labour power's production and reproduction involves.

We have so far argued that before the need for a large industrial labour force, indeed before the dominance of labour in the commodity form, the family's daily provision of its means of subsistence was sufficient not only to regenerate the working capacity of its adult workers but also to produce the next generation of workers. Housewives on family farms and housewives living in towns spent little additional time rearing their children. Nevertheless, they and their husbands provided their children with training sufficient for adulthood and adult work. With industrialization, parents were no longer able to train their children - at least their sons - for adult work roles (Sennett, 1970). Formal education, provided by the state, became essential.

The Production of Labour Power

Labour power is the key commodity upon which capitalist production depends, since labour is the creator of value. Consequently, it is somewhat ironic that the various ways in which it is produced, the material conditions of its production, the social relations of its production, and the amount of control capital is able to exert over its production have

scarcely been discussed in any systematic way. Because women's chief productive role, their responsibility in the household, is to ensure the production and reproduction of labour power on a daily and a generational basis, we must turn to a discussion of changes over time in its production before we can understand the involvement of married women in work outside the home - both the increased availability of married women for wage work, and the availability of jobs for them.

Three labour processes contribute to the production of labour power: the production of subsistence goods in commodity form, education and other essential services, and domestic labour. Wage labour that produces subsistence goods in the form of commodities is most characteristic of capitalism, since the dispossession of workers from their means of production, the historic requisite of capitalist production, meant at the same time the commoditization of the means of subsistence. The work that perhaps most visibly contributes to the production of labour power is that done by public service workers, especially teachers, who develop and maintain the skills of the worker (or future worker) in exchange for a wage. And perhaps most invisible is the work done in

the household, where basic biological and psychological needs are met daily.

The major part of the value of labour power, and thus much of the cost that must be covered by the wage - in fact, we would argue, all of the cost that labour pays directly - is determined by the socially necessary labour inputs to subsistence commodities and services sold on the market for private gain (i.e., as commodities). We have discussed the downward (market) pressures on labour inputs in commodity-producing sectors. Resulting increases in productivity have contributed to a lowering of the value of labour power over time. We should also point out that "subsistence" is socially defined: the level of living that establishes the standard, the amount and quality of commodities seen as essential, changes over time. For much of chapter 2, we shall describe the way in which the market needs of capital have served to increase the commodities deemed necessary for the production and reproduction of labour power. This trend has served to raise the value of labour power.

The particular capabilities and skills (to the extent that these are not natural products), and part of the value, of labour power depends on the labour inputs of education workers, and other social service

workers, paid by the state. Just as the wage that goes into the worker's pocket pays for the commodities he needs for his and his family's daily subsistence, the part of the wage that goes for taxes (and is paid in the name of labour and of capital) pays for social-service inputs to the production of labour power. Thus, abstractly, equivalence is maintained between the value of labour power and the value labour creates during necessary labour time: the value embodied in labour power, which represents a cost to capital, is (for all labour) equal to the value produced by labour and represented in the wage and taxes.

Teachers thus help produce the commodity labour power, but we would argue that the laws that govern forms of commodity production do not operate in this labour process. That is, the law of value, which typically forces individual producers to lower their labour time since it is compared with that socially necessary when its product reaches the market, does not operate on public service workers. They do not produce a service that is individually packaged and sold to a customer. And while they do produce a commodity that is sold on the market, namely their students' labour power, they have no relationship with the market (via

their product) when they are involved in their work. Furthermore, unlike in sectors of commodity production, which interact directly with the market, the product of education belongs not to the education workers, or to the owner of their means of production (i.e., the state), but to the individual who walks away at the end of the production process. He or she sells this commodity, not anyone involved in the social service sector. Consequently, because no commodity is produced directly for the market, productivity increases in education (and other social services) are neither crucial nor frequent. Downward pressures on the time inputs of education workers to labour power's reproduction have not, therefore, operated over time. Indeed, the opposite pressure has asserted itself. The hours and years defined as necessary to educate the next generation have increased dramatically in the last century - contributing to a higher value of labour power.

To the extent that there are pressures to increase efficiency, or productivity, they arise because education (and other social services) is a cost to capital and to labour. The larger the wage the smaller the amount of surplus value, and the larger the portion of surplus value that is redistributed as (tax) payment

to the state the smaller the portion of surplus value capital can appropriate. Thus, pressures to increase efficiency in social services can originate both from labour and from capital. At the same time, however, formal education serves needs of capital besides those involving the reproduction of labour power. For example, it keeps the reserve army of the young and unemployed busy. Therefore, the costs of education may be absorbed without much pressure for increased efficiency or productivity.*

Perhaps it is because productivity increases are extremely difficult to accomplish in social services that services like education remain, in most cases, the province of the state. It is also why, in times of economic slowdown, pressures by capital for state cutbacks on such services result not in greater worker productivity, per unit of time, but simply less service.

The household is the final sphere in which the production of labour power occurs. The product of a particular historical development, the privatized

 *Other, less functional, services may receive larger cutbacks in financial support during economic slowdowns: hospitals and mental health facilities, for example, may be more pressured than schools.

household is especially suited to capitalist production. In pre-capitalist times, possession of the means of production, whether those involved individual plots of land or rights to the commons for peasants, or tools and skills in the case of town artisans, resulted in the past in privatized production (i.e., little division of labour among workers, and production organized uncollectively) in the context of a cooperative community life and a minimal degree of nuclear, private family life (Aries, 1962, Warner, 1968). Perhaps the need to exert some sort of control over the conditions surrounding the immediate production process - the need for collective labour at a level higher than the individual plot or workshop - meant a very fluid boundary between household and community. Capitalism, in leaving the worker with his or her capacity for work as the sole saleable possession, by creating a market for this labour power that sets workers in competition with each other, by requiring de jure freedom (rather than slavery) on the part of each worker as the basis of the contract made with capital, and by fostering the payment of an individual wage, promotes the separation of individual households from each other and the progressive privatization of household work.

The household is the sphere in which rests the final responsibility for both reproducing labour power on a daily basis, that is, maintaining the working capacities of adult workers, and producing labour power in the form of the next generation. In fulfilling these functions the household now relies upon means of production that are almost exclusively commoditized. Moreover, the product of its efforts, family subsistence, has also been subject to market forces, especially subtle forces that over time have served to redefine the content of subsistence. We shall argue (in chapter 3) that domestic labour cannot be seen as a form of commodity production, even though it does contribute to the reproduction of labour power, and that the law of value does not provide the organic link between household and "economy." The effects of capitalist production, and the needs of the market, are experienced in the household in other ways, which will be described throughout this dissertation.

CHAPTER 2

THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF WORK AMONG THE HOUSEHOLD, "THE ECONOMY" AND THE STATE

So far, we have located "the economy", the state, and the household as the sectors in which work contributing to the production of labour power - or, more directly, to the production of daily life - occurs. Through the twentieth century, those tasks and functions essential to the production and reproduction of labour power have shifted among these sectors. Since the changing location of this essential work assumes too complex a pattern to briefly summarize, we shall examine each task in turn, asking what sector has been responsible for its performance. Our purpose is, of course, to better understand the changing organization and content of household work and also changes in capital's (and the state's) needs for labour.

This essential work comprises the following: (1) the provision of shelter, involving heat, light, water, waste removal and the basic facilities needed for

carrying out other essential household tasks; (2) the preparation of meals, involving the provision of raw food stuffs and the processing of them; (3) the manufacture and maintenance of clothing, also involving the provision of raw materials and their intermediate transformation into yarn, thread, and fabrics; (4) the bearing of children; (5) the rearing and education of children; (6) care of the sick; (7) care of the aged; and (8) rest, relaxation, recreation and the emotional maintenance of all household members (i.e., everything from fulfilling the biological need for periodic rest to the social need for human relationships).

In discussing changes in household work which contributes to the reproduction of daily life, and throughout this dissertation, we shall assume that there are distinctions among households, and explicitly make a distinction between households we refer to as "working class" and those we call "middle class." Since relationship to the means of production determines class position and all of the households we are discussing are without the means of production of subsistence, we are in fact discussing working-class households. Moreover, the class position of the housewives, as workers, in these households is proletarian, given their relationship to their basic

mean of production, the wage - especially their husbands' wage since men's wages are the only ones likely to cover the expenses of normal family subsistence.*

Just as there are differences among wage workers due to variations in control over working conditions, in job security, and in wage levels, there are differences among households (corresponding to some extent to these varying conditions of wage earning) which involve variations in the relationship of the domestic labourer to her means of production and in the extent to which she has the resources to accomplish what is expected of her. These differences will be referred to as class differences throughout this dissertation, although it could be argued that a more precise labelling would reduce them to income differences.

Those households we refer to here as "working class" are essentially characterized by a scarcity of income. The scarcity represents itself for most of the period we are discussing as lack of possession of the

*The wage is, of course, essential for access to the nondurable means of household production which must be purchased continually. Wally Seccombe (1980) first pointed out that the wage is one of the means of household production.

durable means of domestic production. That is, women we refer to as working class do not own washing and drying machines and, especially as one moves back in time, other basic household facilities.

Because we are primarily distinguishing between households of different income, in the same way that there is no clear boundary between households that are low-income and those that are higher-income, there is no strict, scientific distinction meant in our usage of the terms "working class" and "middle class." Therefore, the explanations offered to fit these different material situations will fit only more or less well for different households, just as different households fit the working class-middle class categories more or less well. Moreover, since we assume a key element in these domestic situations to be the presence or absence of household appliances (i.e., durable means of production), there has clearly been a shift over time for the majority of households from some of the material circumstances described loosely as working class to some of those referred to as middle class. This trend should not be taken to mean a convergence of North American households towards the middle class condition, for we shall see below that there has been no diminution over time in the

proportion of households with a scarcity of income.

Sociologists writing about the family in the 1920s and 1930s (Groves, 1926, Ogburn, 1933) spoke, with an element of alarm, about the fact that the family (i.e., the household) had lost most of its productive functions (and was thus at the mercy of larger social forces). Their awareness of a long-term trend - namely, the transfer of many productive functions from the household to "the economy" - was probably due to two key factors. First, there was by then a large urban working class (partly a result of huge waves of immigration), which clearly was totally dependent upon commercial means of subsistence. By 1920, over half of the United States population was urban. (See table 5.) In fact, 36% of Americans were living in cities of 25,000 people or more. In Canada, in 1921 almost half of the population was urban, although there were considerable regional differences. (See table 6.) Over half of the populations of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia were urban by the beginning of the 1920s, but in the Maritimes 44% and in the Prairies only 32.4% of the people lived in urban centres.*

 *Urban concentration has increased rapidly in Canada, since then: in 1961, 40.5% of the Canadian population lived in cities with populations above 250,000 while

Second, the (then) recent availability to the mass market of new household technology, appliances, and commercial food products represented the potential for greatly reducing the drudgery and the necessary work involved in maintaining a household. It thus appeared to some (bourgeois) North Americans that women stood the danger of becoming idle, after losing the skills and knowledge requisite for useful home production. Let us examine in detail the location of work involved in fulfilling each of the tasks listed above as essential to human existence, beginning with procuring the basic elements of shelter - heat, light, and clean water.

Shelter

Beginning in about 1840, when clean water was made available at street hydrants on every city block in Philadelphia, American and Canadian city governments gradually assumed the responsibility for servicing each household, with respect to the distribution of clean water, the sanitary removal of waste, the maintenance of roads, and the provision of cheap energy. The state

only 20.75% of Americans lived in metropolises of this size as of 1970 (Fox, 1976).

was forced into this endeavour: it has been estimated that 100,000 people died because of poor drainage in 1890 alone, in the United States (cited in Campbell et al., 1975). That is, it became clear that private households could not be left alone - as they had been - to provide basic necessities for their members; there were problems generated by the dense settlement industrial production required which could only be solved by the state.

In the typical nineteenth-century city the air was polluted, garbage was dumped into the streets, and almost all households used outdoor privies.* In 1860, in New York City, for example, there was an outdoor privy in "every backyard" (cited in Campbell et al., 1975). Wood was the source of heat until about the 1860s when coal became more popular; candles, kerosene, and whale oil lamps provided lighting. Women (and their children) carried water in and out of the house when it was needed, and heated it bucket by bucket; they carried fuel for heating daily from its storage place to the stove (and into each room that was

*Much of the material in this paragraph and the next, and the notion that the state took over distribution of water and energy from women, came from an unpublished paper by Paul Campbell, Margaret Luxton, and Kathryn Petersen (1975).

to be heated), built the fires necessary for both heating and cooking, kept them stoked, and periodically cleaned up the dirt they generated; and they had to periodically clean and refuel their lamps.

By the First World War, most cities in North America had laid out the infrastructure by which water could be distributed, sewage removed and energy made available to each household. Thus, the backbreaking jobs of the distribution of water and energy were lifted from the shoulders of housewives. Hot and cold running water, central heating, and a kitchen stove (used only for cooking) became possibilities. Yet, many housewives living in cities did not receive the benefits of these modern technologies until the third and even the fourth decades of the twentieth century. (Rural women, of course, do not necessarily have them today.)

Studies of working-class households, in the first three decades of the twentieth century, give us an indication of the extent to which women's household work was lightened by the presence of the new technology. The samples in these studies were unfortunately chosen haphazardly, so inferences about the population are risky. Their consideration, therefore, provides only a very crude notion of the

availability of modern household technology in working-class homes.

In a 1909 sample of New York City households whose incomes were probably slightly higher than average for the working class, considerably fewer than half had indoor toilets, fully 36% gathered heating fuel from whatever could be found on the streets, and none had electric lighting (Chapin, 1909). A study of workers' households in a steel mill town in Pennsylvania in 1910 indicated that 52% were without running water and only 17% had an inside toilet; moreover, the water was, for the most part, not safe to drink and sewage link-up did not necessarily entail a means of flushing the waste (Byington, 1910). After World War I, a study of unskilled- and skilled-workers' households in Philadelphia, which were probably wealthier than average, showed that 93% had running water in the kitchen and 74% had it in the bathroom (though only 10% had it in both places); 86% had indoor toilets; 66% heated with furnaces rather than stoves; 94% used gas for cooking; but only 1% had electric lighting (Beyer, 1919). Another study in Philadelphia, in 1925, of poorer working-class households, found 86% with inside running water and about a third with indoor toilets (Hughes, 1925). The Lynds' early 1920s study of

households in all income groups in Muncie, Indiana, found that while 99% of homes had electricity, and many had electric appliances, about 25% lacked indoor running water and 33% were without a sewer connection. Finally, a 1927 study of unskilled- and skilled-workers' households in Chicago, which were probably larger and higher-income than the average working-class household, found 88% with inside toilets and 71% using electric lighting, but fully 87% using stoves for heating (Houghteling, 1927).

There were no comparable studies of Canadian households, but the 1931 Census included a random sample of urban "workingmen's homes" which showed that a large majority (i.e., over 75%) had kitchen sinks, inside flush toilets, running water, bathtubs and electric lighting (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1942). By 1941, 96.5% of urban dwelling units had running water, 87% had inside flush toilets, and 96% had electric lighting; yet only 61% had gas or electric cooking facilities (i.e., 39% used a wood or coal stove for cooking) and only 56% had furnace heating (i.e., central heating). (See table 7.)

Running water and sewage removal, in each household, eliminated hard manual labour, and made clean, pleasant living possible for the first time in

cities. Such facilities were available to bourgeois households by the turn of the century, and, in most cities, middle-class households before World War I, but probably unlikely for working-class households until after the War. Through the 1920s these facilities were acquired by many working-class households, until by 1940 in both countries virtually all urban households had running water and sewage removal.

After about 1910, urban families that could afford it probably had electricity in their homes. But it was not for at least another decade (i.e., the 1930s) that working-class households typically had electricity. By 1941, in Canada and the United States, about 96% of urban households had electric lighting and in 1950 about 99% had electricity. (See table 7.) A 1920s study of housework, which compared urban and rural households that differed with respect to indoor water and electricity, found significant reductions in the time spent on meals, cleaning, and washing because of these technologies (Wilson, 1929). Ironically, however, because electricity is a cheap energy source, we shall see that its long-term effect has been the retention of many tasks within the household.

In 1910, an advertisement for radiators and central heating, in Ladies Home Journal, stated that,

"too many housekeepers are chained to brooms, dustpans, and back-breaking coal hods because of the relentless slavery to stoves." Unfortunately, through the first four decades of the twentieth century, in the United States and in Canada, almost half of urban households, and probably all working-class households, had some form of stove heating. (See table 7.) That is, for urban working-class women, the labour inputs required for heating the house continued at least up to World War II. In contrast, many bourgeois households had central heating even in the nineteenth century. In the United States and Canada, as of 1950, almost 40% of urban households still were without central heating. (See table 7.)

Though stoves continued to be the means of heating working-class households beyond 1940, a substantial number of these households had probably acquired gas or electric cooking ranges by the 1940s. By then, middle-class households no doubt had them. Nevertheless, many working-class women were using wood or coal in their kitchens for cooking, as of 1941 in urban Canada, if not in the United States: 28% of them had wood-burning stoves and 9% had coal-burning stoves. (See table 7.) Even in 1950, 23% of Canadian women in urban areas were still stoking wood- or coal-burning

stoves in order to cook and bake.

Besides cooking ranges, the availability of gas and then electricity made centrally-heated hot water possible. Its acquisition was a labour saver of comparable importance to central heating. In 1950, however, still almost 25% of Canadian households and almost 15% of American households were without hot running water - although they apparently acquired it soon thereafter. (See table 7.)

Because the state had assumed the provision of some of these basic means of household production, which formerly had involved the individual work of a member of each household, it became possible for middle-class women to do their household chores alone - at a time when servants, sisters, and daughters were decreasingly available to help with housework. Even the invention of the telephone, and its availability in most places after about 1910, saved labour because shopping over the phone became a possibility. As for working-class housewives, the drudgery associated with housework no doubt decreased, especially as they acquired running water and electricity. However, the products of their household efforts depended on yet other factors, like the size and internal and external density of their homes.

At the turn of the century, urban housing ranged from tenements in the eastern cities, housing several families in apartments of three or four rooms (without running water or an inside toilet) and two-room shanties in cities of the Midwest, to four- or five-room attached houses for the families of skilled workers, and larger single-family houses with bedrooms for each family member (and indoor plumbing and bathrooms) to suit the needs of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. Robert Chapin (1909, 274) described the apartment typical for a working-class family in New York as follows:

If there are three rooms, the so-called parlor is a combined parlor, sitting room and bedroom. As a rule, it contains a table, a bed and a few chairs... In the corner there is a sewing machine... In some few instances the floor is covered with a cheap carpet. The second room, which is a combination dining room and kitchen, has a table covered with oil-cloth, a few chairs, a stove, and kitchen utensils which hang on the walls, owing to the lack of a cupboard. Frequently an ice-box is found. The third room, which is a bedroom, contains an iron folding bed, chair and trunk, clothes hanging on the wall; seldom is there a bureau. The washing of the family is done at the sink in the kitchen, there being no wash-stands or wash-bowls in the bedrooms.

Early in the century, urban working-class households were typically overcrowded. A 1904 study of Cincinnati tenement households showed 33% with only

one sleeping room and 45% with three or more people per bedroom (Streightoff, 1911). In Chapin's sample in New York City in 1909, 50% of working-class households had over one-and-a-half people per room (and the percentage of overcrowded homes increased when households had lodgers). Crowded quarters no doubt prohibited restful home life as we know it today. But they also probably increased the woman's workload considerably: it would have been her responsibility to maintain a semblance of order amid what must have been considerable chaos. Moreover, facilities for providing absolute essentials like meals were no doubt dramatically inadequate in such overcrowded households.

The first decade of the twentieth century was probably the worst with respect to crowded housing, and even with respect to high external density. Soon after, the construction and installation of electric streetcars and the availability of private cars moved families out from the tightly-packed city centres. The effect of this dispersal was a loosening up of housing and an increased availability of formerly middle-class housing for working-class households, although this trend was tempered by the influx of immigrants to the cities. In Houghteling's 1927 sample of workers (whose income was probably above average), only 33% of

households had at least one room per person and only 52% had no more than one person per bed (or two per doublebed). In Canada, in 1931, the percentage of people, of all income groups, living with fewer than one room per person was 40.5% in Montreal, 35.7% in Winnipeg, and 24% in Toronto (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1942, 49). Crowding decreased throughout the twentieth century, however, in both Canada and the United States: for example, rooms per person in Canada in 1901 were 1.16 and in 1951 1.42 (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1942, 454, 1953, 52-1).

In terms of shelter and basic household means of production, we have seen that by the beginning of the 1940s middle-class urban household workers had hot and cold running water, sewage removal, and electric energy; most had central heating and kitchen stoves fueled by gas or electricity. However, aside from the distribution of water, and energy for heat, light, and cooking, household chores were still largely performed manually, in many middle-class households - especially in Canadian households. However, some middle-class women, and no doubt all bourgeois women, owned refrigerators, vacuums and washing machines. By the Second World War, working-class urban households also had running water, though not necessarily hot water,

sewage removal, and electricity. However, they were probably without central heating and, especially in Canada, tended to be without easy-to-use gas or electric cooking stoves. Electric-powered appliances, for working-class households, were probably out of the question before World War II.

By the 1920s, modern electrical appliances were available to the mass market; and, after 1930, easy-to-care-for household materials were increasingly in evidence. A content analysis of advertisements in Ladies Home Journal, from 1890 to 1970, provides evidence of the timing of improvements in household technology. (See table 8; see appendix A for an explanation of methodology.)

The time necessary for general household cleaning decreased in the twentieth century, not only because of the availability of indoor hot and cold running water and clean fuel, but also because floor coverings such as linoleum became available. Ladies Home Journal advertisements through 1920 are replete with cleaning and finishing compounds for wood floors, which were as difficult to maintain as they were common. Linoleum was available by 1930, and was no doubt quickly adopted for covering kitchen and bathroom floors at least. Moreover, electric vacuums were on the market by 1910,

to ease the cleaning of rugs, upholstery, and drapery. Those wood floors not replaced by linoleum could be covered with carpets which could be cleaned daily. Moreover, the fabrics used in making carpets and upholstery became easier to care for, with the improvement of synthetic materials which took place especially after 1940.

Electric refrigerators were available by 1920. Previously, many women used ice boxes, which kept food chilled for a short period, but created a mess and required periodic attention (e.g., resupplying the ice). Yet, the chief reduction in work wrought by the introduction of electrical refrigeration was probably that involved in shopping for food: daily shopping was no longer necessary.

With respect to food preparation, even in the best kitchens the work took place in a highly inefficient work space, until 1930s kitchen plans featured continuous work surfaces (Gideon, 1948). Actually, efficiently-designed kitchens were not really in evidence until 1950. Through the 1920s, according to Ladies Home Journal advertisements, tables and discrete kitchen cabinets, like those used in the nineteenth century and earlier, were the most modern kitchen surfaces. Cleaning up after meals was eased early in

the twentieth century when pots and pans and kitchen utensils of various kinds began being made of the same substance (e.g., stainless steel) - ending the need for different cleaning compounds and cleaning rituals for different things. Yet, it was not until 1950 that there is evidence of dishwashers which not only perform all the steps involved in washing dishes, but also automatically move from one step to another.

For the washing of clothes, electric wringer washing machines were available as early as 1910, as were electric irons and ironing machines. Wringer washers eased the drudgery of the actual washing, but left the need to manually perform many of the steps involved in cleaning clothes. Again, apparently not until around 1950 were electric washing machines that automatically execute the entire sequence of operations available.

Ownership of electrical appliances, of course, lagged behind their introduction on the market. A random sample of the American population, carried out in 1931 by the National Electric Light Association (cited in Reid, 1934) revealed that 21.5% of households had electric vacuums, 8.6% had refrigerators, 16.5% had washing machines, 3.2% had electric cooking ranges, and 1.9% had ironing machines (although more, no doubt, had

irons). The cost of refrigerators was cut in half between 1926 and 1935 because of increases in the productivity of their manufacture, so annual demand rose from 200,000 to 1.5 million; the same occurred for washing machines and demand for them rose from 900,000 to 1.4 million in the same period (Gideon, 1948).

In the 1930s and especially the 1940s, apparently many American middle-class households acquired mechanical refrigeration. In Canada, the 1940s and especially the 1950s were the decades when middle-class households seem to have acquired this improvement in the means of household production. By 1960, in both Canada and the United States, middle-class urban households apparently were equipped with mechanical refrigeration.

Since only 56% of American households had electrical refrigeration in 1940 but fully 86% had this facility in 1950, we can probably safely conclude that many working-class households acquired this improvement in the late 1940s. (See table 7.) However, besides electric vacuum cleaners, this was probably the only domestic appliance American working-class households could afford through the 1950s and 1960s. Data are scarce, so we cannot support our guess other than by

citing the fact that even in 1970 most American working-class households did not have automatic washing machines. (See table 7.) In Canada, since only 31% of urban households in 1941 and 58.8% in 1951 had electric refrigeration, but 96% had it in 1961, apparently until the 1950s working-class households were unlikely to have electrical refrigeration. It was acquired by most in that decade. Vacuums were probably also acquired in that decade and the next, but washing machines are probably not present in most Canadian working-class households even as of the 1970s. (See table 7.)

Meanwhile, the middle-class household became, by the 1960s, a well-cultivated market for new "household products." During the decade of the 1950s, new household means of production such as automatic dishwashers, automatic washing machines, and large freezer units became available. But also in the 1950s and especially in the 1960s, smaller products proliferated with almost unbelievable speed. A myriad of small hand tools and electrical appliances (e.g., beaters, broilers, and coffee makers) appeared on the market in the 1950s, and over the years more and more items have been developed and marketed (e.g., blenders, and now food choppers and processors).

Meals

If the private household was a profitable market for appliances, for a product as basic as food, huge profits were even more assured. At the beginning of the twentieth century, urban households bought most of their food in an unprocessed state from small local merchants. There were few nationally available products and few large food companies, although some processed foods (e.g., cereals, soups) were available across the country, in the United States at least. Shopping was either a daily chore, or meals were extremely simple and quite unnourishing - or both.

In the next several decades, the commercial canning of fruits, vegetables and meat was perfected, and some of the food giants of today began business. Canned goods (of high quality) meant meal preparation became less time consuming for all women, especially in the context of improvements in household facilities. The availability of canned foods also allowed for greater variety in meals, year round.

However, some of the long-term results of the campaign to sell canned food were less positive. Knowledge about food preparation and even the preparation of meals became the property of "experts" (i.e., the food companies, mostly) and, at the same

time, women came to feel mounting pressures to present their families with higher-quality meals, especially ones of greater variety. For, although the preparation of food was taken over from the household by private industry earlier in the century, the preparation of meals remained the housewife's responsibility. It was not until the 1960s that commercial enterprises could produce meals at a price that made buying dinner out a possibility for most families, and not until the 1970s that completely prepared (frozen) meals were available, in any variety, in the stores. Let us examine these stages in the transfer of food and meal preparation out of the home.

In the early decades of the century, growing vegetables and fruit and raising poultry were considered preferable to buying commercial goods, especially canned goods. This predominant sentiment was no doubt due to the preponderance of family farms and rural living. But there is evidence (some of which we discussed above) that urban housewives who had the necessary space kept poultry, and even larger animals, and had gardens. Urban household workers typically canned, preserved, and pickled - even if they had to purchase the raw materials. Of course, such activities required some basic resources - like space, time, and

kitchen facilities - and so middle-class housewives were more likely to undertake them than working-class housewives.

Home-processed food was preferred to that commercially-processed, into the 1920s. An editorial in the fall, 1886 issue of Ladies Home Journal deplored the adulteration and general inferiority of canned foods and urged housewives to continue to do the work of food processing. But apparently they needed little prompting: even in the early 1920s, the Lynds (1929) reported a clear preference for homemade food of all kinds over commercial substitutes. The Lynds also noted that before the 1920s bakery bread was seen as a working-class food. They estimated that only 25% of the bread eaten by Muncie families in 1890 was commercially made, although by the early 1920s 55.7% of bread was commercially produced.

Despite the value placed on "homemade," working-class households in cities bought their food in an almost finished state early in the century, so the only production that occurred in their households was that of meals. Even bread was purchased ready-made. In More's (1907) study of working-class households in New York City, twelve case studies were presented. In every one, there were no purchases of flour;

ready-made bread was relied upon in all cases. After a similar study of working-class households, Chapin (1909, 132) concluded that, "it is sufficient in a word to say that New York families such as those under consideration universally buy bread." Byington's (1910) study of a Pennsylvania mill town revealed a similar pattern. (So, we can assume that the purchase of bread was not a peculiarity of working-class families living in New York City.)

Bread was, in fact, a major staple in working-class diets, along with meat (in small amounts), potatoes, milk, butter, and tea (More, 1907). Limited financial resources and the narrow range of commercial goods dictated a uniformity in meals from one day to the next. For the same reasons, meals were very simple. Consequently, and ironic though it may be, working-class women must have spent less time and relatively more money in meal preparation than middle-class women. But the quality of their families' nourishment was no doubt considerably poorer than that middle-class families enjoyed, as was evidenced by the significant percentages of children suffering from marasmus (i.e., a form of malnutrition) in the Byington (1910) sample. (Similarly, a dietician's study of the diets reported in Chapin's (1909) sample of

working-class households concluded that only 63% of them were sufficiently nourished.)

Lack of household facilities was clearly responsible for the costliness and dullness of working-class meals. When even a small plot of land was available outside the house, vegetable gardens were cultivated and hens kept. In the Pennsylvania mill town studied by Byington (1910), homes that had backyards or sideyards, however scrappy, had vegetable gardens. And they clearly provided the possibility of reducing food costs considerably. Byington also reported that only housewives who could save up a sum of money were able to buy supplies for preserving and pickling, and purchase dry goods in bulk. It was generally the case that working-class households could only "buy their supplies from day to day in very small quantities, partly from the lack of facility for storing and keeping food, and partly from the lack of money enough at one time to enable them to buy any large amount" (Chapin, 1909, 132).

Time was the final resource essential for the provision of wholesome meals at a minimum of expense. Extra time was required of the housewife who wished to cultivate a vegetable garden, bake bread, or even shop judiciously. Even this resource was more likely to be

scarce in working-class households than in middle-class households, for these households were likely to be larger, and more likely to contain lodgers or boarders. And extra household members represented a drain on housewives' time.

In the 1920s and 1930s, middle-class housewives were the object of a concerted campaign aimed at persuading them to use commercially-processed food, especially canned food. We can follow the progress of this mass advertising drive, as well as the history of the availability of different products, in the advertisements and nonfiction articles in Ladies Home Journal. (This magazine, since the latter part of the nineteenth century, has been a key vehicle through which companies have made their appeal to the consumer. Even its nonfiction articles served to introduce housewives to the products of the big companies that emerged in the 1920s.)

In the late 1880s and early 1890s issues of Ladies Home Journal, there were no advertisements for food; there was, however, an editorial (which we mentioned above) against the use of canned goods. At the turn of the century, 10.5% of the advertisements were for food products, but "preserving powder," flour, lard, and baking powder - ingredients for home cooking, baking,

and canning - were a significant proportion of these advertisements. The only prepared foods that were advertized were cereals and soups. A decade later, the 12.8% of advertisements that were for food featured a range of canned goods, from fruits and vegetables to pork and beans. At the same time, however, there was an advertisement for vinegar "for pickling" and a feature article on growing vegetables. Interestingly, recipes were included in a few of the advertisements and nonfiction articles in the Ladies Home Journals of both 1900 and 1910, but these assumed considerable knowledge on the part of the housewife: they were not at all detailed.

By the early 1920s, "the big sell" on food aimed at housewives was apparent. In a sample of 1920 issues of Ladies Home Journal, over 25% of the advertisements were for food. Most of the canned goods we now take for granted were in evidence (e.g., catsup, mayonnaise, "spaghetti"). At the same time, there was evidence in these issues of the continuing practise of home preserving and pickling (e.g., advertisements for jar seals, preserving pans). Furthermore, it was apparent that middle-class housewives had to be convinced to buy canned goods. A 1920 issue, for example, featured an advertisement for canned goods in general, proclaiming

canning to be a "scientific breakthrough."

This "scientifically prepared" food was presented as the solution to the feeling of guilt that the ad men spent large sums of money inducing in housewives. Both 1920s and 1930s issues of Ladies Home Journal contained articles warning every housewife that her husband's capacity for work (i.e., his labour power) depended solely on the quality of the meals she prepared for him. As well, early 1930s issues carried the audacious message that the solvency of household finances depended on women's shopping and cooking skills. There followed recipes for cooking meals, with canned goods, at low cost.

Recipes, in fact, became very common in food advertisements: 20% of the advertisements for food in the sample of 1920 issues of Ladies Home Journal contained recipes. This was not an accidental accompaniment of the drive to sell canned food. First, the premise of the campaign's appeal, and an implicit message, was that housewives were not as knowledgeable as "the experts" about feeding a family. Recipes, which at this time began to get more detailed, relieved the domestic labourer of the need to think about meal preparation, or even to acquire knowledge about cooking from her mother. Second, recipes for dishes that

looked tastey obviously helped sell the product. This fact was, no doubt, the direct reason why advertisements for canned foods frequently included recipes. Meant not only to sell the product, but also to inflate peoples' standards about the variety of meals and complexity of dishes - and thus to sell a range of other products - the proliferation of recipes in mass-circulation periodicals is of considerable long-run significance to the work of the housewife.

Why was a "hard sell" necessary in order to get middle-class housewives to rely on canned goods? Since the responsibility of the household worker, the wife and mother, was to provide her family with the best sustenance and care possible, these women needed convincing (and rightly so, given the quality of canned food) to give up tasks, like home production of food, which for generations had contributed to the raising of healthy families. However, not only had these tasks which women traditionally performed been useful to the family. They also represented a craft that conferred considerable status on the producer, and left her with a genuine feeling of accomplishment.* So, the issue was not simply one of a conflict between women's work,

 *Witness to the considerable status (among women) that domestic skills can procure is provided by the popularity of cooking contests in state fairs.

and the incentive to reduce it, and the family's consumption, which would motivate a lengthening of the household worker's efforts. That conflict was salient, but so was the fact that the status of the woman as household worker depended upon the manifestation of useful skills - and reliance on commercial products meant an end to the traces of "craftswomanship" remaining in household work.

During the Depression of the 1930s, Ladies Home Journal advertisements on food continued much the same as those of the 1920s. Few new products were introduced, and the same guilt-inducing appeal was made. The Depression clearly presented an obstacle to commercial takeover of food production, since cash was scarce in many homes. Consequently, recipes for low-cost meals were the big selling feature. Fully 35% of the advertisements for food (in our sample) contained recipes. There was one rather significant change from earlier issues, apparent in 1935-39 issues: well over half (61%) of the nonfiction articles with instructions on the home production of useful things involved the production of meals, or food, unlike earlier issues in which home production of clothing and other lasting items were more important. (See table 9.)

This change in the content of nonfiction items is witness to two things. First, it indicates that Ladies Home Journal readers were addressed less and less as craftswomen, or skilled household producers of useful household goods, and more and more as unskilled housewives dependent on commercial products. Second, it was a response to the Depression and the fact that food not only represented a major part of household budgets, but also was the item most sensitive to the efforts of the household worker. It would have been, then, the household job most salient to the readers, and commercial substitutes for homemade goods the most difficult for Ladies Home Journal promoters to sell.

In fact, there is evidence that housewives reverted to home production of food during the Depression, as a way to minimize the impact of drops in real income. Milkman's (1976, 82) review of household studies carried out during the Depression led her to conclude that

Many women managed to approximate their families' prior standard of living despite lowered incomes by substituting their own labor for goods and services they had formerly purchased in the marketplace... Home canning was so widespread that glass jar sales were greater in 1931 than at any other point in the preceding eleven years. There was a corresponding drop in sales of canned goods, which had doubled in the decade from 1919-29.

Middle-class housewives apparently needed considerable convincing about the quality of canned goods and bakery bread, through the 1950s. They repeatedly received the message that they were doing a poor job of feeding their families unless they served interesting, nourishing, and continually varied meals - and to do so, they had to use the particular product in question. As well, however, a preoccupation with the need to save time characterized the ads of the 1940s and 1950s (when cake mixes and canned meals like "spaghetti" appeared).

Thus, the issue of women's household duties as work, and the incentive to reduce the time involved in their performance, was played up by the ad men. This emphasis reflected the fact that much of the traditional skill had been removed from household work, and because it remained a monotonous series of chores, the obvious desire on the part of the housewife was to reduce the time involved. Moreover, since married women increasingly had the option of working for wages, aids to reduce time were both desired and affordable.

By the late 1950s, most food production had been transferred from the home to the factory, for both middle-class and working-class urban families, although meal production remained in the household. The

transfer of the production of food from the household to the factory is documented in tables 10 and 11. Fabricant (1940), who studied factory output in the United States up to 1937, concluded that between 1899 and 1937 the increase in manufacturers' output of canned vegetables and fruit, concentrated milk, and bread and other bakery products grew even faster than the urban population. Several things are noteworthy in the data presented in table 10. First, the factory output of canned vegetables and fruits and canned milk increased over 1,000% between 1899 and 1947. As Fabricant (1940, 137) concluded, "much of the rise in the output of canned fruits and vegetables reflects a shift from home cooking and preserving to factory canning, although no statistical data concerning the change are available." Second, commercial bakery products increased considerably since the 1920s, while the production of wheat flour remained stable. In other words, wheat was increasingly being commercially converted into finished products. Finally, at the beginning of the Depression, the transfer of production to the factory was clearly slowed, but apparently the transfer continued even during the Depression years (like 1936, 1937, 1939).

In Canada as well, as can be seen in table 11, factory output of canned fruits and vegetables increased from 1929 to 1957 much faster than did the urbanization of the population: food production was clearly transferring from household to factory, at least in the case of middle-class households. In Canada as well as in the United States, the commercial production of bread rose more than the production of wheat.

This removal of food production from the household, which has been fairly gradual because of resistance on the part of the middle-class housewife, has probably served to encourage retention of meal production in the privatized household. So have modern kitchen appliances. It is not surprising, then, that the production of meals has not shifted out of the home until very recently.

That transfer is not yet accomplished, and there are barriers against it, but a sizeable enough proportion of all meals are now eaten outside the home, or at least prepared outside it, for the complete removal of meal preparation to seem a possibility. Ladies Home Journal issues in 1970 featured advertisements for frozen dinners, which were not in evidence in 1960 issues. However, restaurant meals are

a more likely substitute for home-produced meals. And two recent developments have made the commercial production of meals a likely investment for capital. First, technological changes, including the mass production of computers, have allowed the reduction of the gap between production time and labour time typical of meal preparation. That is, while the time it takes to produce a meal, including cooking time, typically extends beyond the amount of time the labourer is actually at work, when all of the steps are broken down, mechanized, and performed continuously, such a gap need not exist. And that gap is probably the main technical barrier to the socialization of meal production (Blumenfeld and Mann, 1980).^{*} Technological breakthroughs have apparently been substantial, in recent years, in the restaurant business. Productivity increased 3.1% between 1958 and 1976 in restaurants, while productivity increases for all of private industry were 2.2% during the same period (Carnes and Brand, 1977). Moreover, apparently half of all food served in restaurants is prepared off-premises, so economies of scale can be applied. Second, and more

^{*}If machinery sits idle, or workers must be idle, production is not as profitable as when they are both in continuous use.

important with respect to reducing the gap between production time and labour time, is the growing acceptance by the public of "fast foods," that is, easy-to-eat food that can be nibbled on any time of day and "on the run." With this mass production of a particular kind of food, investors in restaurants like McDonalds have wreaked tremendous profits. Table 12 shows the significant leap in restaurant sales between 1960 and 1970.

Despite the growing importance of restaurant meals, the home production of meals continues to be promoted by the advertisers. Their key approach now seems to be the stimulation of North American food tastes, and the attempt to raise expectations about what meals should consist of, especially in terms of variety. Advertisements for food in 1970 issues of Ladies Home Journal, half of which involved recipes, were exotic, with respect to North American taste. And the message that is conveyed is that women can produce gourmet meals, of restaurant quality, at home. But the makers of commercial food products are not the only capitalists interested in stimulating housewives to continue preparing meals. The kitchen itself, as we mentioned above, has become a huge source of profit. The kitchen gadgetry and furnishings on the market are

as seductive as they are infinite in variety. Perhaps the resistance of the household to eating meals outside the home was the stimulus for such a commercialization of the kitchen.

Clothing

Clothing a family involves both the manufacture of clothes and their maintenance. Well before the twentieth century, in North America, textile production had been assumed by factories, as had the fabrication of men's clothing. However, women's and children's clothes, in both middle-class and working-class households, were usually produced at home through the nineteenth century. During the twentieth century, as productivity in the garment industry increased, as sources of cheap labour (i.e., especially from overseas) continued to make investment in clothing production profitable, and as a nationwide network of marketing and distribution developed, the production of women's and children's clothing increasingly came to be performed outside the home. The maintenance of clothing, however, moved from the commercial sector back into the home. These trends affected working-class as well as middle-class households.

An examination of Ladies Home Journal issues over time indicates, to some extent, the amount of production of clothing that has occurred in middle-class homes. It also helps document the development of national networks for the marketing and distribution of clothes. That housewives typically made their own and their children's clothing early in the twentieth century is clear in those early advertisements and nonfiction articles in Ladies Home Journal. Until the 1930s, about 80% of nonfiction articles that involved instructions on the home production of things useful to the family were for clothing (and a few other durable items); in 1935-39 issues only 39% of nonfiction articles of this variety were for clothing, and in 1960 only 29% of them were. (See table 13.) Advertisements, especially in the late nineteenth century but also in the first few decades of the twentieth century, frequently featured sewing materials, from machines to yard goods, and thread to patterns. The ratio of these kinds of advertisements to those selling women's clothing decreased, especially at the turn of the century, but also, it seems, in the last two decades. (See table 14.)

Before about 1920, advertisements for women's clothing featured only wraps, furs, and undergarments -

no dresses. Advertised children's clothing excluded, for the most part, outer garments. Moreover, what was advertised was available only through mail-order houses. There were, no doubt, local department stores, but the efficient nationwide division of labour, whereby clothing production was concentrated in one area, and its products distributed across the country and retailed in local department stores, was not established before later in the century. So, goods available locally were quite limited and expensive and, even those that could be ordered through the mail, expensive relative to home production.

While evidence that middle-class housewives made their own and their children's clothing is only indirect, early studies of working-class families provide a clearer indication of the extent to which their clothing was homemade. Chapin (1909) discovered that working-class households spent more of their budgets on clothing for the man than for the woman and children combined, which indicates not only that the former took priority because of his importance as breadearner but also that men's clothing was purchased ready-made. Byington's (1910) study of (steel) mill workers' families revealed that even the poorest households had sewing machines - even when there was

little else in the way of furniture. In More's (1905) New York study, over half of the families in the case studies she reported had sewing machines. In these households, the women made and remade all of the children's clothing. In the remaining households, those whose members were apparently more shabbily dressed, commercially-made clothes were worn. One of the reasons why some of these working-class women did not make all of their own and their children's clothing was an absolute scarcity of time. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that working-class women often sewed their own and their children's clothing, and that they were thus able to clothe their families much better than could be done buying the ready-made clothing they could afford.

As the century progressed, ready-made clothing became much more accessible, both in terms of cost and in terms of availability in local stores. This fact alone would probably have been sufficient, in the context of the rising real income characteristic of the period after World War II, to guarantee a substantial amount of transfer of the production of clothing from home to factory. Thus, the "big sell" evident in the case of canned foods was not apparent in the case of clothing, at least not in the history of Ladies Home

Journal (although local newspapers may have been the key medium for clothing advertisements).

Nevertheless, "fashion" has been a persistent preoccupation in women's magazines like Ladies Home Journal throughout the twentieth century. In 1910 issues, articles on fashion featured instructions for remaking last year's wardrobe to meet this year's fashion standards. But, beginning in 1920s issues, there were advertisements for women's clothing stores that offered brochures on "this year's fashions." In "Middletown," the Lynds (1929) reported that although there had been no advertisements for readymade women's clothing in local papers at the turn of the century, in the early 1920s women's "fashions" available in local shops were much in evidence in local papers. The Lynds reported that people were becoming "clothes conscious" in the 1920s. Not only were women buying their own clothes, they were also more frequently buying children's clothing. According to the Lynds (1929), about half of boys' suits were handmade in 1890, but none were made at home in the 1920s. They found evidence also that piece goods were not selling well, in the 1920s.

Beauty and fashion were dominant themes in Ladies Home Journal advertisements and nonfiction items

especially from 1930 on. They inflated to ridiculous proportions in the 1940s and 1950s, when "catching a man" was presented as women's sole purpose in life. The fever such a message intended to cultivate would entail the purchase of the "latest" in clothing, in a perpetual quest for the dress that would bring beauty and a man.

Partly because advertisers have convinced the public that commercially-produced clothing is preferable to that homemade (and is now the standard against which homemade clothing is compared, instead of the opposite situation which held a generation ago), and partly because it has become less and less economical to make clothing instead of buying it, working-class and middle-class housewives typically buy their families' clothing. However, it is probably also true that the manufacture of clothing has been less thoroughly commercialized than the production of food (though not of meals). Through the 1950s and even, to a lesser extent, since then, Ladies Home Journal nonfiction articles have often featured patterns and instructions for making clothes.

While the production of clothing increasingly left the household as the twentieth century progressed, the maintenance of clothing returned to the household,

after a brief period of growing commercialization. Consequently, Vanek (1974) found that over the past 50 years, the time spent in the household cleaning and caring for clothing has hardly decreased. In other words, the availability of cheap energy in the home meant the persistence as privatized household work of a task that could have been socialized.

The drudgery involved in the home cleaning of clothes, until fairly recent decades, was considerable. Starches, bleaches, and rinses had to be mixed at home; different chemicals had to be used on different materials; and clothing often had to be boiled. Both knowledge and skill and considerable physical space - for a stove, tubs, wringer, and boiler - were necessary (Hartmann, 1974). Consequently, even working-class households in the early part of the century had some of their laundry done commercially. Chapin (1909) found that as household income in his working-class sample rose, so too did the percentage of households that sent their clothes out to be washed. But, fully 57% of households in his sample had part of their clothing cleaned commercially. A national sample of households in all income categories, studied in 1927, revealed that women in a majority of households did at least some of the family laundry, but many regularly sent out

things like collars and shirts. Moreover, the higher the income the more likely it was that family clothing was cleaned commercially (Hartmann, 1974). Similarly, the Lynds (1929) reported that more wash was done in commercial laundries in the early 1920s in Muncie than had been the case in the 1890s.

Through the 1920s, in the United States at least, the use of commercial laundry services increased, apparently reaching a high point in 1929 (Lynds, 1937). The Lynds (1937) estimated that commercial usage fell about 150% between 1929 and 1933, a low point for commercial cleaning. According to Hartmann (1974), it then increased during the War, but fell off again after 1948.

During the 1950s and 1960s, middle-class housewives, at least, acquired washing machines. All household workers benefitted from the introduction of clothing made of easy-care fabrics. Consequently, both working-class and middle-class women probably have relied less on commercial cleaning since World War II. Carnes (1978) reported that between 1958 and 1971, in the United States, output of the commercial laundry industry dropped at an annual rate of 1.6%, while per capita family expenditures for commercial laundry and cleaning declined by 50%. During the same period, the

output of the home laundry equipment industry in the United States increased almost 70%. And Canadian statistics on numbers of employees in commercial laundries show an absolute decline over the years, even though productivity increases have no doubt been relatively minimal. (See table 15.)

While the trend through the decades of the 1950s and 1960s was for middle-class housewives to acquire automatic washing and drying machines, which reduce the labour time necessary for the cleaning of clothes, few working-class housewives acquired these means of production. For many of them, the most they can now afford in the way of reduced drudgery is the weekly use of self-service commercial machines. Self-service laundromats have, in fact, proliferated in the last two decades. (See table 15 for Canadian figures.) They are probably used by a majority of working-class housewives. And these users of commercial self-service facilities are distinguished from domestic labourers with their own automatic facilities in two ways. First, the long-run cost of clothing maintenance is greater for families who cannot afford their own laundry appliances. Second, women with their own laundry appliances experience a significant saving in labour time, even though production time remains

considerable and, with rising standards of cleanliness, has probably not diminished over the years.

Consequently, the development of automatic laundry appliances that perform, without human intervention, most of the sequence of tasks involved in cleaning clothes, reduced necessary labour time for those domestic labourers who could afford them. However, in substituting for many of the productivity increases that require economies of scale and no doubt would otherwise have been made in commercial laundry services, private ownership of laundry appliances has left working-class housewives without much of a time reduction in clothes' cleaning (although drudgery has been reduced). Moreover, the selling of automatic washing and drying machines resulted in greatly raised standards of cleanliness and expectations about the appearance of clothing. Garments now worn only a day or a week would have been worn much longer a century ago. Consequently, even middle-class housewives have probably not experienced much of a reduction over the century in the amount of time spent doing the family laundry. And working-class housewives may have, in fact, experienced an increase in that aspect of their housework.*

*Vanek (1974) found a small decrease over the last 50

Other Production Necessary for Daily Life

Besides shelter, food, and clothing, essential household production includes child bearing and child rearing, and the emotional and personal maintenance and fulfillment, recreation and rest that adults require. Therefore, to fully understand how women's domestic labour has changed in the twentieth century, we must consider changes in the numbers of children women typically give birth to, changes in expectations about what is involved in raising them, and changes in women's role in the fulfillment of the "personal lives" of family members.

With respect to child bearing, changes have obviously been minor over the course of the twentieth century: women continue to bear children for 9 months, and the percentage of adult women who do not bear children has not significantly changed over time. There has, however, been some decrease in the twentieth century in the number of years during which women's lives are taken up with the process of bearing

 years, in time budget studies, with respect to laundry. She unfortunately did not discuss class or income differences in the trends.

children. In the United States, Glick and Parke (1965) reported a difference between female cohorts born in 1880-89 (and 20 years of age in 1900-09) and those born in 1920-29 (and 20 years old in 1940-49) in the number of years between first and last birth. For the former cohort, 10 years was the median time between women's first child and their last (i.e., 22.9 years at the first birth and 32.9 years at the last birth); 7.5 was the median number of years between the first birth and the last birth for women in the latter cohort (i.e., 23 years at the first birth and 30.5 years at the last birth) (Glick and Parke, 1965, 190). The same pattern probably held for Canadian women. And, although later cohorts of women experienced the "baby boom," the number of years taken up with child bearing probably continued to decrease. For the baby boom was largely due to more women having children and not women having more children. Moreover, birth intervals have probably decreased as birth control methods have become more popular and accessible. Additional to this decrease in the years taken up by child bearing, from the late 1940s through the 1960s there probably occurred a reduction in the time each infant was dependent on its mother, due to the decreasing popularity of breast feeding. Only in recent years has this trend

apparently reversed itself.

The more prolonged work involved in raising a family is, of course, the actual rearing of the children. Clearly, over the course of the twentieth century, the involvement of the state in this enterprise has greatly expanded. The percentages of children and young adults attending school have greatly increased over the decades of the twentieth century, and the length of the school year and regularity of attendance have also risen. (See table 22 for U.S. figures.) Moreover, the clear trend in the content of education has been towards growing attention, especially in recent decades, to the total development of the child - emotionally, socially, and physically, as well as intellectually. Morality has been seen as one of the primary lessons educators must instill, since early colonial times. However, the extent to which schools have increasingly encroached upon the role of parent is evidenced by contemporary discussions about whether the schools or the parents are responsible for "sex education."

Nevertheless, one must not assume that because the role of the state in the socialization and education of children has increased over the years, that of the parents has decreased. In fact, the responsibilities

involved with raising the next generation, and the time and energy such a task requires, have no doubt increased with each new generation of parents. And the mother has borne most of the weight of this growing responsibility and work commitment. First, just as formal education has expanded, so too has the period of life considered to be "childhood." The very notion that being a "teenager" entails an extension of the dependency known as childhood is, in fact, a twentieth-century phenomenon (Kett, 1971). Over the course of the century, the age at which young adults emerge from the state of total dependence on parents has no doubt risen: the period during which young adults are in school full time has been extended. Thus there has been a considerable prolongation of the years in which parental guidance and supervision, and the woman's performance of housework for an additional household member (e.g., laundry, cooking), must occur.

As well, there has been an intensification of the work involved in raising young children. Ehrenreich and English (1978) argue convincingly that over the course of the twentieth century, the responsibility for the ultimate kind of person the child became was increasingly laid on the shoulders of the mother. Moreover, especially in the 1950s, the complexity of

child rearing was made more and more clear to women by the "experts." Nonfiction articles in issues of Ladies Home Journal are witness to this trend. Early in the twentieth century, articles about raising children were concerned with issues of health and religious instruction. By the 1960s, regular articles by Dr. Spock instructed women on handling the emotional sensitivities of children. Thus, as the burden of housework has eased, the more emotionally and psychically demanding job of raising children has grown to fill its place.

Besides the expansion in the time involved in mothering, it seems that the responsibility associated with making possible the "personal life" of family members, which essentially rests on women's shoulders, has increased over the course of the twentieth century. That is, more concrete tasks like caring for the sick and the aged have been, through the twentieth century, either increasingly commercialized, and taken over from the family by capital, or assumed by the state. But the area of peoples' lives known as "personal," that is, the time in which they cultivate personal relationships or participate in recreational activities for the sake of enjoyment and self-fulfillment, has grown in importance and emphasis, and has remained

focused in the home.

The notion of a "personal life," separate from a work life, is one that can only find reality in a society where work is physically separate from the home, and other human activities.* In fact, "personal life" is probably more of a reality for men than women, since women's household work is not physically isolated from the rest of their lives, and it is something that has no clear limits. Ehrenreich and English (1978) have argued that private life, or personal life, became an end in itself in North America only during the twentieth century. They attribute the phenomenon to the fact that the American economy became increasingly dependent upon individual consumption. That is, self-indulgence was promoted more and more, in the drive to create consumer needs and to sell consumer goods. According to Ehrenreich and English (1978), in the 1920s, at least in the United States, capital came to see the home as a prime market. Thus, it was recognized that minimal wage levels were possibly counter-productive to the long-run interests of

*Zaretsky (1973) argued that "personal life" developed with capitalist social relations; he presented a provocative, if speculative, description of its development.

capital. If home ownership became a possibility for most workers, if the material level of living were significantly raised and workers increasingly experienced the rewards of their work, the labour force should be more acquiescent, according to the reasoning of certain key businessmen (e.g., Henry Ford).

Whether a conscious strategy on the part of capital or not, consumer needs and expectations have certainly been stimulated through the twentieth century. Furthermore, "personal life" may have assumed a heightened importance as well because both manual and nonmanual jobs have become less skilled and probably more boring and more tension-inducing over the course of the century (Braverman, 1974). Women, we think, experience much of this increased striving for satisfaction (in peoples' personal lives) as a burden, a responsibility. They are the ones who organize and prepare for adult socializing and family events. To the extent that the home is expected to be a retreat from the rest of the world, women are the ones who must create that rather nebulous environment. Moreover, to some extent, women themselves are expected to provide their men with satisfaction and reward. As Rowbotham (1973, 108) has argued, perhaps a growing demand made of the woman "is the production of herself, as

comforter, psychologist, or as sexual fantasy."

Conclusion

The changes we have reviewed, involving the distribution of work among the household, "the economy", and the state, have several implications for household work - with respect to necessary labour time, the organization of the work, and the social relations in which it is embedded. The changing product of domestic labour, about which we have hinted, shall be discussed in chapter 4.

Essentially because the distribution of water and energy sources was taken over by the state in the early part of this century, the drudgery and necessary labour time involved in household work decreased. By the early 1940s, even working-class households in both Canadian and American cities had indoor running water, sewage removal, and electricity. By 1950, middle-class urban households typically also had central heating, hot running water, and gas or electric cooking stoves. In American cities, most working-class households probably had these facilities by 1960, or at least 1970; many Canadian working-class households were probably without them in the 1950s, although probably by 1970 most had them. Refrigerators were standard

equipment in urban middle-class households by about 1940 in the United States and 1950 in Canada, and in urban working-class households by about 1960 in both countries.

Besides decreased drudgery, the early improvements in urban household facilities probably meant that it was possible, by 1920 for middle-class households, and by 1940 for working-class households, for women to do their housework themselves, substantially unaided by other household members. As further improvements in household means of production occurred, this possibility no doubt became a reality in more and more homes. That is, the household labourer was increasingly isolated in her work.* Even contact among housewives resulting from their daily work routine decreased. For example, with refrigeration, daily

*Even the dishwashing machine contributes to the isolation of the household worker. Washing dishes was probably the most frequently shared household chore: it was probably typically done by family members working together. Women with dishwashers can do the work themselves.

Interestingly, Luxton (1980) reported that in Flin Flon every woman in her study who had a dishwasher was given it as a present by her husband (who, no doubt, partially wanted to avoid the work of dishwashing himself). None of these women had wanted one enough to initiate the purchase, possibly because dishwashing as a shared work was not so onerous (or possibly because they recognized how little time it would save).

shopping became unnecessary. Later, with the destruction of neighbourhood stores and the rise of chain groceries located in large shopping centers, shopping itself was even less likely to be a source of neighbour contact.

Accompanying the growing isolation of the domestic labourer was the inflation in standards and expectations about the product of her work. Though major amounts of food processing left the household, especially over the course of the twentieth century, part of that transfer involved convincing middle-class housewives that they could prepare more exquisite and varied meals by using the commercial products. Therefore, expectations about meals rose. Furthermore, the increased ease of meal preparation, due to the availability of commercially-processed foods and the individual ownership of kitchen appliances, meant that the growing possibility of a transfer of meal production from household to "economy" has met obstacles. A major obstacle is the desire of families to be together, in the home, at least during meals: in this instance, family members' consumption desires (including their nutritutional needs) conflict with a trend towards the reduction of domestic labour time. With clothing as with meals, the commercial

availability of mass-produced (and therefore relatively inexpensive) products and the individual ownership of appliances for their maintenance have produced an inflation in expectations and a continuation of work in the privatized household. Thus, privatized and isolated domestic labour has grown alongside the increasing socialization (i.e., co-operative organization) of some of the work.

Additionally, for middle-class women at least, a loss of skills and knowledge occurred over the generations, as food processing and the manufacture of clothes were taken over by the factory. In effect, household work lost its status as a craft.

Finally, as the means of household production were mechanized, the organization of housework changed - or at least the potential for a change occurred. At the beginning of the century, because of the many manual steps domestic chores like doing the laundry or baking involved, the round of necessary tasks extended over the whole week, and each took virtually an entire day. Catherine Beecher and Harriet Beecher Stowe (1869, 226) described the typical work week as follows:

Monday, with some of the best housekeepers, is devoted to preparing for the labors of the week. Any extra cooking, the purchasing of articles to be used during the week, the assorting of clothes for the wash, and mending such as would otherwise be injured -

these, and similar items, belong to this day. Tuesday is devoted to washing, and Wednesday to ironing. On Thursday, the ironing is finished off, the clothes are folded and put away, and all articles which need mending are put in the mending basket, and attended to. Friday is devoted to sweeping and house cleaning. On Saturday, and especially the last Saturday of every month, every department is put in order; the casters and table furniture are regulated, the pantry and cellar inspected, the trunks, drawers and closets arranged, and everything about the house put in order for Sunday.

With self-timing, automatic washing and drying machines, and automatic dishwashers it is now possible to perform household chores simultaneously. Tasks can be organized to overlap, since labour time becomes small relative to production time when control functions are assumed by machinery. Moreover, a full round of necessary household chores can be accomplished in a portion of a day (although probably a full day some time during the week will be required to compensate for a reduced work time on other days). This integration of household chores, possible in mechanized middle-class homes, has, of course, not been a possibility in most working-class households until very recently - and remains impossible in many.

Integrating housework requires organization, especially given the likelihood that children's needs will interfere with the optimal integration of tasks.

Therefore, the work of management and organization has probably increased for housewives, with the mechanization of the home since World War II. As well, because nondurable means of production (e.g., food) have become increasingly commoditized, shopping has probably taken up more and more of women's time. Vanek (1974), in fact, reported that time budget data showed rises in time spent on both household management and shopping.

Child rearing responsibilities have also expanded (Vanek, 1974), to fill the time released by the mechanization of the household. Moreover, women increasingly rely on the advice of "experts," and increasingly share their responsibilities with the schools. But, both developments entail greater demands placed on the woman, without any decrease in her isolation in the home. More importantly, the rising responsibility of child rearing probably signifies that women's work more and more involves the direct servicing of the personal needs of family members. Another way to view such servicing is as a contribution to the reproduction of labour power on a generational and a daily basis.

CHAPTER 3

EXPLANATIONS OF THE TREND AND AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK

Overview

In chapter 2, we attempted to describe the context within which the trend of married women's increasing involvement in wage work occurred. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, many of the tasks involved in reproducing daily life have been transferred from the household to "the economy" and the state. At the same time, the domestic labour performed daily by most women underwent a transformation, as did the relationship between that work and the sector of commodity production. The changes in the organization of household production were described in chapter 2. The changing relationship between household and "economy" will be a key theme in chapter 4.

However, before continuing our discussion of changes behind the increased availability of women for wage work, we shall review previous explanations of the rising involvement of married women in the paid labour force. There have been two groups that have offered

such explanations: empirically-oriented economists and sociologists, and Marxist theorists.

Inadequacies with explanations offered by economists and sociologists with an empirical bent arise from as basic a source as the manner in which they define the problem. They are essentially looking for several independent variables that caused women's labour force participation to rise. In looking for the X and Y that caused Z, they are abstracting too much from the intricate configuration of mutually related factors responsible for the change. We believe that the material historical context, and the structural changes that have occurred in the twentieth century with respect to the relationship between the household and "the economy," are at the heart of an understanding of the trend. And we assume that it is impossible to summarize the essence of these changes with measurements of several variables, even if these measurements occur across time, and that the complex interplay between important factors cannot be captured in an equation.*

 *One imagines, in reading the work of many of these social scientists, that the data and statistical techniques available for data manipulation informed the theory - rather than the converse. Instead, of course, they should have assumed secondary importance, as very

Yet, perhaps more problematic than the abstraction from a material context which should itself form the heart of the explanation, is the assumption that the focus of the explanation should involve individual behaviour. These social scientists ask the reasons why individuals choose certain options, instead of focusing on the changes in social structure which determine the (changing) options people face. Thus, from the start, their enterprise is extremely limited.

Even assuming the need for an explanation of individual behaviour - and that must be the final step in any attempt to make sense of the trend - that which is generally offered by orthodox economists is problematic. It involves a model of market rationality, which is not suited to the material situation of the married woman. That is, economists assume that women in their primary work role, in the

 limited tools for conducting an empirical check on the theory. However, because there is a close correspondence between the structure of the theoretical explanations and the statistical equations, and because the theory is scarcely more involved than the statistical equations, the former leaves much to be desired in the way of explanation. One would hope for a theory of human behaviour that involves new theoretical concepts that are considerably broader in meaning than their operational definitions (i.e., the measured variables), and one that spells out the imperceptible and usually complex laws of motion behind appearances.

domestic sphere, are subject to the same pressures and incentives that govern the behaviour of commodity producers. Or, when they cast women in the role of consumer - which, oddly enough, occurs in discussions of where and how long they work - they assume that these female consumers are free to choose how to spend their time, and do so according to "tastes" for different courses of action.

While orthodox social scientists have thus provided seriously insufficient explanations of women's increasing employment outside the home, very few alternative suggestions have been offered by Marxists. Because the domestic sphere of production has received no theoretical attention until the last decade, Marxist explanations suffer from the absence of a theoretical analysis of household production and its relationship to "the economy." Consequently, they tend to simply appropriate Marx's notion of a "reserve army of labour" without any of the modification or amplification that empirical complexity demands. Specifically, those who simply assert that women compose a "reserve army" fail to specify the mechanism by which capital's need for labour is expressed as a set of pressures or incentives acting on female household workers.

We shall expand upon these points, as we summarize the literature. First, we shall describe the theoretical explanations and supporting evidence offered by orthodox economists and sociologists. Then we shall review Marxist contributions to an explanation of the trend of women's growing involvement in wage work. Finally, we shall offer a framework with which to analyze women's "double day of work" (i.e., in the home and in the wage work force).

The Social Scientists' Explanations

Attempts by neo-Keynesian economists to explain the trend of women's growing involvement in the work force vary from the heavily descriptive and largely sociological to the highly abstract (i.e., mathematical modelling). However, all begin from the same substantive premises. Glen Cain (1966,5) stated them concisely: "the study of labour force participation is a study of labour supply. The theory of labour supply is one of an individual making choices among alternative uses of his (sic) time." The structural context which establishes the options is unexplored. And even changes in demand, the counterpart of supply changes, are often left unexplained.

Clarence Long (1958) and Gertrude Bancroft (1958) made the first serious attempts to explain increases in women's employment outside the home. Both assumed that, because real income (i.e., income modified by the consumer price index) rose in the period of women's influx into wage work, increasing financial pressure did not contribute to the trend. Bancroft dismissed the effect of forms of economic compulsion after additionally attempting to determine what women were involved in the influx - and concluding that women from higher-income households were chiefly responsible for the movement into wage work. Both researchers, then, proceeded to look for factors that had attracted women into the labour force.

Long and Bancroft were alike as well in their methodology. Both examined one variable at a time, looking at the apparent effects of changes in each over time. In employing this descriptive, piecemeal approach, they could not examine the exact or the simultaneous effects of changes in the variables they considered. A multivariate statistical analysis would have allowed them to do both. And because the factors both Long and Bancroft considered were not abstract or subtle, they could easily have been used as variables in statistical analyses.

Long (1958,99) thus, in The Labor Force Under Changing Income and Employment, "did not attempt to set up a rigorous analytic model because the factors seemed too numerous, the relationships among them too complex and changing, and their statistical measurement too inadequate to permit us to fit them into any mathematical framework." Unfortunately, in place of statistical analysis, Long did not elaborate forces "too numerous" and "relationships among them too complex and changing."

Changes in factors that establish necessary domestic labour time were Long's first concern in trying to explain married women's movement into the labour force. He concluded that demographic changes which might have lowered necessary labour time could not account for the influx, since it occurred during the "baby boom." Long pointed out that child-rearing responsibilities were increasing after World War II, since rising fertility was not accompanied by a boom in the construction of day care facilities.

Long further concluded that the mechanization of housework was insignificant in explaining the trend, but that the transfer of many production tasks from the household to "the economy" was of causal significance. Arbitrarily assigning the release of one hour of

housework to every dollar's worth of household appliances, and assuming that the current stock of household appliances equalled production totals for the preceding 10 years, Long determined that the labour equivalent of only about 31 out of every 1000 women was saved in 1950. Aside from the arbitrary nature of these calculations, the equally important question of changes in the organization of housework, attendant upon its mechanization, was neglected.

To ascertain the time saving due to the transfer of some production from the household to "the economy" and the state, Long computed an annual ratio of (constant) dollars spent on commercial goods and services to average annual earnings of women. The ratio represented domestic labour time saved to money in hand. It rose, since 1890, indicating a real savings in time spent on housework. Consequently, a lightened domestic burden (due to a reduction in necessary tasks) explained, to Long's satisfaction, why many married women were free for wage work.

Long then looked for the factor that had attracted women out of the home and into an additional job. He hypothesized first that rises in women's wages, relative to men's, provided an incentive. Why Long looked at women's wages, in relation to men's wages, and

not relative to living costs, he did not explain. He found, after an empirical investigation, that the years in which increases in women's participation relative to men's occurred, and the industries in which they occurred, did not coincide with the years and industries in which women's wages rose relative to men's. In Canada, female labour force involvement was rising relative to male involvement since 1911, for factory workers, but the relative rise in women's wages occurred only after 1931. In the United States, women's relative wages declined in all industries between 1940 and 1950, yet that was a decade of greater gains in women's labour force participation than had occurred previously. With respect to American industries, manufacturing showed the only relative increase in women's earnings, yet it had one of the smallest increases in the ratio of female to male workers. Similarly, finance, insurance, real estate, and retail trade featured the greatest decreases in the female-to-male earnings ratios and the largest increases in the female-to-male employment ratios. Clearly, rises in women's wages relative to men's did not attract women into wage work.

Long then hypothesized that a decrease in the length of the work week was an attraction to married

women. The empirical evidence did not disprove this notion. Data from four industrial countries showed the full-time work week to have fallen about four hours per decade, over the first half of the twentieth century, while the female labour force grew. More convincingly, Long found that census-to-census fluctuations in the extent of reductions in the length of the work week were associated with changes in the rate of women's entry into the work force.

Long additionally noted the coincidence of the trends of rising credit purchasing and women's rising labour force involvement. He thought the two trends somehow related. Unfortunately, he did not explore possible forces that gave rise to these two trends.

Long concluded that decreases in necessary household tasks (due to their transfer from the household) freed women for extra work, and a shorter work week attracted them into the labour force. The need or desire for extra money, whichever it was, he simply assumed. He did not use the fact that credit purchasing was also growing to shed light on the question of increased need or increased desires mediating changes in household production and increased involvement in the work force.

Turning to the question of changes in the demand for labour, Long focused on the fact that the work rates of older men declined at the time women's labour force participation was rising. Overall, that is, women were to some extent replacing men in the labour force. For Long, the factor central to an explanation of this phenomenon was women's higher relative educational attainment. To some extent, he was invoking the notion that education represents an investment in "human capital" that finds its due return in the labour market (see Gary Becker, 1964). In fact, because women's wages are not commensurate with their educational qualifications, and because the male-female gap in wages is not explained by differential objective characteristics (except that of sex), such a line of reasoning is largely fruitless. However, Long also speculated, quite provocatively, that women represent competitive pressure on male wage workers. Specifically, he argued that women's educational qualifications may have provided them an edge over older men in the job market, and may also have pressured young men to remain in school longer because of the possible competition.

Long's evidence showed, contrary to his hypothesis, that the ratio of women's education to that

of older men rose less quickly than did female labour force participation relative to that of men. Moreover, Long pointed out in pursuing another question that it was largely clerical jobs that absorbed the influx of women. Therefore, it was clearly problematic to argue that (better educated) women replaced older men in the same jobs. More possibly, the educational qualifications of women may have indirectly placed pressure on men: young men may have had to obtain more education, since white collar and especially new jobs were open to sexual integration, and were thus likely to carry entry "labels" with respect to educational qualifications.

The decline in the involvement of older men in wage work, and the increase for women, were both probably results of larger changes in the economy - and thus only spuriously related. In that case, it would be difficult to argue that women themselves exerted competitive pressures on male workers. Earlier work by Durand (1948) suggested, and in fact presented supporting evidence, that older men were losing the opportunity to work because of the decline of family agriculture and of "own account" work (i.e., that of self-employed businessmen and craftsmen). Both of these trends resulted from the increased concentration

(i.e., accumulation) and centralization of capital. Another consequence of the concentration of capital was the extensive elaboration of the division of labour and the eventual deskilling of all occupations, which prompted a shift from experienced and skilled men to inexperienced, unskilled and cheap women workers (see Braverman, 1974). In short, we imagine a spurious, and not causal, relationship to exist between the increases in women's labour force presence and the decreases in the involvement of older men.

In The American Labor Force: Its Growth and Changing Composition, Gertrude Bancroft (1958) used what would become a fairly standard argument about the origins of the growing demand for women workers. She emphasized, as Long did, the importance of the proliferation of clerical occupations. The argument is that new occupations characteristically modern and especially suited for women because they require educated but not highly skilled workers and entail clean work needing little on-the-job training developed as the scale of business grew, paperwork multiplied, and the service sector expanded with the maturing of the economy. For Bancroft as well as for Long, the key attraction these jobs held for women was the increase in part-time work which accompanied their growth.

With respect to labour supply, to support her argument that the mechanism responsible for women's increasing assumption of wage work involved attraction rather than economic pressure, Bancroft attempted to show that greater increases occurred among women from higher-income households than among those from lower-income households. In the decade she studied, that of the 1940s, the largest rises in labour force participation occurred among women 45 to 54 and 55 to 64 years of age, and among women 18 and 19 years old, all of whom experienced a doubling in rates of involvement in wage work. Ignoring the young group, Bancroft pointed out that 45 to 64 were the ages when husbands were apt to be at their earnings' peak. Moreover, because women 45 to 54 years of age with high school degrees increased their involvement in the work force more than did other groups of women, Bancroft reasoned that the husbands of these women probably had greater than average amounts of education. From this indirect evidence, she argued that women from households in which men had higher amounts of education and were at the peak of their earnings were of the greatest single importance to the trend. However, even assuming that there is this close correspondence between wives' and husbands' education, in presuming

that the women seeking wage work were the same women as those whose husbands were (on average) at their earnings' peak and had more education (on average), Bancroft committed the methodological error known as the "ecological fallacy."

Bancroft (1958), moreover, did not show direct evidence of a positive relationship between men's occupational status or median income and the presence of two wage earners in the household. Instead, she showed only that as family (i.e., household) incomes increased (up to \$10,000), the proportion of households with two wage earners also rose. In fact, in the 1940s, the second wage earner in a household typically contributed fully 25 to 30 per cent of its income. In short, and quite significantly, female labour force participation was not higher in the 1940s when male household heads' income was higher (as can be seen in table 17) but, rather, it was higher with higher family incomes because part of that income resulted from the wage work of those women. We must conclude, in short, that there is no evidence that women from higher-income households caused the influx into the labour force.

In 1962, Jacob Mincer wrote "Labor Force Participation of Married Women: A Study of Labor Supply," the article that appeared to theoretically

reconcile the "consumer choice model" of labour supply with the trend of rising female involvement in the work force during a period of rising real income. Of course, this trend posed a problem to a neo-Keynesian economist because it contradicted the consistent finding, with cross-sectional data, that there is an inverse relationship between husbands' incomes and wives' labour force participation. The several empirical tests to which Mincer submitted his explanation of the trend were successful. Consequently, neo-Keynesian economists writing after him have oriented their efforts to comments upon and tests of Mincer's explanation.

Assuming married women to be consumers who make rational calculations about how to maximize their gain, and (implicitly) to be workers who allocate their time rationally, in the manner of commodity producers, Mincer used the consumer choice model, with one key modification: women were assumed to allocate their time not only between (wage) work and leisure, but also housework. According to the model, real income determines the total amount of time any adult woman works, at home or in the sphere of commodity production, while the relative productivity of the two production sectors determines how a woman allocates her

time between the two. Leisure is a "normal good," or commodity, which is purchased in greater and greater amounts, and work chosen less and less, as income increases. This tendency is referred to as the "income effect." Operating alongside the income effect, according to the model, is the "substitution effect." This effect intensifies with an increased wage rate, which would make both leisure and, for women, housework more "expensive," or "costly." In other words, what economists call the "opportunity cost" of leisure and housework rises with rising wage rates, because the wage foregone with each hour "consumed" in leisure or housework also rises. Therefore, the consequence of a rise in wages (or income) due to the substitution effect is an increase in work. The two effects, in other words, operate in opposing directions.*

According to this consumer choice model, an increased wage rate for women has meant an increased opportunity cost attached to household production, in terms of commodities that could be purchased. Higher women's wages therefore explain the increase in the involvement of married women in wage work, assuming a

 *Generally, the income effect has been found to be the stronger of the two.

high degree of substitutability between wage goods and things made in the home. Mincer, in other words, hypothesized that a stronger substitution effect, relative to the income effect, explains the influx of married women into wage work.

The first part of the empirical test of his model involved a multiple regression, with aggregated 1949 (i.e., cross-sectional) data from 57 Standard Metropolitan Areas. The dependent variable was women's labour force participation rate (for each SMA); the independent variables were median income of male family heads (wife present), median income of women who worked 50-52 weeks during the previous year, the percentage of the population 25 years of age or older who completed high school, the unemployment rate for men, and the percent of families with children younger than 6 years of age. Only variations in men's income and women's income showed statistically significant effects, both in the predicted directions. But what was most important to Mincer was the fact that the positive effect of women's income was substantially larger than the negative effect of men's income. He claimed that result to be proof of the greater relative importance of the substitution effect than the income effect for women's labour force involvement.

Nevertheless, there are two methodological problems with Mincer's analysis. First, if the cost of living is positively related to wages (and income), and it probably is from one city to the next, then omitting it from the equation would (a) make the negative effect of men's income (or wages) smaller than it would be if cost of living were included in the regression, and (b) make the positive effect of women's income (or wages) larger than it would be if cost of living were included (since this income variable alone would then show the effects of both variables, working in the same direction). In other words, Mincer's key piece of supporting evidence may have been an artifact of poor statistical model specification. Second, the ecological fallacy prohibits concluding from this analysis of aggregate data that individuals responded to these income or wage (i.e., substitution) effects.

Mincer also examined some cross-classifications of sample survey and census data, and obtained similar results. That is, the notion that the substitution effect was larger than the income effect seemed to hold. He also found evidence that the effect of men's transitory income outweighs that of men's permanent income, using men's educational attainment to indicate their earning power and also examining their current

income.

Mincer's second step in showing the empirical validity of his model involved measuring the decade-by-decade increases in full-time earnings of men and women since 1890, and using the estimated regression coefficients to estimate the impact of changes in these variables on women's labour force participation (expected on the basis of the income and substitution effects). In fact, the model predicted four-fifths of the overall rise in women's involvement in wage work since 1889. However, as Clarence Long (1962) later pointed out, the model did not predict decade-to-decade changes in female labour force participation well. This low predictive power of the model, with respect to decade-to-decade changes, perhaps points out the weakness of a strategy of applying regression coefficients that indicate effects at one period of time to time series data. Perhaps only if the economic and societal context is constant over time would such a strategy make sense. For example, the effects of a wage increase on women's work orientation in a year of recession would be different from its effects in a boom year.

Mincer, nevertheless, concluded that he had explained the trend in female involvement in wage work.

The negative relationship between husbands' income and wives' labour force participation in cross-section need not make the fact that women increasingly entered the labour force in the face of rising (husbands') real income a puzzle. According to Mincer (1962), in the long run, long enough for the transitory elements in men's income to disappear, the inverse relationship between income and female labour force participation disappears because the strong positive elasticity with respect to wives' earnings more than offsets the weak negative elasticity with respect to husbands' permanent income. Thus, Mincer argued, the transitory components of income (which are strongly negatively related to women's labour force involvement) and the weak relationship between wives' earning power and husbands' transitory income results in the cross-sectional statistical relationship.

Aside from the methodological problems with Mincer's analysis, which actually are sufficient to cast doubt on what he considers to be proof of the validity of his model, there are problems specific to the model. It is problematic that women's choices about how to allocate their time are central. Furthermore, it is assumed that in making these choices women are rational (in the economic sense), that is,

calculating time maximizers. The model assumes that conscious calculation, according to principles of economic rationality, motivates women's behaviour with respect to work, and, more precisely, how they allocate their time. In short, women are assumed to allocate their time so as to maximize their output, or minimize the time input in the products of their efforts. Such a notion of individual behaviour is either predicated on the fact that market pressures impinge upon the household, where women's primary work takes place, or it assumes that human beings have an innate desire to maximize "utility." In fact, women working in the home no doubt often attempt to rationally organize their schedules, and their behaviour may even at times fit a maximalist model. However, the structural mechanism by which such a result occurs is not elaborated in the consumer choice model.

Glen Cain (1966) submitted Mincer's model to further empirical tests. Multiple regressions using cross-sectional data from the Growth of the American Families Survey (GAFS) and the 1-in-1000 Sample (from the Census) revealed what many similar cross-sectional analyses would show. The presence and number of children is the most important (inhibiting) factor affecting whether a married woman seeks wage work. Age

is the next most important variable. As well, both analyses indicated the effect of women's wages to be positive, statistically significant, and stronger than the effects of husbands' income.

In Cain's statistical analyses as well as in Mincers', cost of living was omitted and, as we noted above, the omission could conceivably be responsible for the apparent verification of the relative strengths of the income and substitution effects. Moreover, because Cain omitted interaction terms in these statistical models (using disaggregated data), he should not have concluded that any variable had a larger effect than any other. Yet he did just that, despite the fact that one would expect statistical interaction between some of the variables he examined. For example, one would expect the effects of women's wages to be different with different husbands' incomes.

Not surprisingly, given all of the problems with Mincer's model and subsequent tests of it, Cain's (1966) multiple regressions using 1940, 1950, and 1960 aggregated census data (for Standard Metropolitan Areas) presented evidence contradictory to Mincer's predictions. Only in the 1950 data - those used by Mincer - did wage elasticity appear to be stronger than income elasticity! Additionally, Cain found that a

measure of transitory income had a smaller negative effect on wife's employment than did a measure of permanent income; so, the key argument in Mincer's reconciliation of cross-sectional and time series findings was put into question.

William Bowen and T. Aldrich Finegan, who carried out the most extensive work, in the neo-Keynesian tradition, on the determinants of labour force involvement, also found evidence of a substitution effect stronger than an income effect only in 1950 census data. In The Economics of Labor Force Participation, Bowen and Finegan (1969) used the 1-in-1000 Sample data from the 1960 Census to estimate very comprehensive multiple regression equations, with married women's labour force participation as the dependent variable. They found: a negative relationship with family income other than that contributed by the wife;* a strong positive relationship with the status of women's former, most recent wage job; a positive relationship with husbands' unemployment rate; a positive relationship

*This negative relationship holds even in Canada where husbands and wives are taxed separately and there is thus no tax disincentive for the woman to work for wages.

with women's wages; a negative relationship with the local supply of females; and a positive relationship with local industry mix (i.e., whether the composition of local jobs is weighted towards "female jobs"). In fact, local labour market conditions appeared to have a major impact on married women's labour force involvement - more so than on any other group in the population. Perhaps we might assume from this that changes over time in demand for female labour were as crucial as supply changes in explaining the trend in their involvement in work outside the home.

Multiplying the respective changes in these independent variables between 1948 and 1965 with the 1960 cross-sectional regression coefficients, Bowen and Finegan (1969) estimated (in the manner Mincer had) the change in female labour force participation due to changes in these factors. Though change in the labour force participation of married women 14 to 54 years of age, between 1948 and 1965, involved 14.2 percentage points, demographic changes increased the percentage point change to be explained to 14.6. The result of their statistical exercise was that all of the changes in the economic variables together (i.e., men's income, the unemployment rate, women's earnings, women's schooling, industry mix, supply of women) accounted for

an increase of only 4 percentage points (net), or 27% of the change in the rate of female involvement in the work force.* This estimate of the proportion of change accounted for is much lower than Mincer's. Nevertheless, when, instead of one set of regression coefficients (i.e., estimated effects), Bowen and Finegan used regression coefficients estimated with 1950 data to explain the change between 1948 and 1955, and 1960 regression coefficients to explain the change from 1955 to 1965, they accounted for 58% of the change in rates of women's labour force participation. Even so, this is a lower proportion of change accounted for than that explained by Mincer.

Bowen and Finegan (1969,219) concluded that "the postwar trend in the participation of married women cannot be explained in terms of a negative income

 *Specifically, the increase in men's income should have decreased the rate of women's labour force participation by about 5 percentage points; the rise in unemployment should have decreased it by about .8 percentage points; the increase in women's earnings should have increased it by about 6 percentage points; the change in average educational attainment of women should have increased it by about 1.9 percentage points; the change in the "femininity mix" of industry should have increased it by about 4 percentage points; and the rise in wages of domestics should have decreased it by about 2 percentage points. Omitting this last variable (given rising availability of appliances) results in 6 percentage points being accounted for.

effect having been outweighed by a far more powerful substitution effect." They proposed that several other factors were central to the trend: the decrease in the length of the work week, the decrease in the amount of time it is "economical" to spend on housework, and the increase in income aspirations.

Their rather unconvincing proof that income aspirations (or expectations) had increased consisted of the fact that consumption has risen over time along with real income. Additionally, they cited the finding of the 1965 National Fertility Study that 32% of women were working to acquire "extra things;" they neglected the finding that 41% of women in this sample were working because their families "needed the money" (Sobol, 1963, 58). Moreover, Stanley Lebergott reported (in an apparently unpublished article), according to Bowen and Finegan, that a higher proportion of families with consumer debt had both husband and wife working, at all income levels, than families without consumer debt. We suggest that a rising incidence of debt, coupled with rising rates of female involvement in wage work, in the context of rising wages, places in question the notion that increases in peoples' aspirations for "the good life" were more important during this period than increasing real costs of

living.

In conclusion, with respect to Mincer's proposed explanation of the trend in married women's involvement in the work force, we agree with Bowen and Finegan that it is inadequate. The methodological problems with Mincer's supporting evidence, Cain's contradictory findings, and Bowen and Finegan's very weak support of the model all suggest that the trend remains largely unexplained. Partly this is so, we suspect, because changes in demand - that is, changes in capital's and the state's need for labour - must be concentrated upon as well as changes in labour supply. But this explanation is also inadequate partly because a consumer choice model of labour supply, which posits rational calculation on the part of a household worker, is simply inadequate.

Sociologist James Sweet's (1973) Women in the Labor Force was an exploration of both demographic and economic causes and consequences of women's increasing employment outside the home. Using 1960 census data and data from the 1-in-1000 Sample, Sweet employed multiple regressions to predict the percentage of the female population that is employed (instead of the percentage in the labour force).*

*That is, oddly enough, his dependent variable was a

Current Population Survey showed that over half of all married women with jobs outside the home were working for reasons of economic compulsion of one sort or another, Sweet used an independent variable he called "income adequacy." This variable was the ratio of family income, minus wife's wage, to income needs of a family with a specific composition (as specified by the minimum budget standard computed by the Community Council of Greater New York). Surprisingly, Sweet found that income adequacy exerted a statistically significant positive effect on married women's employment! Unless this finding prompts us to abandon a primary emphasis on economic variables - and nothing in the literature suggests that demographic or other variables are more important - it suggests perhaps that we probe more deeply into the notion of living costs, and how they are measured. More importantly, it suggests that deeper economic changes were and are operating, such as changes over time in women's work in the household and its relation to living costs.

 measure not only of supply but also of demand. Yet, no demand factors were specified as independent variables in his regression equations.

The final major American study of married women's entry into wage work was carried out by sociologist Valerie Oppenheimer (1970). Since Oppenheimer was not concerned with rigorous statistical analyses, we expected a more penetrating theory and a more complex description of causes of the trend than that offered by those social scientists whose primary concern seemed to be methodological rigour. Nevertheless, she framed her questions in the same manner as the economists, but answered them without the benefits of statistical rigour. For example, she was obsessed with the question of the most important variable causing the influx, yet she neglected to use multivariate statistical techniques (which give quantified estimates of the effects of each variable, holding the others constant). Moreover, she failed to present any interesting theoretical perspective with which to attack the problem.

Oppenheimer attempted to determine whether supply (of women) changed and demand (for them) responded, whether demand changed and supply responded, or whether there was an interaction (i.e., she meant joint effect) of the two. She first investigated possible supply factors that could have changed prior to changes in demand (and thus could have stimulated demand). She

declared as least satisfactory the explanation that economic factors "forced" women into the work force. Why? The fact that disposable per capital income, in constant dollars, has risen since 1940 is sufficient to merit rejection of all explanations involving the notion of economic compulsion, according to Oppenheimer.

As for the possibility that the mechanization of the home may have facilitated women's entry into the work force, Oppenheimer argued that the innovations in household appliances had larger effects before 1940 than after. First, the major innovations occurred before 1940. Second, the increase in money spent on appliances was greater in the years 1900 to 1940 than it was between 1940 and 1960 (and the same held for purchases of processed fruits and vegetables). Oppenheimer argued from those facts that the burden of housework had eased before the influx of married women into wage work occurred.

Yet, as she pointed out, the former period was longer than the latter, so the absolute increase would be expected to be larger. Also, percentage increases are necessarily larger on a small base than a larger one. Finally, the (constant, per household) dollar amounts spent yearly in the latter period were about 5

times those of the previous period! In short, (as we saw in chapter 2), it was the latter period in which the mass of middle-class and, to some extent, working-class housewives acquired household appliances. Oppenheimer ended her argument by asserting that "labour-saving" devices actually increased time spent on housework by making it easier, and thus raising standards. We merely point out here that the time necessary for basic household chores has certainly decreased over the twentieth century (Vanek, 1974), and probably has done so most substantially since 1940 when the majority of households could afford "modern conveniences."

More substantial than her other remarks regarding supply was Oppenheimer's argument that the "baby boom" and the rise in home ownership - and, consequently, household responsibilities - occurred during the years of the influx of married women into the work force. As well, she noted, perhaps legitimately, that the increases in women's wages that occurred during those years probably would not have happened if female supply had been greater than the demand for women.

Oppenheimer's conclusion, and what she assumed for the rest of her investigation, was that a rising demand for women was more important than changes in the supply

of women workers, and that demand changes stimulated supply changes. Her first step was to demonstrate that there is such a thing as a demand specifically for women or, in other words, that there is a labour market for women. Although she was unable to analyze detailed industrial-occupational categories, she found that in 1900, 54.4% of the female labour force was in occupations over 70% female and in 1950 46.4% of it was in such occupations. This fact confirms the notion that women are occupationally fairly concentrated. It does not, however, necessarily indicate occupational sex segregation - as she claimed. We suspect, in fact, that there is a labour market for women. Oppenheimer simply did not demonstrate that fact.

The second part of her argument on the priority of changes in demand involved focusing on the general shift in the economy from primary to tertiary industry and from farm and manual occupations to nonmanual occupations - in other words, a shift towards occupations women can hold. At the beginning of the century, Oppenheimer demonstrates, women monopolized (or nearly monopolized) several clerical and professional occupations which grew rapidly in the following 60 years. For example, women represented over 70% of all nurses, telephone operators, teachers,

and stenographers, typists, and secretaries in 1900. The growth of these occupations was substantial: 8.4% of the female labour force held these occupations in 1900, and 19.9% of what was a much larger female work force held them in 1960. These few occupations alone accounted for about 23.4% of the growth in the female labour force between 1900 and 1960 (Oppenheimer, 1970). Bancroft (1968), as well, noted earlier that the largest increases in female employment between 1900 and 1950 occurred in clerical jobs, and were due to the general occupational shift in the economy. For example, the net increase of four million clerical jobs would have instead been an increase of 400,000 if the occupational distribution had not shifted (Bancroft, 1959).

The observation that clerical and professional occupations such as teaching and nursing represent the growing demand for female labour is accurate. It is insufficient, however, to use that observation as an explanation of changes in the labour needs of capital and the state. It is not a natural law that as economies mature, professional, clerical, and service jobs grow relatively faster than others. Therefore, we must still explain what the changes were in the economy that resulted in proliferation in clerical jobs

especially. (In chapter 6, we give a brief explanation.)

Finally, with respect to Oppenheimer's work, it reveals the reason why older, married women rather than young, single women have so increased their involvement in wage work. Oppenheimer showed that a shortage of young women relative to the demand for women "necessitated" the use of older women.*

In sum, Oppenheimer (1970) argued that the rising demand specifically for women wage workers met a (relatively) declining number of those women typically seeking wage work, and this opened jobs to married and older women. Her work is important next to that of the economists if only because it emphasizes the need to explain changes in the demand for labour. Unfortunately, Oppenheimer did not offer an adequate explanation of demand changes. Moreover, changes in

 *As "estimates" of demand, she unfortunately used trends in actual numbers of employed women; so demand is confused with supply. According to her most conservative estimate of demand (i.e., a constant proportion of women 18 to 64 years of age, equal to the proportion of women in that age group who were in the labour force in 1900), the available population of women 18 to 34 years and single was 3 times too small to meet demand in 1960. Even the supply of women 18 to 64 years and single, widowed, or divorced, and that of all women 18 to 34 years minus those married with husband present and pre-school children barely met this minimal demand, as of 1960.

supply must be explained as well as changes in demand, no matter which is more important. Specifically: what moved married women out of the home and into these jobs; what compelled or attracted them? This question assumes weight especially when we note that the wages women typically make did not rise relative to men's, that men's real wages rose and that the baby boom occurred (i.e., more women had children) during the years of the influx of married women into the work force.

Marxist explanations

Marxists, and increasingly social scientists of different orientations, refer to women as a "reserve army of labour." The concept was developed in the culminating chapter of volume I of Marx's Capital, "The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation." Counterposing Malthus' notion of the relationship between population growth and the economy, Marx described the growth of a redundant population of workers which was inherent in the development of the process of capitalist production and which became a necessary condition of its continued expansion.

Because Capital was an analysis only of the process of the production of commodities, organized

capitalistically, it dealt with women's labour only incidentally and only in terms of their involvement in industrial work. It did not discuss domestic labour and the relationship of that work to wage work. Consequently, it gave no indication of how women who are primarily involved in household labour (i.e., married women) are mobilized as a reserve army. Let us briefly review Marx's ideas, before discussing how they have been used by writers discussing married women.

Because the logic of capitalist production is continual expansion, it involves two inherent contradictions. First, if the production process expands faster than the population grows, wages will rise and cut into profits. Second, continual expansion of the market is essential: the expansion of production that is central to capitalism creates a problem of realization of the value that is produced.

Especially because of the pressures of competition, but also because of the threat of rising wages and growing labour militancy, individual capitalists are motivated to continually revolutionize their means of production and thus increase their productivity. Increased productivity means, of course, a heightened transformation of means of production (i.e., raw materials) into products, in a given amount

of time, with a given amount of labour. Because higher productivity means that each product requires less time for production, each incorporates less value, and consequently can sell at a lower price. This result satisfies the individual capitalist's initial incentive (to meet the demands of competition), although as his prices put pressures on fellow capitalists, they too revolutionize their means of production, and average prices come down. To some extent, however, productivity increases - though they do nothing in the long run for the individual capitalist - serve the interests of capital as a class, because lower prices allow the conquest of new markets.

Because higher productivity raises the relative proportion of "constant capital," or machinery and raw materials, to "variable capital," or labour, the demand for labour falls relative to the magnitude of the total capital. In short, because of productivity increases, labour needs grow as capital expands "in a constantly diminishing proportion" (Marx, 1976, 782). Thus, the development of the capitalist process of production constantly generates a relatively redundant population of workers. Either workers are expelled from jobs, or additions to the labour force are absorbed with growing difficulty.

The key consequence of the growth of this redundant population is that the "pressure that the reserve by its competition exerts on the employed workers forces them to submit to over-work and subjects them to the dictates of capital" (Marx,1976,789) .

Thus,

Taking them as a whole, the general movements of wages are exclusively regulated by the expansion and contraction of the industrial reserve army, and this in turn corresponds to the periodic alterations of the industrial cycle (Marx,1976,790) . (emphasis added)

The reserve army of labour represents competition among workers, the competition that pushes wages (i.e., prices of labour) towards the value of labour power (Sweezy,1942). For, "the industrial reserve army, during periods of stagnation and average prosperity, weighs down the active army of workers; during the periods of overproduction and feverish activity, it puts a curb on their pretensions" (Marx,1976,792)*

Perhaps most definitive of Marx's notion of the reserve army of labour is the idea that it arises out of the development of the capitalist production process

*As well, a pool of labour is essential to capitalist development, for expansion into new areas of investment. It is also an essential product and requirement of the business cycle inherent in capitalist development.

itself. In Marx's (1976, 793) words,

Capital acts on both sides at once. If its accumulation on the one hand increases the demand for labour, it increases in the other the supply of workers by 'setting them free,' while at the same time the pressure of the unemployed compels those who are employed to furnish more labour, and therefore makes the supply of labour to a certain extent independent of the supply of workers.

Marx described three forms the reserve army might assume. First, the "floating" reserve consists of workers temporarily thrown out of work because of short-term contractions in some branches of industry and some types of occupations. Second, a "latent" reserve consists of workers slowly and inevitably becoming redundant as their jobs are mechanized. This part of the reserve, exemplified by agricultural workers, expands progressively over time, unlike the floating reserve which grows and shrinks. Finally, the "stagnant" pool of labour involves those who only irregularly work and are permanently poor: casual labourers.

In Labor and Monopoly Capital, Harry Braverman (1974) pointed out that married women have, over the course of the twentieth century, increasingly assumed the position of a latent reserve army of labour. Much like agriculture, household work was mechanized so that

labour time formerly necessary in that sector of production was increasingly reduced. But not only was the work mechanized. Braverman pointed out that (as we have shown in chapter 2) much production was transferred out of the household, so that the means of subsistence were decreasingly produced there and increasingly produced as commodities. Perhaps overdrawing his argument, Braverman (1974,271) asserted that "the capitalist mode of production takes over the totality of individual, family, and social needs and, in subordinating them to the market, also reshapes them to serve the needs of capital." He assumed, quite inaccurately, that the family is now no longer a unit of both production and consumption, that it is now only a unit of consumption - the key market for the products of capitalist production (Braverman, 1974,277).

While he may have elaborated an overly functionalist argument, which cast the family in too passive a role and left it without any significance with respect to production, Braverman's work was important in pointing out that a transformation of work in the household resulted from the development of capitalist production. That is, two tendencies intrinsic to capitalist production - the need to expand its market with new products (e.g., household

appliances) and the progressive encroachment into more and more areas of production (e.g., household production) - changed the domestic work sector and released labour time. Braverman concluded that while the male labour reserve was expanded over time by men's expulsion from jobs, the creation of the female reserve involved the increasing entry of married women into the labour market. (He did not directly attempt to explain why women were either attracted or pressured into wage work.)

One of Braverman's key contributions was his discussion of changes in demand for women. While others had made the growing demand for female labour seem part of an inevitable maturing of the economy, and something quite separate from changes in the supply of labour, Braverman assumed the constant interaction of supply and demand changes. In fact, the two are obviously part of the same process. Braverman indicated that as labour has tended to be drawn into occupations less susceptible to "engineered improvements in labour productivity," wages have been held down in these occupations and consequently investment in them has been encouraged. Thus, the fastest growing occupations in this "automated" age have been, Braverman pointed out, those in labour

intensive areas not subject to rapid technological change. Service occupations and clerical occupations have grown especially rapidly in the twentieth century. Finally, Braverman maintained that these service occupations involve much of the work formerly performed in the home. (See chapter 6 for a further discussion of Braverman's explanation of rising demand.)

Braverman's notion that married women represent a latent form of reserve army of labour was elaborated upon by Patricia Connelly in Last Hired, First Fired (1978). She argued that in order for women to represent a reserve army, they must (a) be available, (b) be cheap, and (c) exert competitive pressure on wages. The availability of women is a result of changes in the organization of capitalist production, specifically the splitting of production into a sphere of privatized labour and one of socialized labour, in which the latter sphere progressively assumes tasks previously carried out in the former. Women are cheap labour, according to Connelly, primarily because the value of men's labour power has historically included the costs of the whole family's maintenance and, therefore, the price of women's labour power need only cover the costs of their own (and not their children's) subsistence. Finally, having argued that women are

segregated in the occupational structure, and therefore cannot compete directly with men, Connelly maintained that women essentially represent direct competition only for women's jobs, that the female "institutionalized reserve" (in the home) functions to keep women's wages down. Women's presence in the work force might, according to Connelly, also indirectly threaten male workers' jobs and wages - because of the possibility that jobs will be relabelled (with respect to sex).

In spelling out the argument that women represent a labour reserve, as that argument has been developed so far, and in presenting empirical evidence to support the argument for the Canadian labour force, Connelly's book was invaluable. However, it raised as many questions as it answered. With respect to her first condition for establishing the notion that women are a labour reserve, we would argue that women must in fact be more than "available" for wage work: they must be in need of wage work. And in asserting that female labour is cheap primarily because the wage men earn covers the costs of family subsistence, Connelly seemed to preclude the argument that economic pressures on family finances pushed many married women into jobs outside the home.

In fact, whether or not men are paid a "family wage" varies across occupations, and has probably changed over time. (See Humphries, 1977, and Barrett and McIntosh, 1979, for discussions of the historical development of the "family wage.") In chapter 4, we shall investigate whether, in fact, all male "heads" of households have received a wage sufficient for family subsistence, over the course of the twentieth century in the United States.

Actually, however, Connelly made clear in another part of her argument that economic need was a key force in married women's entry into the work force. She argued a point we shall elaborate in chapter 4, and one that cannot be underestimated: the commodities necessary to a North American standard of living have risen faster than men's real wages. She also pointed to the research of Armstrong and Armstrong (1975), which attempted to establish that economic need was responsible for the presence of most women wage earners in the work force. Interestingly, the Armstrongs showed that between 1951 and 1971, in Canada, the percentage of income going to the lower three-fifths of individual wage earners had decreased while that received by the lower three-fifths of families had increased. That is, the rising phenomenon of second

wage earners had ensured the relative position of families, even though individual wages had become more disparate. This evidence supports the Armstrongs' (1975,381) argument that "the increasing disparity amongst wage earners in Canada provides strong[er] motivation for women to enter the labour force. In order to maintain the family's economic position, many wives must seek employment outside the home."

However, arguing that "by working, they forestall a relative drop in their share of income" does not argue that, for women, "the threat of an absolute drop in income was very real" (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1975, 383). It would be possible to receive a declining share of total income and, at the same time, because real income was rising, experience a rise in real income. The Armstrongs' jump from relative shares of income to economic need was, in short, logically problematic. A measure of living costs was an essential part of their argument which, nevertheless, remained absent. And, in fact, only in light of living costs would their argument that women entered the labour force in growing numbers in order to maintain their families' position relative to that of other families not remain essentially idealist.

Besides the argument that economic need increasingly pressured married women to enter the work force, Connelly also refers to Wally Seccombe's (1974, 1975) position that greater increases in productivity in the economy relative to those occurring the household meant that, increasingly, women could acquire means of subsistence more easily working for wages (and purchasing commodities) than by making them at home. Such a recognition on the part of household workers has, no doubt, been an important element in the trend towards their greater involvement in the work force. But there are problems with this type of explanation. Let us examine Seccombe's argument, which in fact springs from his theoretical analysis of household production, and its relation to capitalist production. Before reviewing Seccombe's argument, Margaret Benston's (1969) theory of domestic labour must be examined, since it represents the position to which Seccombe was responding.

Margaret Benston's (1969) article, "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation," opened the Marxist debate on domestic labour. She based her analysis of household production on an examination of the nature of its obvious products and the quality of its social relations. To Benston, household production is a

"pre-market," "reduplicative, kin-based, private" mode of production of use values, standing outside the sphere of market mechanisms. Women represent a distinct class - but not because they have a distinct relationship to the means of production. They are the "people who are responsible for the production of simple use values in those activities associated with the home and the family" (Benston, 1969, 201). Unfortunately, the household worker's relationship to her means of production was not explicitly analyzed, even though Benston stated (1969, 199) that "women as a group do indeed have a definite relation to the means of production... and this is different from that of men."

In limiting her analysis to a description of the household as a separate and parallel mode of production, a hold-over from precapitalist times, Benston took the position that there is no organic relationship between the household and "the economy." Rather, the functions performed by the household that meet the needs of capital provide, for Benston, the link between household production and capitalist commodity production. Specifically, the privatized household serves as the "production unit for housework and child-rearing," the "ideal consumption unit," and

the source of satisfaction of male (wage workers') emotional needs. Moreover, according to Benston (1969, 207), "the amount of unpaid labour performed by women is very large and very profitable to those who own the means of production." She argued that male wage earners and not capital pay for household labour. Of course, in so doing, she neglected the fact that, at the level of the whole working class, male workers' wages (in families with one wage earner) must pay for the subsistence of whole families or the system would self-destruct (since labour power would not be reproduced).

The tight functional "fit" between household and economy posited by Benston leaves little room for change. As well, while such a functional argument can explain why the privatized household is maintained, it cannot explain how it arose. Moreover, because Benston's argument began with functions or results instead of causes, it precluded the possibility of organic connections between the household and the capitalist production process. And because of this absence, the model generated a very weak explanation of the trend of married women's increased involvement in wage work.

Benston argued that housewives represent a reserve of labour, which capital can utilize as it needs. The mechanism that allocates women's time between the two production spheres is, for Benston, simply the variable need of capital for labour. Yet, she did not explain how a worker producing use values in a productive sphere governed by personal relationships is made to move into wage work, where the law of value has fashioned an alienating work process. In other words, the mechanism by which the needs of capital are translated into incentives or imperatives experienced by women was not made clear in her argument.

Unlike Benston, Wally Secombe (1975) attempted to specify what moved married women into wage work. The explanation appears to follow from his argument that because domestic labour is a form of independent commodity production (of the commodity labour power), it is at least indirectly subject to laws of motion that govern all forms of commodity production. In other words, Secombe argued that the law of value extends into the household ("indirectly impinges upon it") and allocates women's time between household work and wage work.

His specific argument rests on the fact that productivity rose faster in the sector of the economy

producing wage goods than it did in the household in the post-World War II period. Women could thus acquire more use values working in the sphere of capitalist production for wages than they could working the same amount of time producing similar subsistence goods in the household. It therefore made increasing "economic sense" to enter the wage work force.

This part of Seccombe's argument bears a striking similarity to that made by Jacob Mincer. The argument appears to be that the law of value, which is expressed through marketplace competition, provides the mechanism that imposes rational ordering of time on the household worker. However, such an analysis would have to demonstrate how the market mechanism extends into the household, quantifies the work performed by the domestic labourer, and compares it with other work.

Seccombe does not attempt to argue that market pressures governing all commodity production are at work in the household - although the logic of his discussion indicates such a position. His argument ultimately departs from Mincer's because he assumes that economic compulsion was the key component in the changing pattern of work for married women. Seccombe argues that productivity increases in the wage goods sector of the economy occurred in the context of an

inflating social (i.e., market) definition of the number and quality of commodity goods necessary for family reproduction. This raised the value of labour power, in spite of the potential that productivity increases provided for its lowering. Thus, Seccombe argues, domestic labourers experienced pressures to produce more (than was possible) in the household, which was falling further and further behind the wage goods sector of capitalist production with respect to productivity.

Unfortunately brief but ultimately quite provocative, Seccombe's explanation of the trend is only a partial one. For example, although he mentions changes over time in men's wages as the other factor (besides changes in productivity) that is potentially disruptive to the household cycle that reproduces labour power, he never considers actual trends in men's wages. This omission is perhaps the result of his focus on women's work instead of family reproduction. Yet, because domestic labour essentially involves the responsibility for the reproduction of labour power on a daily and a generational basis, through the provision of family subsistence, the household (and not the individual) is the unit of analysis most suitable for understanding changes in women's productive role.

Seccombe also neglects to explore the composition of the items increasingly assumed necessary for subsistence, and the changing material conditions (e.g., the means of production) of household work. In assuming perfect substitutability between the products of labour at home and labour in the wage goods sector of the economy, Seccombe fails to ask whether women are still able to produce, at home, the means of family subsistence. (Connelly's argument that the commodity content of what is necessary for family reproduction has expanded is relevant here.)

This insight, and others already suggested, can be used to formulate a more systematic explanation than has so far been offered of the trend of married women's growing involvement in wage work. In attempting to develop this explanation, we shall concentrate on the mechanism by which workers not producing for the market are made to feel market pressures. What must be recognized is that because female household workers direct their efforts to meeting human needs, their behaviour must often depart from a rational model. We think that specification of the mechanism calls for an analysis of the changing material conditions of women's domestic labour, examining, for example, the means of household production and the product of household

labour. Unlike other attempts to explain the trend, this approach reveals differences among women. And perhaps the greatest weakness with past explanations of the trend is the assumption that one explanation is sufficient for all women.

Obviously, an analysis of changes in the household labour of family reproduction must flow from a theory of domestic labour and its relation to capitalist production. Let us, then, elaborate such a theory before proposing (in chapter 4) an explanation of the growing importance of wage work in the lives of married women.

An alternative framework

We have already indicated what we see as the key shortcoming in Benston's analysis. Specifically, it seems to accurately describe the character of the household work process but it reveals no organic connection between it and capitalist production. Conceptually, the household is left hanging in space, a holdover from precapitalist times - despite its clear shaping by capitalist development. Yet, the attempt to correct for this apparent absence of a connection between the household and the capitalist work processes, namely the argument that domestic labour is

simple commodity production, governed by the law of value, seems to ignore real differences between this work and work that produces material products or services for the market.

A considerable amount of household labour is socially necessary (despite, for example, fast food chains) for the production and reproduction of labour power, which under capitalism assumes the form of a commodity. That is, there are no commercial substitutes for much of the management and preparation done by the household worker - none that are more efficient, at least. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Marx's abstract model of capitalist production, developed in volume I of Capital, located that effort outside the sphere of the production and reproduction of self-expanding value (i.e., capital) and even outside any process that produces the value embodied in labour power. This is only implied in the body of the text; it is only implicit in the logic of Marx's argument. However, he (1976, 1004) stated it directly in material he planned to publish as part of volume I, but which has only recently been reproduced as an appendix to the work:

In fact, of course, the worker must sustain his capacity for work with the aid of means of subsistence, but this, his private consumption, which is at the same time the

reproduction of his labour power, falls outside the process of producing commodities. (emphasis added)

In Marx's model of capitalist production, the value the wage worker creates in the part of the work day Marx called "necessary labour time" must equal the value of labour power, or the time socially necessary to reproduce the capacity for work, and the wage. That is, in Marx's schema, the labour time figuring in the value of labour power equals, in equilibrium, the labour time spent working for capital and producing the value whose equivalent is the wage. This equivalence between labour times that produce labour power and the value paid for by the wage is one instance of the general assumption, in Capital, that exchange involves things of equal value. The assumption is necessary to the labour theory of value, which rests on the notion that value does not arise in the exchange process but rather is created in the process of production.

Unlike the value of other commodities, the determination of the value of labour power has an historical element (what Marx called an "historical and moral component"). That is, the amount and quality of goods and services that are defined as necessary for subsistence are subject to cultural, social influence:

"subsistence" is socially defined. So, even an abstract determination of the value of labour power is difficult, since it is something that is in continual flux.

Moreover, when one moves from the high level of abstraction necessary to discuss labour power, to the level of concrete situations at particular points in time, the assumption that wages equal the value of labour power and the value produced in "necessary labour time" gives way to the question of how the absolute levels of particular wages are determined. That is, how is the value of labour power translated into its price? At that point, competition among workers, tradition, the level of labour militancy, the strength of capital, and other historical, situational, and market factors come into play.

Let us return to the abstract model, for the moment. Because of the equivalence of the time socially necessary (i.e., given the average level of skills and the newest household technology) for the reproduction of labour power and that for which the wage is payment, it seems clear that only labour that produces the commodities that the worker consumes adds to the value of his or her labour power. The most obvious reason is that if the socially necessary time

spent in household labour aimed at the maintenance of the male wage earner added to the value of his labour power, it is unlikely that he could produce for the capitalist an equivalent amount of value (plus surplus-value). For, even today, despite the aid of "fast foods" and permanent press clothing, about 26 hours of household work, on average, seem to be necessary (Vanek, 1974). And these hours would be additional to the hours of labour embodied in the commodities and services domestic labourers use in carrying out their weekly household work. Of course, there are substantial differences in the productivity of labour in the household and that in the capitalist work sector, so the hours spent in the household are not strictly comparable (as "abstract labour," or quantitatively) with those spent working for wages, unless the latter involve service jobs. Nevertheless, given the large time requirements for necessary household work and especially recognizing that in the decades prior to the development of easy-care fabrics and "fast foods", housework took even more time than it does today, we must at least question the quantitative possibility of including time spent in household labour in the calculation of the value of labour power.

There is a more compelling reason why only labour that produces the commodities and commercial services required by the wage labourer can be considered to contribute to the value of labour power. It is simply that not only must the labour time socially necessary to produce labour power be equal to "necessary time" spent in the sphere of capitalist production, but that additionally there must be a mechanism that quantifies and compares these two labour times. Of course, the market is the point at which this quantification and eventual equalization usually occurs. Through the market mechanism, when commodities are exchanged, the labour that contributed to their production is "abstracted" from its particular concrete quality, and quantified - and thus compared with other labours. Then, because of competition, different producers are continually subject to the law of value, which works to reduce the labour time socially necessary for all production.

Household work differs from other work processes chiefly because exchange (i.e., the market) does not mediate between the labour performed by the woman and the commodities the family must buy, or that performed by the wage worker under the aegis of capital and partly embodied in the wage. Domestic labour is never

abstracted, never quantified, because it is never subject to market forces such as competition. In other words, there is no (market) mechanism that would force the woman's labour time downward to equal the social average (i.e., no competition) or that could receive the use values she creates and return their value in the shape of the universal equivalent, money.

Unlike family farmers, for example, the results of housewives intensifying (or diminishing) their efforts towards the reproduction of labour power will not be more (or fewer) products that will earn them more (or less) cash on the market. When times are hard, family farmers can intensify their work efforts, produce more, and earn more cash in market sales (assuming each is small enough that his or her products have no effect on prices). Household workers in the same situation cannot double their efforts, produce a higher quality or quantity (of) labour power and thus earn more in (husbands') wages. They would probably intensify their household efforts, in that situation, but with an entirely different effect - one which we shall discuss below.

In short, household production is not aimed at the market. Consequently, there is no competition among housewives to produce a cheaper commodity, husband's

labour power, for they have invested nothing in its production that must be recovered. "Time is money" in the capitalist workplace, not in the household. That is, the market does not directly shape the production process.* In sum, then, the value relations in Marx's model require that the value of labour power be determined by labour time socially necessary for the production of basic subsistence commodities - and only commodities.

If, as I argued above, the value of the worker's labour power depends solely on the value of the necessary commodities that compose his means of subsistence, household labour creates no new value, but simply transfers the value of the commodities consumed to the worker's labour power. As well, however, the work a woman does in the home can substitute for commercial goods and services. So, to the extent that household work generally substitutes for purchases of goods and services, it effects a reduction in the value of wage workers' labour power.

We are arguing that the work done by married women in the household determines the mixture of homemade

 *For this reason, household work has never experienced significant reorganization similar to that industrial labour experienced.

goods (and services) and commercial goods (and services) that compose the worker's and his family's subsistence. To the extent that domestic labour generally performs certain essential services, it reduces the socially necessary labour time that is embodied in commodities and services necessary for subsistence and thus reduces the (social) value of labour power. This value of labour power is the equilibrium point around which wages move.

In terms of the determination of the value of the individual worker's labour power, to the extent that his wife can substitute products of her labour for commercial products, which are defined by a certain amount of value and must be purchased, she can reduce the value of the individual wage worker's labour power and thus "stretch" his wage. In short, household production can improve the level of living a wage will purchase. Consequently, in times when the working-class household is financially squeezed, the household worker can either intensify her labour at home or try to find wage work. The former course of action involves a substitution of the use values she produces and services she provides for commodities which, when purchased, raise the cost of daily living and (in value terms) add to the (individual) value of

her husband's labour power. In effect, she is attempting to reduce the individual value of the wage earner's labour power below, or keep it even with, its social value, which partly (and with a time lag) determines the wage he will attract. This would be the logical course of action when real wages fall or the price of commodities deemed necessary to subsistence rises.

Jean Gardiner (1975, 54) in her first article, seems to be making the same argument:

The contribution which domestic labour makes to surplus-value is one of keeping down necessary labour to a level that is lower than the actual subsistence level of the working class. For example, it could be argued that it is cheaper for capital to pay a male worker a wage sufficient to maintain, at least partially, a wife who prepares meals for him, than to pay him a wage on which he could afford to eat regularly at restaurants.

The argument, in short, is that household workers' efforts towards the reproduction of labour power do not directly create value. Domestic labour has an effect on the value of labour power, however, to the extent that its universal performance of necessary tasks reduces, at the level of society, the commercial goods and services necessary for labour power's reproduction. That is, household labour may reduce the labour time socially necessary for the reproduction of labour power

which determines its value (i.e., reduce the cost of daily life). In part, the durable means of production a housewife has will affect her ability to decrease these costs of reproduction; as well, the product expected of her, the socially defined "standard of living," will have a major effect on this ability.

We have argued that the household worker is not producing for market exchange, but rather to satisfy human needs. However, we must also point out that these needs are objects of social construction. So, unlike the use value production characteristic of pre-capitalist social formations, the fact that personal needs govern the household work process does not mean that there is a clear point at which the job is done. Rather, because needs are socially defined, and because capital requires consumption boosted by need creation (through advertising, for example), domestic labour does not have a built-in, well-defined termination point. The domestic labourer, the mother, the wife is ultimately responsible for her family's material welfare, their standard of living, and their satisfactory "personal life."

What is expected of the home environment, what is considered necessary for relaxation and recreation, what is deemed essential for rearing children, the

quality and variety demanded with respect to food and clothing, etc., are all defined by a capitalist marketplace. "A woman's work is never done" partly because these standards of family life and personal needs are continually inflating. Moreover, perhaps it is chiefly through this continually changing (and inflating) product of household work that capitalist production influences the work. So, for example, to the extent that housewives experience an absolute scarcity of time each day, it is largely because the task they have come to expect of themselves is virtually unbounded. That is probably why household workers often feel pressured to produce more in less time.

Furthermore, the work that occurs in the household cannot simply be characterized as use value production. Such a characterization implies a production process like that typical of pre-market societies: production predicated chiefly on control of the means of production. For the domestic labourer under capitalism, there is little possibility for the self-sufficient production of necessary subsistence goods. While she may own durable means of production, such as kitchen appliances, she is perpetually dependent upon the purchase of nondurable means of the

production of meals, namely the food itself. In short, household labour depends upon commodities as its means of production. Some of these the worker owns, some she does not.

Access to the nondurable means of household production occurs through the continual sale of (their own or their husbands') labour power. In other words, proletarianization is the basic condition of most housewives. Nevertheless, these women have special class interests. First, they occupy a unique position because of their sex. Household workers are dependent upon a man's wage (or on state subsidies). This is so even if female domestic labourers are themselves wage-earners, because men's wages are the only ones that are sometimes high enough to cover the costs of family subsistence. Thus, proletarian women are, in a sense, doubly dependent.

Second, the fact that household workers own the durable means of their production, that the private possession of housing and household facilities has grown over time in North America, probably has immediate consequences for women's consciousness. Working in a privatized sphere of production, with no relationship to the market and to capital certainly inhibits the development of working-class

consciousness. But perhaps equally key in the development of a block to the growth of class consciousness is the typical building up of private property over the life cycle of the family. Many working-class families experience the satisfaction of ownership, or at least possession (through credit purchasing mostly) of private property, although that ownership bestows no possibility of economic self-sufficiency (i.e., it does not change the proletarian condition of separation from the means of production of subsistence).

Focusing on the means of household production highlights a distinction which, at least until very recently, has existed between working-class and middle-class households. Until recently, working-class women have had to continually purchase not only their nondurable means of production (e.g., food) but also the use of those durable goods necessary for housework (e.g., laundry facilities). Middle-class housewives came to own virtually all of their durable means of production (i.e., household appliances) in the decades before and after World War II. This difference has consequences for women's involvement in wage work, as we shall see in chapter 4.

So, basically, because household means of production are commodities, and because the product of a woman's efforts - namely the family's continued existence, its standard of living - is socially defined and variable, the household work process and its workers are perpetetually influenced by forces emanating from the sphere of capitalist production. We have argued that although the household is a unit of production, because the household worker does not have any relationship with the market, a model of market rationality does not really fit her behaviour. However, because means of domestic production are commodities, accessible only through the wage, to the extent that scarcity characterizes the relationship between wages, or means of production, and the product expected of household work, the housewife must try to make economically rational decisions about how to allocate her time. That is, for families who experience a scarcity of means of production, that scarcity may provide the mechanism that promotes market rationality in the household.*

 *For example, depending on the level of the wage, the housewife will buy either expensive or cheap food, and will use it in either exotic or food-stretching recipes. She will make these choices in the context of a social definition of what constitutes a meal. She is

Moreover, because household work is the production of the wage earner's labour power, simply because it is work, there is a built-in tendency towards decreasing the woman's labour, especially since there are substitutes for homemade goods. Thus, the response to the wage earner bringing home high wages would be a tendency to substitute commodities for the woman's labour - and minimize her household work. However, because the woman's household production is, at the same time, family members' consumption, there is an inherent tendency towards increasing the woman's labour. That, in fact, is the other reason why the household cannot be held to operate under laws of motion that guide commodity production. Because the housewife's work is, simultaneously, the family's consumption, all other things equal, the more effort the woman makes in the home, the better family living

 obviously making economically rational choices. However, the actual choices she makes are not often the same as those that would be made by a commodity producer. For example, if the household worker is assumed to be operating like a commodity producer, and her labour is held to be productive of value, a low wage (or selling price of the commodity she produced) should bring about adjustments towards increasing the productivity of labour inputs to the commodity. But, in actuality, a low wage results in increases in her household labour (i.e., that of relatively low productivity) and shifts away from the inputs of higher productivity labour embodied in commodities.

will be. With increases in the wage package, the initial tendency would be to substitute commodities for homemade goods, but there is probably in the long run a tendency towards increasing the labour of the household worker as wages rise and a higher quality of living is expected. For, with respect to food at least, homemade is still held to be preferable to something commercially produced. But, perhaps more important than production of material things is the planning and coordination of family life that assumes increasing importance as the standard of family living rises.

Thus, because household work is at the same time consumption, there are opposing tendencies at work in the household, one promoting reductions in a woman's work time and the other promoting increases. The two tendencies are perpetually in operation. So, while in the instance where there is a scarcity of means of household production, and market rationality imposes its rule on the behaviour of the household worker, it does so only to the extent that the consumption needs of family members are neither at variance with its dictates nor of greater strength. At times, family consumption needs will in fact be in accord with the incentives of market rationality, but at other times they will be opposed to them - and will overrule them.

In chapter 4, we shall, in trying to understand the influx of married American women into wage work, focus on the household as a sphere of production, but production for use, and thus one in which consumption needs can govern behaviour, for the household worker produces family subsistence. Thus, we shall focus on changes in the means of household production, in the consequent organization of domestic work, and especially in the relation between means of production and this socially-defined product, family subsistence.

CHAPTER 4

THE INCREASING INVOLVEMENT OF MARRIED WOMEN IN WAGE WORK IN THE UNITED STATES: A CLASS ANALYSIS

The Timing and Composition of the Influx

If there were a decade (or two) in which the major influx of married women into wage work occurred, and if that decade (or those decades) were different from the others in terms of changes in the relationship between wages (or salaries) and the cost of living, an explanation of the influx would not be difficult. If the increased involvement in wage work occurred for women from households largely in one income group, the explanation would be greatly simplified. However, the trend we must explain provides no such clear evidence of its underlying causes. In other words, we must assume that it arose from a complexity of social changes.

There were no unique periods of increase in married women's labour force involvement in the United States. In fact, perhaps the only certain conclusion that can be made about the shape of the trend is that

it involved an increase between the late nineteenth century and 1970. And even that conclusion has been challenged (see Jaffe, 1956, and Smuts, 1960). Nevertheless, given the underestimation of married women's involvement in market-directed work in both those early censuses which enumerated "gainful occupation" and the later censuses which measured labour force involvement, we conclude that the trend involves a substantial and even dramatic increase over time. (See Appendix B for a full discussion of the issues involved in measuring the trend.)

Because the monetary contribution married women made to their households was likely to be overlooked by census enumerators in the pre-1940 censuses, there was no doubt sizeable underestimation of women's wage work in those years. More important, though, is the fact that the estimated "gainful occupation" rates for those years cannot be compared with the labour force participation rates from 1940 on. We cannot determine, for example, the extent of the increase in married women's involvement in wage work during the crucial depression years of the 1930s. However, the census figures from 1940 on are comparable, though perhaps uniformly a bit low since intermittent workers were not necessarily at work during the period (i.e., a week)

relevant to the enumeration. An examination of the increases in married women's employment during these decades shows substantial changes for all of them, the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. (See table 16.) Furthermore, it appears that the major influx of married women into the wage work force occurred in the decades during and following World War II.*

The increases were not significantly greater for women whose husbands had low incomes than for those whose husbands had high incomes: married women from households in all income categories of the population extended their labour force participation between 1940 and 1970. (See table 17.) Since there is, at any point in time, a negative relationship between married women's involvement in wage work and husbands' incomes, we might have expected the influx to have come disproportionately from women in lower-income households. However, as the data in table 17 indicate, when husband-wife families are divided into (approximate) population fifths, according to husbands' incomes, it is apparent that there occurred between

 *There is no reason to believe that if the underestimation in the early censuses were corrected, the early ten-year increments would be greater than the ones after 1940.

1940 and 1970 percentage point increases in married women's labour force participation which were virtually equal for each category of husbands' income.

There were differences in the change over time among these broad income categories. But more important than the differences is the fact that sizeable increases in the numbers of married women wage workers took place for households in all categories of husbands' income. The percentage increases since 1940 were, then, higher the higher the income category, because such a low percentage of married women in higher income categories was in the work force in 1940.

As a consequence of the fact that the trend represented all (broad) income sectors of the population, differences in the labour force participation of married women whose husbands' incomes are different decreased over this thirty-year period. The ratio of the participation rate of women from the lowest income fifth to that of women from the highest income fifth was over 3 to 1 in 1940 but only about 1.4 to 1 in 1970. Nevertheless, there remained in 1970 an inverse relationship between husbands' incomes and wives' labour force participation.

Basically, married women whose husbands' incomes were at or below the median were considerably

overrepresented in the work force in 1940, and they were only slightly overrepresented there in 1970. Similarly, in 1940 married women whose husbands' incomes were above the median were considerably underrepresented in the work force, and only slightly underrepresented there in 1970. (See table 18.) A comparison of the percentages of married women in the labour force with the percentages of all married women (i.e., in husband-wife families), distributed according to husbands' incomes, shows that about 14% of the work force of married women would have had to be redistributed (i.e., fewer coming from low-income families and more from high-income families) with respect to husbands' income in 1940 in order that the two percentage distributions be equal. By 1970, only about 5% of the work force of married women would have had to be redistributed, for married women to be represented in the work force the same way they were in all husband-wife families. Yet, it is significant that even after the substantial influx into wage work of women from all income groups, women whose husbands' incomes are at or below the median remain in the labour force in higher percentages than their distribution in the general population would warrant. (See table 18.)

In conclusion, there are two key facts that must inform any explanation of the recent influx of married women into wage work in the United States. First, more women from all income categories were working in 1970 than in 1940. Because there were substantial increases for all married women, we suspect that the configuration of precipitating conditions will be different for different types of women, especially for women from households in different income categories. Consequently, we shall offer two explanations for two different material conditions, one that we shall call "working class" and the other that shall be labelled "middle class."*

Second, because wage work continues to be more important in the lives of women from lower-income households than in those of women from higher-income households, our understanding of the reasons why working-class women so increased their labour force involvement will be especially crucial.

Because we are dealing with a change over time in the relationship between the household as a unit of

 *Unfortunately, the data do not exist that would allow an investigation of the class backgrounds of women in the labour force in 1940 and in 1970, similar to the investigation shown for income background in table 17.

production and "the economy" when we seek causes of the trend, and because that relationship is not clear, our approach (so far) has been to examine the changes that have occurred in this relationship since the late nineteenth century, even though the bulk of the female influx into wage work occurred after 1940. That is, we examine the changes over a long time period, to capture greater variations. It is not clear how impulses generated in "the economy" make themselves felt in the household. And that is our chief concern here. We continue to assume that these issues might become clearer by examining their development over as long a period of time as is possible.

Our specific approach in the investigation will be to focus on the household and its chief task of reproducing daily life. We shall look for changes in the means of household production, and in the product expected of the domestic labourer (i.e., the housewife). We shall also consider differences among households with respect to access to nondurable means of production and ownership of durable means of household production. To the extent that changes in these material factors conditioning women's productive roles do not totally account for the trend towards greater labour force involvement, we shall examine

changes in ideology about women's role and other forms of changing expectations with respect to married women.*

Working-Class Women

By the turn of the century, American working-class households were dependent upon a continual flow of cash for shelter, food, and other essentials of urban living, except perhaps clothing. That is, basic means of family subsistence were commoditized, and accessible only on a cash basis. In chapter 2, we saw that many of the resources and facilities necessary for the household production of food were absent in working-class urban households from the turn of the century. Only with respect to clothing were significant numbers of working-class housewives able to produce homemade substitutes for commercial goods.

 *Before introducing our explanation of the increase in married women's labour force participation, we should note that it is not due to the growing proportions of married women living apart from their husbands. Married women whose husbands are absent from the household represent a decreasing proportion of married women in the work force. In 1940, 16.2% of married women in the labour force were not living with their husbands, while in 1970 only 8.3% of married women in the labour force were not living with their husbands (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, 133).

The question which immediately arises, in light of this cash dependence for access to necessary means of subsistence, is whether men typically earned wages high enough to support their families. While an exact answer to the question is not possible, dollar estimates of minimum family budgets (for a family of five) and average men's wages and salaries will allow us a tentative answer. Fortunately, in the United States efforts to estimate a minimum family budget have been made through the twentieth century, and average wage figures have also been calculated through the century.

For the first three decades of the century, efforts to estimate a minimum family budget took the form of scattered studies of the budgets of select samples of working-class households, carried out under government auspices or with private funding.* We have referred to some of these studies already, in chapter 2. Basically, the family budget studies tried to determine "minimum requirements of health, decency, and self-respect according to standards prevailing"

 *These studies are reviewed in Standards of Living: A Compilation of Budgetary Studies, volume I and II, by the Bureau of Applied Economics (1920, 1932) and Family Budgets of American Wage Earners: A Critical Analysis, by the National Industrial Conference Board (1921).

(National Industrial Conference Board, 1921, 50). A family of five was assumed for the estimate. In order to determine a minimum dollar requirement, most studies relied on an empirical determination of the amount of income necessary before households went into debt, usually combined with decisions made both by "experts" and the housewives themselves with respect to quantities and types of items necessary for "health and decency." Housewives' choices were used in those studies in which some of the subjects kept detailed accounts of their household expenses and income.

In 1919, the Bureau of Labor Statistics constructed a standard of minimum quantities of items necessary for "health and decency," after surveying a large sample of representative working-class households, and considering experts' opinions about essentials. Until the 1940s, most minimum family budget estimates were based on this list of essentials, and local prices. Since the list represents a definition of subsistence for American working-class families at that time, let us review the list of items.

With respect to housing, one room per person plus a bathroom was deemed essential. Necessary food intake was placed at 3500 calories daily for each adult male (and a fraction thereof for other family members).

Clothing requirements were, of course, more arbitrary, not only with respect to what was essential, but also in terms of determining what had to be purchased readymade. The Bureau's (1919, 1313) decision was that "in preparing this quantity budget, a considerable amount of sewing at home has been assumed as possible... where little or no home sewing can be done, the number of garments allowed will be barely sufficient to maintain decency." In other words, the dollar minimum allotted for clothing could not be reduced through household efforts. Household appliances, furniture, and other implements were all assumed to be owned; only the costs of annual upkeep were tallied. Remaining goods and services listed in the budget involved those having to do with cleaning, health, insurance, carfare (for those without a private automobile), recreation, information (i.e., newspapers), organizational membership, and incidentals like making telephone calls, smoking, and writing letters. The costs of car ownership, the original purchase of household equipment and furniture, the purchase of a radio, the rental of a telephone, and any form of educational costs were not included in this budget of essential goods and services.

The minimum family budget standards are listed in table 19. Ideally, a minimum income estimate should be compared with the median wage for the local area where the budget estimate was made. A full distribution of local wages would be even better: then, we could determine the percentage of households with incomes below that judged to be essential. Unfortunately, because of the limitations of existing data, we are forced to be satisfied with a comparison of national mean wages* for men (shown in table 20) and the minimum budget standards estimated for different cities (shown in table 19).

Let us review the comparisons. In 1910, mean earnings for males (deducting for unemployment) were about \$568. Yet, the estimated minimum family income was \$825 in New York in 1907, \$675 in Buffalo in 1908, \$915 in a Pennsylvania mill town in 1907-08, and \$800 in Chicago in 1909-10. Only in two small textile communities, in 1908, was the minimum budget estimated to be lower than \$568. While the average wage (or

 *With respect to income distributions, means are typically higher than medians. Consequently, we will be able to assume that if the mean wage is below the minimum budget standard, the median would surely be below it. And thus we can conclude that 50% or more of male wage earners make less than the dollar minimum.

salary) paid men in 1914 was about \$614, the minimum budget in New York City in 1914-15 was estimated to be between \$845 and \$876, and about \$747 in Buffalo. In 1917, 1918, and 1919, when prices were rising rapidly, mean income for men was about \$830, \$1080, and \$1242, respectively. But estimated minimum budgets were \$1637 for Philadelphia between 1916 and 1918, and \$1803 in 1919; \$1386 for New York City in 1918; and \$1268 for Fall River, Massachusetts, in 1919. Men's average wages were about \$1376 and \$1082 in 1920 and 1921, respectively. The minimum family budget estimated for Philadelphia was \$1988 for 1920 and \$1742 for 1921. Estimates made in 1920 for other cities varied between \$1374 in the South and \$1733 in the North. In 1921, between \$2067 and \$2573 were judged to be the minimum levels necessary for city living. In 1923 and 1924, mean income for male wage earners was estimated to be \$1361 and \$1336, respectively, while \$1854 was estimated to be the minimum budget in Philadelphia in 1923, and \$1921 was estimated to be the minimum in Muncie in 1924. Men's average wages were \$1466 in 1926 and \$1469 in 1927. Yet, between \$1442 and \$1567 were estimated to be necessary for family living in small cities, and between \$1552 and \$1880 were deemed necessary in large cities for those years. Finally,

while the mean wage for men was \$1454 in 1928, income between \$2055 and \$2511 was estimated to be minimal for urban living that year.

This necessarily crude comparison leaves us with a rather remarkable conclusion: in a sizeable proportion of households during the first few decades of the twentieth century the male wage earner did not make enough money to support his family. It seems that as many as 50% of all households were in this precarious position. Our conclusion is supported by the research of others. In 1913, Scott Nearing estimated that half of all wage earners in small towns and three-fourths of those in large cities were not earning an annual income sufficient for family subsistence. Similarly, Sam Bass Warner (1968, 211) estimated that in the 1920s in Philadelphia over 48% of households (including all wage earners in the family) earned less than \$2000 annually - not much more than the \$1854 estimated to be the minimum standard in 1923.

Despite the evidence supporting our conclusion, we must not ignore problems inherent in the comparison of a national mean wage for males and various local minimum budget estimates for a family of five. The basic problem is that we are comparing two single summary measures. The single wage figure and the

single budget figure, for families of one size, no doubt obscure tremendous variation. Without knowledge of the population distributions of these variables, we cannot be sure that these "summary measures" actually summarize the data. For example, the budget standard was constructed for a family of five. Yet, at any point in time, all families are at different stages in their life cycle and five may be the average size of only those families at the point in their development when they are largest. Instead of a single budget minimum, we should ideally use estimates for families of all different sizes, and consider them according to the proportion of families of those designated sizes in the population. Furthermore, aside from the statistical problem that a single figure cannot capture population variation, using five as an average family size is problematic: average family size has been about three-and-a-half during the twentieth century.

Using a mean wage also creates problems, some of which would lead to an overestimation of the proportion of households with inadequate incomes, and others of which would generate an underestimation of the proportion of such households. Because the wage estimate combines wages paid in metropolises, cities, small towns, and even farms, it is perhaps risky to

compare it with budget standards based on prices in local areas. There is no doubt a relationship between the levels of local wages and prices. That relationship between prices and wages which exists, however weakly, in the real world is ignored in our comparison using two single summary measures. Ignoring this correspondence may inflate our estimate of the proportion of households with inadequate incomes.

Nevertheless, a mean wage figure also represents a combination of occupations which vary widely with respect to the levels of wages. And since a statistical mean is pulled toward the high end of a frequency distribution skewed in that direction, occupations such as those of doctor, lawyer, etc., no doubt raise the figure we are forced to use well above what it would be if based only on the wages of nonprofessionals - and, more importantly, above the wage level that would divide the population in half. Reliance on a mean wage for all male workers thus causes underestimation of the proportion of households with inadequate incomes. A median wage is a more desirable summary measure, and it would be even lower than a mean wage for the same occupations. In sum, we proceed with the assumption that the inflation of the wage figure compensates for the inflation that is

present in the minimum family budget estimate, due to the use of a family of five as the standard. We are left, then, with a (hopefully small) overestimation of the proportion of households in which the man does not earn a "family wage," due to the forced comparison of a national average wage and local prices.

Actually, the minimum budget figures for the late 1920s at least are underestimates. Although the 1920s were years of tremendous change in the commodity content of family means of subsistence, the "basket of goods" determined in 1919 to be essential remained the quantity standard for estimates made throughout this period. Consequently, when in 1927 a revised estimated minimum budget included possession of an automobile, a telephone, and a radio - all determined to be essential by the National War Labor Board - the cost of living was judged to be \$2844, over \$1000 higher than figures based on the 1919 "basket of goods" (Bureau of Applied Economics, 1932). That is, the estimated minimum was double the mean wage.

If we can conclude, despite these methodological problems, that 50% of married men were unable to support their families on their wages (or salaries) alone, we can then conclude that the majority of working-class men were unable to do so. Given the

problems we discussed above, if we can only conclude conservatively that many married men earned incomes below what was necessary for the support of families, then we can still conclude that a large proportion of working-class men were in that position.

How did working-class households survive this cash shortage, in the early decades of the twentieth century? Clearly, they did survive. The working class did reproduce itself. Yet, it did so at a low standard of living. A household did not either achieve the budget minimum and survive, or fail to achieve it and disappear. There were various degrees of survival, and there were varied ways of compensating for inadequate cash incomes. Nevertheless, it appears that working-class housewives lacked many of the household resources necessary for the substantial production of homemade substitutes for commercial goods, especially with respect to food, which is usually the largest item in working-class budgets. As we saw in chapter 2, early twentieth-century working-class households typically relied on commercially prepared food, and many even purchased most of their clothing.* A very

 *Byington (1910) reported that bread was, in fact, probably cheaper to buy than to make. And of the small number of staples in working-class diets, bread was

low standard of living was thus the chief consequence of inadequate wages.

Clearly, a second wage was needed. According to the evidence, other family members regularly added cash to working-class household funds. In fact, children represented the most usual source of supplementary funds. But housewives too often worked for wages, and even more often made money taking in boarders or doing domestic chores such as washing, sewing, and cleaning for others. From the early working-class household budget studies, we can obtain a fairly clear idea of the extent to which children and wives brought money into the household.

Near the turn of the century, several studies by the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicated the extent to which children and wives supplemented men's earnings.* In 1890, a sample of the families of workers in iron, steel, and coal industries was studied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Although average income in the

probably the only thing that could be made at home.

*None of the early working-class family budget studies used probability samples. Consequently, it is somewhat risky to see them as representative of working-class households in general. Therefore, when we discuss their findings, we provide as well information on the sample (e.g., average wage) which allows comparison with the population, and a very rough idea of how typical the sample was.

sample was above the national average, only 64.5% of sample households were supported solely by the man's income. In about 17% of the households the man and one or more of his children worked for wages; in about 24.5% of the households the woman kept boarders (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1890). Children were much more likely to earn wages than were their mothers, and when they did they typically earned twice the amount made by women who either worked for wages or kept boarders. In 1892, a similar sample of the families of workers in cotton and woolen industries was studied. Again, the average income in the sample was above that in the population. But only 31% of these households were supported solely by the man (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1892). Children earned wages in fully 44% of the sample households. In 14% of them the wife worked for wages, and in 36% of them the wife earned income by keeping boarders. In this sample too, when children worked they contributed twice as much money to household maintenance as that contributed when wives worked for cash, inside or outside the home.

Men in this sample did, however, contribute the bulk of household income: on average, they supplied about 65% of it. In 1903, a large national sample of working-class families showed that, on average, men

contributed about 79% of household income. About 22% of sample households received income from wages earned by children, about 8.5% had income from wages earned by women, and in approximately 23% of households the housewives kept boarders or lodgers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1904).

Studies undertaken over the next few decades indicate that women and children continued to be relied upon as sources of supplementary household income. In 1907, Louise More studied working-class families living in the lower West Side in New York, who "lived on the edge of (financial) disaster." In almost half of these households (i.e., 46.5%) the wife contributed money to family subsistence, above and beyond that earned by housing boarders! There were boarders or lodgers in 31% of these households. According to More, when children were old enough not to need looking after, women typically did whatever they could to earn money. These efforts frequently involved taking in wash or doing janitorial work. And despite the frequency of women's money-earning activities, in 37% of the households studied children earned money.

Several years after More's study, again in New York City, Robert Chapin (1909) studied a sample of families whose incomes were between \$500 and \$1000, and

who were "normal": they consisted of a wage-earning man, a woman, and children. Despite the specification that they be "normal" nuclear families, in only 47% of the households was the man the sole financial support. Children earned money in 15% of the households, and the woman contributed cash - aside from keeping boarders or lodgers - in 18% of them. There were boarders or lodgers living in 34% of the households. Finally, Chapin (1909) discovered that the proportion of family income contributed by the man decreased as family income increased. In a study complementary to Chapin's, carried out in Buffalo by John Howard Jr. (1909), 37% of households used supplementary earnings contributed by children or other sources besides the wife, and 29% of the married women earned money.

A study of the families of workers in a Pennsylvania steel mill town, by Margaret Byington (1910), showed that even though there were few jobs for women and children, men provided the sole support in only 59% of the households. Older boys typically worked, and boarders or lodgers were common. For example, about 42% of Slavic families, who constituted the poorest group in the community, took in lodgers.

Households in cotton mill communities were especially unlikely to subsist on one wage. In two

very small samples of cotton mill families with a "decent standard of living," one in the South and one in the North, typically over three people per family contributed to the running of the household. In this sample, there were no instances of households supported on the wages of one worker (Worcester and Worcester, 1911). Of course, cotton mill owners probably purposely paid wages that would force households to send several members to work: samples of these households were no doubt especially poor replicas of working-class households in general. Accordingly, a 1920 study of cotton mill workers in the Kensington area of Philadelphia indicated that only 22% were supported solely out of the men's earnings. In 48% of these households there were two or more workers and in 56% there were boarders or lodgers (Little and Cotton, 1920).

Cotton mill families may not be representative of other working-class families. Nevertheless, in all of these studies, regardless of the area studied, the type of sample chosen, or the occupation of the workers in the sample, the findings were consistent with each other: most working-class households relied on income additional to that earned by the man. Later studies simply confirmed many of the findings mentioned so far.

Even the disposition of children's earnings was found to confirm what the earlier studies had only suggested. For example, the New York State Factory Investigating Committee concluded, in 1915, that working girls living at home typically turned over all of their earnings to their mothers (Streightoff, 1915). In fact, reliance of households on the earnings of a working girl was common enough to warrant editorial comment in a 1910 issue of Ladies Home Journal .*

Chapin's (1909) finding of a declining proportional contribution made by men as household income rose was replicated by a 1919 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics study. In families with incomes below \$900, the man contributed, on average, 94% of the money; in families with incomes between \$2100 and \$2500, the man contributed, on average, 64% of the money. The contribution made by the "household head", as a percentage of total income, decreased monotonically as family income rose. Children principally filled the gap in the finances. As income rose, the percentage of households receiving money from

 *It argued that young women who worked should be treated with respect and given privileges girls were otherwise denied. For example, they should be allowed to sleep late on weekend mornings and not be responsible for any of the housework.

their children increased tremendously (again, rising monotonically): in only about 8% of households with incomes below \$900 did children contribute monetarily, while they contributed in about 71% of those with incomes above \$2500 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1919, 34).

The importance of boarders, and the money women made in the home, were apparent in all of these later studies. In a Philadelphia study of skilled- and unskilled-workers' families, carried out in 1919, boarders and lodgers were found to be present in 35% of the households. And in 11.5% of them the housewife earned money unrelated to the keeping of boarders (Beyer et al., 1919).

Through the 1920s, working men's wages were typically insufficient to support a family, according to family budget studies. In a 1927 study of employed, unskilled-workers' families, Leila Houghteling estimated that 69% of those families who were renting their housing had total incomes below the figure estimated to be the minimum family budget standard for Chicago. Consequently, almost as many were in debt. In this sample, only 57% of households were supported on the man's wages alone. In 23% of them the children worked, and in 23% of them the housewife worked for

wages.

Finally, a large sample of families in six industrial neighbourhoods in Philadelphia sought specifically to determine why many married women worked for wages. In this sample, only 45% of households were supported solely by the man's wages (Kingsley, quoted in Hughes, 1925). Of the married women working for wages, aside from those who were widowed, deserted, or married to men whose health prevented them from working, 48% specified insufficiency of their husbands' wages as the cause. Another 22% reported that their husbands did not support them. Only 22% said that they worked out of some kind of preference, such as the desire to purchase things they labelled "luxuries" - but which, Hughes noted, were things most Americans considered to be necessities.

Hughes (1925) also probed into the circumstances surrounding the keeping of lodgers or boarders, and the benefits their presence generated. She found that boarders and lodgers were much more likely to be found in the homes of women who were without husbands than in those of women living with their husbands. Moreover, it appeared that there were certain minimum requirements in housing before women took in boarders or lodgers. As housing facilities improved, in this

working-class sample, so too did the likelihood that boarders or lodgers lived in the household. Finally, the benefits households derived from having nonfamily household members were not necessarily directly monetary; but they were always at least indirectly monetary. Besides rent-paying boarders or lodgers, there were those relatives who provided services like babysitting, which freed the women for wage work outside the home.

Wage work done by family members to supplement the earnings of the adult male, was thus quite common in the United States, at least up to the Depression of the 1930s. As our calculations and the family budget studies indicate, a large proportion of working-class men made incomes insufficient for family subsistence. In fact, the percentages of households supported solely by the man varied in these studies between 22% and 64%, and clustered around 50%. Consequently, the evidence indicates, it was usual that the housewife or, even more likely, one or more of the children worked for wages. Between 15% and 44% of the families in those early samples of working-class households counted children's wages in their annual income. Between 12% and 46% of the households studied had income from wages earned by the women. The 1930 Census supports the

findings derived from these nonprobability samples: in only 62% of all families that year was there only one wage earner. Additionally, for the housewife, keeping boarders or lodgers was more likely than doing wage work. In the family budget studies, between 20% and 56% of households included boarders or lodgers.

Home economist Hazel Kyrk (1933) estimated that in the 1920s and 1930s, about one-fifth of all urban married women contributed financially to the running of their households. She might have guessed that at least twice that proportion of working-class urban households, examined at any point in time, had income from work done by the wife. Indeed, if thought of in terms of the life cycle of households, it is probably safe to say that at some time in the existence of virtually all working-class households the housewife not only fulfilled her domestic responsibilities but also earned cash to keep the household going.

While all working-class married women probably contributed money to the household budget at some time during their lives, in these early decades of the century, the domestic work they performed daily probably had a more crucial effect on the household budget. Urban working-class households had limited facilities: usually no outside space for a garden, no

running water or electricity until the 1920s, and antiquated heating and cooking facilities. Thus, as we noted above, because of these limitations with respect to durable means of household production, and a resulting limitation of time, working-class households relied almost exclusively upon commercial means of subsistence. That is, subsistence was on a cash basis, for the most part. Consequently, married women's skills at shopping often determined whether the family survived in health and out of debt, or plunged into chronic poor health and perpetual debt. Nevertheless, we must qualify our conclusion that little could be contributed materially by the housewife to family subsistence - and therefore only her shopping skills had an effect on the standard of living - since many working-class women had sewing machines and were thus able to make and remake their own and their children's clothing.

Most of the studies of early twentieth-century working-class households stress the importance of women's skills in shopping. More (1905) noted significant differences in the standard of living of different households living on the same wage, due to variations in the shopping skills of the women. Similarly, after determining that many families were

undernourished, Chapin (1909, 322) concluded that "the explanation of the failure...to live well is not so much a question of ability to purchase nourishing food at the price given (22 cents per man per day) as of injudicious buying." Byington (1910) was especially impressed by the extent to which housewives could affect the budget. She (1910, 63) noted that food was the family's biggest expense, and that it was also the expense "which, by thrift and ability, housewives can reduce without lessening the comfort of the family." She observed (1910, 75) that "by planning ahead, by extra labor, by wise buying, even luxuries were secured on a food expenditure of only 24 cents per person per day."

While shopping was the household chore of most consequence to working class budgets, even with limited household facilities some housewives apparently were able to produce homemade substitutes for commercial goods. More, Chapin and Byington all indicated that the household manufacture of clothing was common for the working class. And More's case studies vividly revealed differences among families with approximately the same incomes attributable to home sewing. In some, all of the children's clothing was purchased. Necessarily cheaply-made, such clothing lasted a short

time and the children appeared to be shabbily dressed. In other households, the children's clothing was made and remade - and these children looked better cared for. Moreover, Byington (1910) found that even in households bare of furniture, there was apt to be a sewing machine.

Finally, even working-class housewives sometimes could substitute homemade food for commercial products. Around 1910, in working-class areas in both Buffalo (Howard, 1909), and a Carnegie steel mill town in Pennsylvania (Byington, 1910), there was evidence of vegetable gardens, and poultry in private yards. However, as the years passed, most activities involved in actually producing food, like the keeping of hens, probably became less possible in cities.

Nevertheless, the processing of food has always been a possibility even for working-class housewives. During the depression years of 1907-09, Byington (1910, 77) noted that she was "surprised to see how quickly certain housewives rose to the emergency in their determination that the family should feel this change as little as possible." No doubt, some home processing of food occurred as well during the Depression of the 1930s. Working-class housewives were then better equipped than earlier for household production: they

had at least acquired running water and electricity. Milkman (1976) has, in fact, provided some evidence of increases in the household processing of food during the Depression (as we have seen in chapter 2).

Nevertheless, the limitations of such efforts at home production, in the face of an absolute scarcity of cash, are probably of most significance. As Hughes (1925, 11) concluded in her study of women working for wages, many a woman could not "invest her time and ingenuity in sufficient economies and makeshifts [in the home] to make up for the shortage of money income earned by her husband. Either the family expenditures must be reduced beyond the limit of comfort and decency or additional sources of money income must be found." During the early decades of the twentieth century, in spite of the inadequacy of the man's wage in a large proportion of households, it may have been economically rational in these same households for women to spend their time performing (as optimally as possible) their domestic tasks. There were often other family members who could work for wages. And the household tasks for which the women were responsible critically affected the budget. But, during the 1930s, for those many households in which cash became even scarcer than in previous years, it would no doubt have been more

rational for the housewife to seek wage work. The chief problem then was, no doubt, scarcity of jobs, especially jobs for women.

If the inadequacy of one wage persisted in a large proportion of working-class households through the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, then rising demand for women workers will suffice to explain the influx of married women into wage work which occurred during those decades. In fact, the evidence indicates that the need for more than one wage earner persisted through these recent years. Tables 20 and 21 allow a comparison of median wages (and salaries) earned by men with family budget standards. Actually, these budget figures are not for "subsistence" levels, as were the former standards. Rather, they represent a "modest but adequate" budget, and thus measure a higher level of living than did the "minimum family budgets" constructed earlier. However, a factor that perhaps compensates for the difference in the levels of the early and the recent standards is the use of the family of four as the standard for these later budget figures. (That difference in family size lowers these figures about 20%.)

In 1946, the estimated budget adequate for urban households was between \$2345 and \$2718, varying from

city to city. The average (mean) male wage was actually above these amounts. However, when price controls were removed, prices inflated and the budget standard rose to between \$3092 and \$3546 for large cities in 1947. (We estimated that about \$2900 was necessary for living in smaller cities.) The mean wage for men was only \$2860 that year. The same pattern held in 1949: men's average wages were below the estimated standard. In 1951, when between \$3812 and \$4454 was estimated as essential in large cities, and approximately \$3300 was necessary in small cities, 50% of men earning wages or salaries were making less than \$3216. In 1959, between \$5370 and \$6567 was estimated to be necessary for "adequate" living in large American cities, while 50% of male wage earners made less than approximately \$4696.

Actually, for 1959 we can be more exact about the percentage of married men living with their wives who earned less than the adequate budget standard, since the census provides the appropriate income distribution. According to these census data, about two-thirds of married men earned incomes below the "adequate standard" for large city living and a little over half of married men earned less than the amount estimated to be necessary for adequate living in small

cities (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1963, 2).

Finally, by 1966, the gap between the budget standard and men's median wage seemed even greater than it was earlier. About \$9376 was estimated to be necessary for an adequate level of living in a large city, and about \$8366 was judged to be essential in smaller cities. Yet, 50% of male wage earners made less than approximately \$6345.

In the context of families' persistent need for a second wage earner, the chance that children would step into the role was diminishing. Educational requirements were inflating, and the school year was lengthening. As can be seen in table 22, the school attendance of all children increased significantly between 1910 and 1970, but it increased especially dramatically for young adults 16 years of age and older. In 1910, about 90% of children 10 to 13 years of age, about 81% of children 14 years of age, and about 68% of children 15 years of age attended school. That year, only 30% of boys and 44% of girls 16 to 17 years of age were in school. Only about 18.5% of people 18 and 19 years of age, about 9% of boys 20 years old, and about 8% of girls 20 years old attended school in 1910. So, in 1910 about three-fourths of children older than 16 years of age, and probably a

higher percentage of working-class children, were not attending school and were thus available for employment.

By 1940, before the major increases in the labour force participation of married women, most children younger than 16 were in school, and almost 70% of children 16 to 17 years of age were attending school. While school attendance figures that separate urban from rural youth are not available, it is probably safe to assume that school attendance was greater in urban areas. That is, by 1940 it was probably common for most urban working-class youth 16 and 17 years old to attend school regularly. Beyond age 17, that is beyond high school, there were, however, apparently few working-class youth attending school. Consequently, the significance of these data appears to lie in the fact that the age at which children typically began contributing to household finances probably was delayed two years between 1910 and 1940 (i.e., from about 16 to 18).

The data on the employment of children and young adults reflect the increases in their attendance at school. As can be seen in table 23, in 1910 about 18% of children 10 to 14 years of age were counted as wage workers (or family farm workers), and about 59% of

people 16 to 20 years of age were enumerated as "gainfully occupied." These percentages are underestimates, given the early tendencies (discussed above) to underenumerate youth and women. By 1940, only about 5% of children 14 to 15 years of age worked for wages, and about 37% of young adults 16 to 19 years of age were wage workers (or were working on a family farm).

School attendance continued to rise, until in 1970 almost 90% of young adults 16 and 17 years of age, over 50% of 18- and 19-year olds, and over 33% of 20-year-olds attended school. Somewhat surprising, then, is the fact that between 1940 and 1960 the percentage of 14- and 15-year olds who earned wages rose, and the percentage of 16- to 19-year olds working for wages failed to decrease. (See table 23.) The finding is, in fact, not so surprising, when we consider that people who worked only an hour in the week previous to the enumeration are counted as being in the labour force. In light of the fairly high school attendance figures, which mean that little time is available during the year for wage work for the majority of teenagers, and especially given (what we strongly suspect to be) an increased tendency for young people to keep their earnings, the possibilities for

households to rely on their children to supplement the primary wage earnings have no doubt diminished - certainly between 1910 and 1940 and probably since 1940.

Opportunities for women to make money working at home also decreased over the course of the twentieth century. The possibility of keeping boarders or lodgers diminished as a result of both the falling age at marriage and the rising rate of household formation which followed World War II, and the gradual disappearance of the expectation that everyone be part of a family. In short, there were fewer people looking for lodging in the period following World War II. Consequently, as the data in table 24 indicate, about 10% of households had boarders or lodgers in 1930, about 8% had them in 1940, and by 1970 only about 3.5% of households kept boarders or lodgers. The comparison between the incidence of working-class households keeping boarders in even earlier years and those doing so in 1970 would no doubt be greater.

Families were also less likely to double up over time: about 5% of all households involved subfamilies in 1940, while about 2% comprised them in 1970. (See table 24.) And if additional relatives did not pay for their lodging, they at least must have provided

services indirectly financially supportive. Finally, over time, even opportunities for taking in people's wash declined, as middle-class housewives acquired washing machines, and self-service laundromats grew to meet the needs of working-class women and single people.

We can thus account for an influx into wage work of lower-income, or working-class women without much reference to changes in the nature of their household work. If, as the evidence suggests, the need for a second wage has persisted, then rising demand for women workers - in the form of increased job possibilities - would explain an increase in the involvement of working-class, married women in wage work. At the same time, not only did possibilities for earning money in the home decrease, but also growing job entrance requirements kept children and young adults in school longer.

The data in table 25 lend some additional support to the hypothesis that there has been a persistent need by lower-income households for more than one wage. The percentage of households with three wage earners was, in 1970, about as high as it was in 1930. The percentage of households with two wage earners increased only after 1950, and much of this increase

might be due to the entry of higher-income, middle-class women into the labour force. That is, there are probably more married working-class women in the work force now than there were earlier, but for the most part their added involvement since 1940 may have been in replacement for that of other household members, especially children.

The fact that much of the drudgery of household work was alleviated for most working-class women by the 1950s (because of running water, electricity, and central heating) certainly supported the trend towards their increased involvement in wage work. Decreased drudgery meant essentially that household chores could be done in less time. Moreover, although improved household facilities meant the home production of use values like food and clothing became a more distinct possibility, these household changes came in the context of tremendous productivity increases in the socialized, industrial production of consumer goods like food and clothing. Because household production is privatized (i.e., allows little division of labour), improved facilities and increased mechanization could do little in the way of increasing productivity in that production sphere. Consequently, the widening productivity gap between the two spheres of production

meant that working-class women, who are forced to make economically rational choices about how to allocate their time - because their budgets involve a constant cash shortage - increasingly chose to spend their time earning money rather than working in the home. Because they could acquire necessary means of subsistence more easily by earning money and buying commodities than by attempting to produce household substitutes, working-class women increasingly entered the wage labour force.

Middle-Class Women

The causes of the increased involvement in wage work of women we shall call "middle class," that is, women whose husbands earn wages near or above the subsistence standard, are varied and complexly interwoven. We shall not find a single economic factor responsible for this trend. However, changes in household means of production and in what these can accomplish in relation to changes in the socially-defined product of household labour, as well as changes in the organization of household work, seem to be among the key elements behind the rising labour force participation of these women. As well, changes in social demographics, changes in job opportunities

and wages for women, and the changing popular ideology directed at women contributed to the trend.

Before investigating changes in these factors, let us briefly consider women's responses to survey questions about why they work outside the home. Unfortunately, information of this kind is not terribly useful since (a) there is very little of it, and what is available was collected only in the 1950s, and (b) the questions and possible responses were so unspecific that the resulting information is barely informative. In four American surveys carried out in the 1950s, the majority (i.e., 55% to 90%) of working women cited "money" as the reason they worked for wages (Hoffmann, 1963). That is, they indicated that they needed money to pay debts, for a specific purchase, "for the children," or as an additional resource. The Growth of the American Families Study (GAFS), carried out in 1955, indicated that almost two-thirds of working women had purely financial reasons for entering the work force (Sobol, 1963). Almost half of all women in the survey who were planning to work for wages in the future said they were doing so "because the family needs money." It is significant that almost half of these women referred to their family's need for money, despite the social stigma attached to admission of a

husband's failure to provide for his family. This finding supports our explanation of the influx of working-class women into the labour force.

The most interesting survey finding is one to which we shall return. Among working women, pregnancy was found to be an inhibitor of plans to work in the future, while the presence of small children was found to promote them. For women not currently working also, pregnancy inhibited plans to work in the future and having small children promoted them (Sobol, 1963). Let us trace the changes in women's domestic labour, focusing on the means of their production and the expected product of their labour. These changes should reveal why having children prompted women to desire wage work, and why so many women increasingly entered the paid labour force.

It appears that in the early decades of the twentieth century, many middle-class housewives produced significant amounts of necessary use values for their families. That is, women who had resources such as land for a garden, running water, electricity, adequate work space in the kitchen, and a sewing machine, typically spent a considerable amount of their time producing necessary means of subsistence. As was described in chapter 2, homemade food was preferred to

commercial products, at least through the early part of the century. Middle-class housewives probably typically bought food in an unprocessed form and not only undertook the necessary processing steps but also did enough canning and pickling to last the year. We would also suggest that many women who lived in the less dense parts of cities or in the half-rural fringes of cities frequently grew their own vegetables and fruits. Even bread was typically made at home, in middle-class homes.

Middle-class women typically sewed their own and their children's clothing at least until the 1920s. The Lynds (1929) reported that people appeared to be "clothes conscious" in the 1920s, in a way that they had not been earlier. It was then that stores were beginning to run advertisements on clothing in local newspapers. Apparently before then clothes were either typically tailor-made, for wealthy families, or made at home. Yet, home sewing persisted for decades, as the usual way in which children's and women's clothes were made. Nonfiction articles in Ladies Home Journal issues in the early decades of the century made clear the role of home sewing. Articles on women's "fashions" featured instructions and patterns on how to remake last year's wardrobe as often as they showed

ready-made garments, until the early 1940s.

Therefore, through the early decades of the century, many housewives - women we are calling "middle-class - were able to contribute substantially, materially to their family's means of subsistence. Largely because they had better household facilities than their lower-income sisters, housewives in middle-income families were better able to contribute (the more desirable) home products to family reproduction. Furthermore, although these women had husbands whose wages were more than adequate for subsistence, if circumstances drove their husbands' wages down, they were in a position to minimize the consequences with respect to family subsistence. Robert Lynd (1933) provided evidence on the extent to which home production substituted for commercial production during the Depression. Lynd (1933, 907) stated:

American housewives sought to economize during the depression by buying commodities in less fully processed forms to which they could add value by their own labor. Home canning attained such proportions that glass jar demands were unofficially reported as markedly greater in 1931 than at any time in the past eleven years, and bottle and jar plants were operating at capacity in the fall of that year. Meanwhile, wholesalers and retailers were experiencing lessened sales of canned goods.

Other evidence he gathered included consumption shifts reported in 1930 in the Milwaukee Journal's Consumer Analysis. According to Lynd (1933, 908), that newspaper reported that

While an increase occurred in the consumption of wheat bread, with a rise from 195 loaves average yearly consumption per family in 1929 to 241 in 1930, probably related to the substitution of bread for other foods, flour consumption rose from 171 pounds per family in 1929 to 256 pounds in 1930, and baking powder from 68 to 79 ounces per family; canned milk was used by 5% more families in 1930 than in 1929, with an increase from 86 to 97 cans used per family; increase in home cooking is probably indicated by a decline from 90 to 87 percent of families using canned soups and a decrease from 75 to 57 cans per family per year; the number of pounds of bulk cookies purchased per family decreased from 83 to 45 in 1930; package butter decreased from 114 pounds per family per year in 1928 to 85 in 1930...

As we saw in chapter 2, the household facilities and equipment of middle-class women had been improving from the early years of the century. Because of these improvements in household means of production, which essentially meant the mechanization of the middle-class household after World War II, the time and energy necessary for domestic chores decreased. Women could do their jobs better and in less time. Moreover, the mechanization of the household has meant the possibility of integrating household chores more

closely (as we saw in chapter 2). Consequently, the domestic work schedule is more flexible.

At the same time, domestic labour was made increasingly monotonous. In general, the knowledge and skills characteristic of the occupation of housewife gave way in the twentieth century, with the transfer of much production out of the home, to unskilled sequences of tasks guided by the simple-minded instructions that accompany commercial products. Moreover, the responsibility for domestic chores shifted to the shoulders of the individual woman. Even in the twentieth century there has probably been a considerable increase in the extent to which a single woman in each household performs most of the tasks involved in family maintenance. The mechanization of housework promoted this trend. However, changes such as the decreased size and complexity of households and the growing demands of school on children probably were equally responsible for a progressive individualization of domestic labour.

Also because of the improvement in the means of household production, and the advertising drive that accompanied their adoption, standards of care of the home and the family have generally inflated, pushing the housewife's expected accomplishments always a bit

beyond her grasp. Similarly, the tasks of shopping (i.e., procuring means of household production), managing the home and its appliances and other commodities, and coordinating the schedules of household members have greatly expanded. These expansions in domestic tasks indicate a change in what is expected of the housewife, in her role as the person ultimately responsible for meeting family subsistence needs.

Generally, the product expected of domestic labour was changing. Specifically, family subsistence underwent social redefinition, over the course of the twentieth century, such that a larger and larger proportion of what families require to raise the next generation and maintain adult workers involve goods and services that must be paid for, and for which there are no homemade substitutes. Cash has increasingly become the sole medium of access to the means of subsistence, even in middle-class households. Owning a private automobile (or two), sending ones children to college, and even owning household appliances were increasingly felt to be imperative.

While cars were popular luxuries in the 1920s, and apparently a chief means of urban recreation, their widespread acceptance meant that city development in

the United States was predicated on the easy transportability of individuals by private cars. (Urban growth has been characterized by low-density development, single-family dwelling units, and segregated land uses.) By the 1950s, suburban households especially, but also households in city centers, required a car for transportation to work, to school, and to buy the means of household production and family subsistence. To a lesser extent, certain household appliances also became necessities. In 1960, the national Survey of Consumer Finances (Survey Research Center, 1960, 29) wrote:

For over 10 years the Survey Research Center has reported that major durable goods do not represent luxury items for the American consumer. The proportion of income spent on major durable goods does not rise with income... the data would even suggest the reverse generalization.

Standards about what constitutes a meal and how clean clothes should be have so changed in the twentieth century, and certain types of pressures on the housewife's time (e.g., involving the raising of children) have so increased, that means of household production like refrigerators and washing machines have become virtually essential. Even college educations are now essential expenses in the raising of

middle-class children: without college educations, in the United States, they will not find jobs comparable to those their fathers hold (i.e., the middle class will not be reproduced).

Therefore, the means of family subsistence have changed in composition over the course of the twentieth century, such that they are relatively more heavily composed of commodities and services that must be paid for than they were in early decades of the twentieth century. The housewife is the person immediately responsible for family subsistence, for seeing to it that daily life is produced and reproduced. And she has been increasingly unable to produce necessary means of family subsistence through her efforts in the home, because of this change in the composition of the means of subsistence. That is, the things she can produce in the home represent a smaller and smaller portion of family subsistence. A growing portion of it is available on a cash basis only.

To some extent, the changing composition of subsistence has not been reflected in estimates of minimum or adequate family budgets. Estimates for recent years, shown in table 21, cover costs of car ownership and possession of durable household appliances, but they represent replacement costs only.

That is, they do not take account of the costs of initially purchasing a car and household equipment. Married couples setting up households would face significantly higher costs than these estimates indicate; and the rate of household formation was up in the period directly following World War II.* Moreover, the costs of college education are not included in the estimated budgets. Consequently, the inflation of the costs of middle-class living in urban America are not entirely captured in the figures shown in table 21. Thus, there are probably more households in which the man's income is below the level necessary for "adequate" living than we previously estimated. In fact, over time that percentage of households with inadequate income has probably increased. However, most significant for the household worker is the fact that her efforts in the home are decreasingly efficacious with respect to producing means of subsistence.

There is some statistical evidence to support the argument that household durables, a car, and college

*It is true that early estimates of minimum family budgets also excluded the costs of initial purchases of durable means of household production. However, we have argued that these costs represent a higher proportion of a family budget in later decades.

educations have assumed rising significance in family budgets and that these items are now necessary for urban family living. According to a Federal Reserve Board Study, while total consumer expenditures increased slightly over three times between 1929 and 1955, expenditures for household appliances increased five times (Hartmann, 1974, 277). Moreover, the percentage of households purchasing appliances remained approximately constant to the 1970s (Survey Research Center, 1960, 1963, 1965, 1970). Perhaps more significant is the fact that the percentage of households with consumer debts increased between 1952 and 1970, even though real income was rising. (See table 26.) In 1952, about 62% of families had no installment debts, by 1970 only 51% were without this kind of debt.

Changes in household work - in the means of production and the expected product - were thus substantial in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. But there was also a significant demographic change which must not be ignored: the so-called baby boom. We noted before that one of the key findings of the surveys carried out in the 1950s was the somewhat surprising one that the presence of young children was positively related to women's labour force participation. This

fact is not so surprising if, in fact, child rearing represents a continuing, growing cost as the children grow older. That is, having children represents, for parents, a major financial commitment, involving costs which increase over the course of the children's development. And not only are the costs directly involved in child-rearing relatively higher now than ever before. As well, the period during which children are dependent has been extended over the course of the twentieth century. Many children expected to leave school and begin full-time work by their mid-teens at the turn of the century, while today in the United States middle-class youth expect to be supported, at least in part, until they leave college, at age 22. Therefore, the "baby boom" represented a growing number of households in need of money for the present and the future, in order to produce the next generation.

Viewing the household as a unit of production, and analyzing changes in its production activities, is insufficient if we wish to fully understand how it has changed in the twentieth century. As we noted in chapter 2, production in the household is, at the same time, personal consumption. Even the durable means of household production assume the status of private property. Thus, the purchase of appliances with which

to ease household labour is also the attainment of a material reward for wage labour, in a time of growing mechanization, and consequent alienation, in the workplace. Moreover, because this growing durable portion of family subsistence to which we have been referring, is in the form of commodities, we understand why they so proliferated: capital must continually create new needs, and capture new markets, by constantly presenting new products. Advertisers have thus worked overtime to make sure that Americans need household appliances and cars and televisions.

Less obvious is the fact that housewives' purchase of appliances with which to ease their labour has contributed to further purchases. That is, these efforts to improve household production have probably resulted not so much in increased home production of use values as in further purchases of commercial products. For instance, if the home could be kept clean more easily because of possession of a vacuum and the use of fabrics and materials easily cleaned, shabby furniture became less excusable and more noticeable. A new, attainable standard of cleanliness called for a clean-looking home. Similarly, with respect to clothing, new standards of cleanliness called for clean-looking (i.e., new) clothes - and more frequent

washing may wear them out more quickly. In short, to some extent, modern means of household production embody incentives to increased commodity dependence.

As the twentieth century has progressed, the general level of living has indeed risen for households in the United States. The rising cost of the product required of household labour - the rising cost of family subsistence - is, at the same time, a rising standard of living. Nevertheless, we would not wish to simply sum up the trend we have been describing as "rising expectations," as orthodox economists have. For the population as a whole, the standard of living has risen. However, from the standpoint of the individual, at a particular point in time, this rising standard has been experienced as a rising cost. So, the connotation that the phrase "rising expectations" carries, of individual desires and their satisfaction, is inadequate: the rising level of living must be seen in the context of a changed social definition of subsistence.

To this point, we have discussed changes in the means of household production and the expected product of household work, as well as changes in the organization of domestic labour. We saw that the incentive for the housewife to try to reduce her labour

time combined with family consumption aspirations to promote the general mechanization of the household. This mechanization was made possible, and perhaps instigated, by capital's needs for product development and market expansion. Household mechanization was, in fact, one instance of the general rise in the portion of family subsistence available on a cash basis only. The cost of family living - and the value of labour power - rose in the twentieth century, especially since World War II. At the same time, the household efforts of middle-class women have become decreasingly efficacious with respect to family support. Consequently, the incentive to take on wage work, which these married women have experienced, is understandable simply after an examination of these household production-consumption changes.

Furthermore, it appears that there were changes in the ideology generated by the mass media about women's role - not unrelated to these changes occurring in the household - which, at least indirectly, promoted women's entry into the work force. From the late decades of the nineteenth century to 1970, there were several trends evident in the messages Ladies Home Journal issues presented.* First, there was an early

 *Magazines represented the key medium by which

shift in the way women were addressed, in nonfiction articles, from an implicit image of them as useful craftswomen to that of women as unskilled housewives who gave most of their attention to serving their families. Second, women were decreasingly seen as people with the right to self-fulfilling lives, and increasingly defined in relation to men (i.e., as their loving appendages). Finally, to some extent there was a rise in messages addressed to women as consumers (which corresponds to the fact that they were decreasingly addressed as producers). (Table 27-A shows these trends in Ladies Home Journal nonfiction

corporate capital spoke to its audience, in the early part of the century. Later, it was replaced by radio and then by television. But the ideology carried by all of these mass media had the same source: corporate capital. And while the message reached most people even before radio and television, with mass ownership of radios and especially televisions it pervaded the culture.

The importance of Ladies Home Journal, to housewives, was made clear in several surveys in the 1920s. The Lynds (1929) reported Ladies Home Journal to be among the most popular of three magazines: over 16% of the households they asked had subscriptions to it. A survey carried out in 1926, by an advertising company, which unfortunately did not use a probability sample, reported that 63% of women paid a "good deal" or a "great deal" of attention to advertisements (Hoffman, 1926). In 1941, Ladies Home Journal reported that it had the world's largest audited circulation: over 4 million copies were sold annually.

articles.)

The housewife role in which women were cast more and more over the years involved a decreasing personal fund of skills and knowledge on the part of the woman, because of the progressive commoditization of household means of production. However, additional to the deskilling that was occurring in the housewife occupation, advertisements directly played upon and encouraged women's feelings of inadequacy. An especially apparent drive to induce women to feel as inept at their work as was possible was the phobia created in the 1930s over "germs". The solution offered with respect to these life-threatening elements in the environment - and the guilt they induced in women - was the host of household appliances and gadgets featured in advertisements and promoted in Ladies Home Journal nonfiction articles, which were beyond the range of most housewives until recent decades.

Besides inducing guilt, advertisements from about the 1930s on enthusiastically preached the need to save time on housework. Increased leisure time, especially increased time for shopping, was advanced early on as the reward of such efforts. However, the message that won out in later years was the notion that work time

cut into time available to meet the needs of family members.

Let us briefly review these changes in the messages carried in issues of Ladies Home Journal. In the late decades of the nineteenth century, women received a strange mixture of messages, some promoting marriage as their lifelong goal and occupation, and demoting women to the role of men-catchers, but others ranging from an implicit assumption that women were men's equals to an explicitly anti-male note. Perhaps responsible for the positive images of women which were evident in these early years was the fact that women were viewed as producers of useful and essential things for their families - things which were preferably made at home. Early twentieth-century editorials argued that household skills were comparable to those of craftsmen and businessmen. One editorial proclaimed the age of the "new women," a stronger, more self-willed creature. These were the messages women were receiving about themselves (though they were probably not so much indicators of the status of household work at the time as of attempts by promoters of the domestic science movement to preserve the family and keep women in the home).

In the early part of the twentieth century there were also a number of articles on working (single) women, and on careers for women. However, by the late 1940s, there were no signs of independent, working women in issues of Ladies Home Journal. With few exceptions, it seems, women were represented at that time as brides-to-be or housewives. (See table 27-B.) In fact, the period from the late 1940s through the early 1960s seems to have marked a low point in the history of media images of women. Fulfilling the "labour of love" for one's children and one's husband was depicted as the highest achievement women could attain. This message was not subtle, as can be seen in the following quotes from the February, 1960, issue of Ladies Home Journal:

There's little doubt that lots of girls would make better wives if they weren't trying to make better husbands.

A woman who loves to cook is at peace with herself.

Not only were women urged to dedicate themselves to serving their families. They were further made to feel that the only way to do so adequately was through the purchase and use of the best commodities available. Guilt inducements had given way to positive

inducements, in urging commodity dependence on women. Thus, the following message appeared in the February, 1960, issue of Ladies Home Journal:

It's such a lucky thing to be a woman... Remember when we were children how we all planned to "be" something? ...all those dreams of mine came true... Today I took pleasure in many small luxuries. The wedding ring glow of polished brass, the wild-fern fragrance of fresh sheets, the look of serenity I have at last achieved with the new draperies in the living room. (emphasis added)

Trends in the content of Ladies Home Journal advertisements over the years mirrored those in nonfiction articles. The transition in household work from useful production to commodity dependence, and the corresponding increase in the consumption aspect of that activity, is clear in changes in advertisements over time. Apparent also is a rise in the promotion of "beauty," the goad for women to present themselves as objects rewarding men's efforts (as soldiers or in the work force). Perhaps the generalization that the marketing trend in the twentieth century has been to increasingly commoditize personal life itself would not be too far from the truth.

In late nineteenth-century issues of Ladies Home Journal, there were as many advertisements for women's sewing and knitting materials as there were for

implements for housework and commodities for the home combined. However, by 1910, commodities for the home (e.g., furniture, china) and household equipment together accounted for more advertising space than did the raw materials of home sewing, though these were still much in evidence. By about 1930 sewing materials had virtually disappeared from advertisements. By then, household equipment, especially cleaning materials, and commodities for the home were both abundantly advertised. In the late 1940s and through the 1950s, these two types of commodities - household equipment and goods for the home - were the most frequently advertised products (together accounting for about one-third of all advertisements). And the variety in household equipment which was apparent by 1960 was almost unbelievable: there were new materials for both clothing and household surfaces, a multiplicity of cleaning agents, types of bags and paper for every use conceivable in the kitchen, and a multiplicity of labour-saving devices.

Beauty, and the means to it, was a salient theme in advertisements even in the nineteenth century. But by the late 1920s it had become a major preoccupation, from one Ladies Home Journal page to the next. And to sell their products, advertisers intimidated and

criticized, with images of the horrors of "halitosis" and "body odor." They lured women into "fashion consciousness" while they generally belittled them for not looking like the models in the glossy ads.

In short, the image of women portrayed in Ladies Home Journal, one of the most popular of women's magazines, suffered a decline over the course of the twentieth century, at least until the 1970s. Reflecting the changing material circumstances of their household production, women were increasingly assumed to have meager skills and little knowledge with which to do their work. Less and less were they seen as producers, and more and more were they cast in the role of consumers. The examples of independent, self-willed women which were present in Ladies Home Journal copy until about 1930 disappeared thereafter, to be replaced by a fairly uniform image of women as mothers and wives (i.e., people defined by their relation to their family) whose chief characteristic is an attractive appearance. Consequently, because money earning brings such automatic status in this society, while the role of housewife merits such meager recognition and fulfillment, one might assume that married women became more positively disposed to earning money, as their image diminished in the media.

Conclusion

In asking why an influx of married women into the work force occurred after World War II, we were essentially looking for the mechanism by which the reserve of married women working at home has been activated for wage work. Clearly, there is no simple mechanism by which the needs of capital are exerted as pressures or pulls on the household worker. Moreover, the pressures and pulls felt by different women vary.

In some households, in fact in a sizeable and constant proportion of them, over the course of the twentieth century the man has apparently received a wage too low for family subsistence. In these households, the need for a second wage placed women in the role of a perpetual labour reserve. However, there were few job possibilities for married women earlier in the century: capital's need for them was low. Moreover, their household work was long and hard and, more importantly, their domestic skills - especially shopping skills - were crucial to the household budget. Consequently, children more often than women earned the supplementary wage, in the early part of the century. Over the years, education requirements grew and children were decreasingly available for wage work. At

the same time, jobs for women expanded.

These women, whom we have called "working class," represent an obvious labour reserve. Since they have been perpetually available, changes in capital's* need for labour (i.e., represented in jobs for women) were sufficient to move working-class women into wage work. More subtle changes in the organization of household work were of minimal significance in explaining their increased labour force participation.

With respect to other married women, in households where there has not been the need for a second wage, we argued that changes in the organization of capitalist production were indirectly responsible for their move into wage work. That is, women eventually responded to changes originating in "the economy" because they had an effect on household production. Capital's perpetual need for growing markets led to product creation and need stimulation, for things ranging from automobiles to household appliances. As a consequence, subsistence was redefined over the years in such a way that the essentials of family living increasingly became accessible through cash alone - and women working in the household were decreasingly able to contribute to

*By "capital," we mean employers as a class.

family maintenance. They thus came to feel pressured to earn money.

Also due to the cultivation of the market, by capital, was mechanization of the means of household production. Because household appliances reduced necessary labour time and promoted an overlapping organization of household chores, domestic labour time was reduced. The deskilling of household work and the increased isolation of the worker which followed upon household mechanization added further incentives to the housewife to seek work outside the home, where contact with other people was at least assured.

In other words, for many women, changes originating in capitalist production affected the organization of household work and the relationship between household means of production and the product expected of household work. These changes cumulated over time, to provide eventual pressures and incentives for women to enter the work force. Thus, while a supply of working-class women was available for wage work since at least the beginning of the twentieth century, and demand increases alone were sufficient to move them into the work force, a supply of middle-class women has been created gradually over time, essentially through changes women have experienced in their role as

household workers.

Part of the question about the mechanism that has activated the female labour reserve is whether women household workers make decisions about how to allocate their time according to principles of economic rationality. That is, do household workers experience pressures to lower production time, or maximize output? These pressures would, of course, be different than those guiding commodity production, since household workers are not producing commodities, and consequently have no relationship through their products with the market.

If, in fact, the household worker, who is responsible for producing family subsistence, faces a scarcity of the means of household production relative to the product expected of her, she will probably be forced to attempt to behave in economically rational ways. That is not to say that she will necessarily consciously calculate the way to most efficiently allocate her time. In the case of working-class women, because they apparently experience an absolute insufficiency of income for meeting basic subsistence requirements, there is no need to posit conscious calculation on their part. In taking on wage work, they behave economically rationally, but do so simply

because they experience a shortage of cash. Nevertheless, by shifting their work efforts from an area of low productivity (the household) to one of higher productivity, so they can acquire use values with less labour input, they are behaving rationally. Thus, scarcity forces an attempt at a rational allocation of time.

For women whose husbands' incomes are adequate for minimum essentials, but which may become inadequate over time as the standard of living and the content of subsistence change, market rationality probably shapes their behaviour to the extent that they feel pressured because of a gap between the wage coming in and the expected product of their domestic efforts, namely this changing subsistence. That is, the wage they depend upon may be low in a relative sense - relative to a changing, and flexible, standard of living. To the extent that they feel the need for more cash, and in direct proportion to the strength of that perceived need, they may become consciously calculating about the way they use their time. And at that point, the productivity gap between the wage goods sector and the household would become salient. These are the women for whom choices are possible.

Thus, one of the incentives these women would experience would be to reduce their time in the household and maximize their cash income, and thus, as an indirect consequence of this, move into higher productivity work (i.e., make an economically rational move). In making this move, they would also, in one sense, augment their families' consumption, because of the greater amounts of cash coming into the household. In another sense, though, a reduction of their time spent in the household could detract from family consumption. (Because a woman's labour in the home is, at the same time, the family's consumption, there always exist incentives to increase such labour time; that is, for the woman to behave in an economically irrational manner.) Therefore, because the household is women's key production arena, and because it represents the unity of production and consumption, middle-class women are subject both to incentives to behave in economically rational ways and ones to behave in ways opposed to economic rationality. Finally, in households where no relative scarcity is experienced - where there are no money pressures - women's behaviour will seldom follow the dictates of economic rationality.

Actually, to fully understand the pressures women experience, one must analyze the social relations in the household: those between wives and husbands and those between mothers and children, over the life span of a family. Consumption pressures originate with the needs and desires of these individuals. This analysis is outside the scope of our work here, and in fact empirical data on household social relations would be quite difficult to acquire. However, we might assume that there would be class differences and even ethnic differences in the types of pressures husbands and children exert on a woman, and in their expectations of her. As well, there may have been changes over time in these aspects of family life.

There are several clear consequences of the general influx of married women into the work force which we should note here in conclusion. One has to do with the consequences for capital. The other involves the consequences for families.

For all families, over the course of the twentieth century there has been an increase in the productivity of inputs to the production of labour power, which has meant a lowered value of labour power. However, there has additionally been a tremendous expansion of educational inputs in the production of labour power,

which of course has heightened its value. As well, because the social definition of subsistence has shifted towards a greater commodity content, the value of labour power has been pushed further upward. Thus, on balance, we would guess that the value of labour power (reflected in the cost of family maintenance) has risen over the course of the twentieth century.

That means, of course, that the wage paid either directly to labour or indirectly, in the form of tax money, has been subject to upward pressures. All else being equal, higher wages mean reductions in surplus value, and the accumulation of profit by capital. However, at the same time, it is to the advantage of capital to pay higher wages, in order that labour can afford the rising standard of living: a growing market (i.e., increasing consumption) is essential for the continual reproduction of capital. The question is, how can capital pay higher and higher wages?

Capital has been, to a large extent, saved from the pressures of rising wages cutting into surplus value precisely by the trend of households increasingly sending two members into the work force.* When two workers produce value instead of one, (a) more value

*Wally Seccombe (1980) has pointed out that capital's

is produced altogether, (b) the (rising) cost of family maintenance is spread over two wage workers, and thus (c) surplus value appropriated by capital can rise while the total wage package that the family receives also rises. When families rely more and more on two wages, individual wages need not increase for the buying power of households to rise. Consequently, the acquisition of two wage workers from families instead of one represents a considerable boon to capital. Nevertheless, we might also note that while the increased participation of housewives in the work force solves problems arising from the contradictions of capitalism (e.g., crises of underconsumption) at this point in time, there is a demographic limit to the possibilities of this solution.

The strictly economic consequences for households of the increased assumption of wage work by women are less straightforward. On the one hand, if the family has two sources of wage income, clearly it is less vulnerable to the possibility of impoverishment. If one worker loses his or her job, the other can be relied upon. On the other hand, to the extent that

acquisition of two workers per household is similar to an extension of the length of the workday (i.e., a form of absolute surplus value).

households depend upon two wages, and the commodity content of their level of living has increased, they are more financially vulnerable. There is little flexibility in such households' budgets, and thus the ups and downs of the economy may hit them harder than they would if these households had a labour reserve to turn to when money became tight. Especially in times of inflation, when families are already dependent upon the wages of two workers, they can only lose ground as the dollar devalues: the possibility of sending the housewife into the labour force to earn a second wage no longer exists. Moreover, each cohort of housewives will develop fewer skills of home production than the one before it, as the pattern of commodity dependence and wives' involvement in wage work develops.

CHAPTER 5

THE HISTORICAL TREND IN THE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF CANADIAN WOMEN

Like American women, married Canadian women are increasingly involved in wage work. In Canada, the proportion of married women in the labour force has been consistently lower than it is in the United States. Nevertheless, the rise in their involvement in paid employment outside the home since 1941 has been dramatic: there was a 1270% increase in the labour force participation rates of married women between that year and 1971. (See graph 2.)

We have already attempted to explain why married women in both Canada and the United States are seeking wage work more and more as the years pass. The transfer from the household to "the economy" and the state of much of the work involved in providing the basics of housing (e.g., water, fuel), food, and clothing, and the inflation in the years of formal schooling required of the next generation, underlay the shift of female labour from domestic to

commodity-producing sectors of the economy. This long-run change partly explains the changing demand for women wage workers. In that it represents a shift in the labour time necessary for reproducing daily life from the household to wage-labour sectors of the economy, it accounts for the growth in certain types of jobs. Furthermore, since the trend partly involves an inflating commoditization of the means of household production, it helps explain the growing desire for wage work on the part of married women.

We developed a more specific explanation of the changing supply of female labour, however. American data indicate that a large and probably unchanging proportion of men who are the primary wage earners for their families have not earned a "family wage" since the early years of the twentieth century. Additional wage earners have been imperative in these working-class households. In the early decades of the century, secondary earnings were typically provided by children and, less commonly and in lower amounts, by women working in their homes and extending their normal domestic chores.

Although information on changes in the conditions of the maintenance of Canadian families is much less plentiful than that for American families, what we have

suggests that the pattern was essentially the same in Canada as in the United States. Unfortunately, for Canada we are unable to make the crude but systematic comparisons between changing costs of family subsistence and median men's wages which were possible for the United States. However, Terry Copp (1974) made some sketchy estimates of both minimum family budget standards and average wages for manufacturing jobs in Montreal in the early decades of the century. It seems that while the average wage in industry (excluding low-wage sectors of the economy) was about \$7.78 per week, a 1901 Department of Labour estimate called for a minimum family income of \$9.64 for basic needs. Copp concluded that even if the average male worker had a working wife or child, total family income could not reach the subsistence level. Similarly, in 1911, average men's wages were about \$10.55 weekly, while the necessary budget standard was about \$12.82 weekly for basics. In 1921 as well, men's estimated average wages were well below the estimated minimum budget standard. "On the basis of the data it is necessary to conclude that the average annual incomes for adult male workers in occupations which involved two thirds of the city's labour force were from 20 to 30 per cent below the poverty line" (Copp, 1974, 36-38). "Even at the peak

of prosperity in the late 1920s, the average income for adult male workers in occupations which account for at least 67 per cent of the labour force fell well below the minimum income required to support an average family" (Copp, 1974, 41).

Supporting an assumption that a large proportion of families were not maintained adequately on the wages of the man, in the early decades of the century, is evidence that many Canadian households sent their older children out to work. In 1931, 54% of children 15 years and older living in households "headed" by a man who worked for wages, and 61% of children 15 years and older in female-headed households worked for wages (DBS, 1936a, 686, 716). Assuming that households typically had only one child in the work force, we would estimate that approximately 32% of male-headed households had a child 15 years or older working, and 29% of female-headed households had a child 15 years or older earning supplementary wages. And the incidence of childrens' wage earning increased greatly as household heads' incomes decreased. Moreover, in 1931, in Canada, only 34% of 15- to 19-year-olds were in school and only 3% of people 20 to 24 years of age were in school (DBS, 1936b, 2, 902).

Because each successive cohort of Canadian children spent more time in school, because the opportunities for women to work for supplementary earnings at home diminished over the years, and assuming the same, continuing inadequacy of the man's earnings in many households in Canada as in the United States, the growing availability of jobs for women alone would explain the influx of married women from lower-income households into the wage work force. In the case of American women from higher-income households, we argued that the decreasing efficacy of domestic efforts, with respect to a changing definition of the essentials necessary for reproducing daily life, partly explains their growing involvement in wage work. In Canada, of course, the same forces were at work: urbanization and the growing necessity to own a car, the increasing need to obtain a university education for the children, and a general inflation in the consumer durables assumed to be essential in the home. However, while the trend towards a rising commoditization and cost of household essentials was the same in Canada as in the United States, its impact was perhaps less severe and probably more gradual. Specifically, a family car is probably less mandatory in Canada than in the United States (because of

marginal differences in the shape of cities and the strength of public transit systems); university education is neither taken for granted by middle-class Canadian families nor is it so costly; and (as we saw in chapter 2) the mechanization of the household occurred later in Canada than in the United States. These differences between Canada and the United States may partly account for the lower proportions of married Canadian women in the labour force at any point in time.

There seems to be no reason why the explanation developed in chapter 4 should not apply to Canada, although so far the changes described above may have had less impact on Canadian households.* Therefore, especially in light of the shortage of Canadian data, we shall be able to add very little to the explanation of changes in the supply of married women seeking wage work. Instead, we shall first turn our attention here to examining some simple hypotheses about changes in

 *It should be noted here that Canada's significant regional and ethnic differences caution against leaving the explanation of this trend at the level of generality we are satisfied with for the United States. The differences among American households, with respect to their experience of and response to these large changes, are surely small relative to the differences among Canadian households.

the conditions of domestic labour - namely, whether the real incomes of the men heading lower-income households did not fall in recent decades and whether the cost of living even at a minimal level did not rise faster than real wages. We shall also look briefly at changes in peoples' perceptions of and anticipations about the cost of living. Next, a multivariate statistical analysis of factors affecting women's labour force participation will be attempted. Finally, we shall begin an examination of the importance of changes in the demand for female labour, primarily by asking whether the influx into wage work varied significantly from one time period to another.

The Households Contributing to the Influx

When we ask what households the women came from whose involvement in wage work increased so much in recent decades in Canada, we must be satisfied with a comparison of the rates of gainful occupation as early as 1931 with the rates of involvement in paid work in 1971. (See table 28.) In 1931, there was only minimal involvement of married women in paid work outside the home. Moreover, there was a substantial negative relationship between the extent of that involvement and husbands' incomes. In 1971, when between approximately

one-fourth and one-third of married women in households at all (major) income levels were employed, the negative relationship between husbands' incomes and wives' employment seemed to no longer hold. We must remember, however, that the percentages shown in table 28 for 1971 refer to employment and not to involvement in the labour force (which includes people looking for work). Because the demand for women from lower-income households may be lower than that for other women, who probably tend to be better educated, a continued negative relationship between the proportions of women seeking wage work and husbands' incomes may be obscured by these data (which confound demand and supply more than do the other measurements).

Between 1931 and 1971, the percentage increases in married women's paid employment were greater with higher husbands' incomes. Very low rates of employment by married women in higher-income households in 1931 meant very high percentage increases between 1931 and 1971. By 1971, there appears to be less difference among households with respect to wives' employment than there was in 1931. In terms of percentage point increases, as in the United States, the most substantial finding for Canada is the fact that growing employment outside the home occurred among women from

all income groups. (Therefore, we are at least not obviously incorrect in applying the explanation of the trend we developed for the United States to Canada.) It also seems to be the case that the influx into wage work was greater for women from the middle 60% of households than for others, and that the involvement of women from low-income households increased less than for others.

Changes in Real Income and the Cost of Living

In the United States, we found evidence of a gap between average wages and the cost of living which persisted through the century. We then reasoned that for a substantial proportion of American households, those lower-income households that required income supplementary to that contributed by the man, an increased availability of jobs for women is sufficient to explain the influx of married women into the work force. There is no reason to doubt the validity of this explanation for Canada. However, instead of a constant cash shortage in lower-income households (i.e., the fact that their labour power has persistently failed to realize its value), perhaps there occurred a change over the decades that witnessed the increases in women's labour force participation.

Perhaps for some households the real wage the man's labour power was realizing actually decreased over these past decades.

The Armstrongs (1975) found that, between 1951 and 1971, the proportion of total income earned by individuals in the lower income groups of the population actually decreased, although the distribution of relative shares of total income going to households was not becoming increasingly unequal. These findings are suggestive, but they leave us wondering especially about the relationship between the income going to the lower population strata and the changing costs of living. While these lower-income individuals were receiving a decreasing share of total wages, they may still have been experiencing wage increases which kept up with the rising cost of living - or, perhaps they were not.

Canadian data allow fairly crude tests of the hypothesis that the real income of some households did not increase in the past few decades, and the hypothesis that the actual cost of living (at a minimal level) increased as fast as wages. Table 29 shows real wages from 1941 to 1971, in current and constant dollars, for men who "head" households at the first quartile, median, and third quartile of the population.

Real income is measured in two ways, as current income deflated by the government's consumer price index and as current income deflated by the alternate index of price changes that we constructed. (See Appendix C for a description of the manner in which the index was constructed.) According to these data, the real income of male wage earners in households at the 25th percentile of the population more than doubled between 1941 and 1971, even when deflated with our consumer price index: it rose about 150%. For households at the midpoint of the population, the real income of male wage earners more than doubled. And the real income of male wage earners in households at the 75th percentile of the population also more than doubled.

Changes in the cost of living are, however, as important as changes in income. While "real income" takes account of the changes in the prices of a constant "basket" of goods, a measure of changes in the cost of living should take into consideration the changing composition of goods and services considered necessary for living. We have a measure of the changing cost of living in Toronto, from 1939 to the present. Modelled on those measures calculated in the United States, especially in New York, this measure of the cost of living at a "minimal level of health and

self-respect" should give us at least a crude notion of the change. As can be seen in table 30, this estimated minimal cost of living for a family of four almost doubled between 1939 and 1972. That is, the cost of living in urban Canada increased substantially over the last three decades, but probably not as much as men's incomes. As a comparison of the wage data in table 32 and this cost of living measure shows, the real wages of men working in manufacturing rose faster than the cost of living during the three decades of the influx of married women into the labour force, although probably not after the latter part of the 1960s.

We remain, then, with our assumption that for a fairly constant proportion of families there existed an absolute gap between men's earnings and the cost of living, and that for all households subsistence was increasingly commoditized over the course of the twentieth century. While the material circumstances defining women's domestic responsibilities were thus changing, peoples' perceptions were also registering something of perhaps most immediate relevance to the trend of women's increased labour force participation: the fact that prices were continually rising. Table 31 shows the responses of the Canadian Gallup Poll sample, over the post-World War II years, to the question of

whether prices will rise, fall, or remain the same in the following year (or 6 months). There was a dramatic increase, especially after the mid-1950s, in the percentage of Canadians who believed that prices would rise in the next year. By the late 1960s, a very high majority of people expected continuing price rises. Moreover, in 1949 fully 50% of Canadians expected prices to fall the next year, while only 6% of Canadians in 1960 and 2% of Canadians in 1974 thought prices would fall the next year. These changes in peoples' expectations signify most clearly a growing recognition that inflation was a permanent condition of modern life, but they also represent the growing expectation that the cost of living would continue to climb.

An Analysis of Time-Series Data

While an explanation similar to the one we elaborated in chapter 4 is essential for as complex a trend as married women's increased involvement in the work force, and while such an explanation probably cannot be tested directly and simply with a statistical analysis, we additionally employed a multivariate statistical analysis in order to obtain an idea of the simultaneous effects of some supply and demand

variables. Specifically, we examined the simultaneous effects of changes in men's real wages, women's real wages, fertility, (per capita) consumer debt, and the availability of part-time work on women's labour force participation rates from 1945 through 1975. We expected that changes in men's real wages would be negatively related to women's labour force participation rates and, if supply factors were important to the trend, their effect would be large, larger than the positive effect we expected for women's real wages.* We also thought that consumer debt would be positively related to women's labour force participation. As well, we thought we might obtain an idea of the relative importance of supply and demand factors by noting the influence of changes in the availability of part-time jobs, relative to the impact of changes in men's wages.

The time-series data are shown in table 32. (Since we have constructed some of the variables, we explain their construction in Appendix D.) An examination of the trends in some of the variables is

 *However, since we could not include a cost of living variable in our model, the misrepresentation of effects which we discussed with respect to the models of orthodox economists will apply here.

interesting in itself. Women's labour force participation (that is, the rates for all women, not just married women) rose dramatically during the years of full war-time mobilization. After World War II ended, they dropped to pre-War levels and began to rise slowly only after 1955. From then on, the increases in every five year period were greater than those in the preceding period. That is, some of the female labour reserve was activated during the War, probably with very little inducement aside from wages (at levels presumably equal to those paid men for the same work, as we shall see in chapter 7), and many of these women were removed from the work force as a result of more coercive measures (also described in chapter 7). Since the mid-1950s, the female reserve has been increasingly activated; that is, married women have increasingly become part of the wage labour force. One of the ways in which capital may have directly activated this reserve over the years is by providing part-time jobs, which have been a rising proportion of all jobs since 1955.

Fertility, which inhibits women's labour force participation, was high during the early years of the rise in women's labour force participation, and only began dropping substantially in the late 1960s.

However, consumer debt increased, in real dollars, over ten times in this 30-year period. Men's wages did not decrease over the period, even when deflated by our price index (which, unlike the government's consumer price index, took income taxes into consideration). Women's wages rose in step with men's.

Because the values of these explanatory variables were steadily rising over this period, and especially since women's and men's wages are so closely related, the variables are very highly correlated (that is, there is high multicollinearity). (See the matrix in table 33.) Separating the effect of one variable from that of another is, therefore, a risky and nearly impossible undertaking. Short of leaving the data unanalyzed, we decided that a technique known as "ridge regression" would provide the best strategy for analyzing the data. Normally with such data one would employ "ordinary least squares" regression. With high autocorrelation - that is, high correlation among the error terms, from one year to the next, as is common in time-series data - "generalized least squares" regression would ultimately be employed. However, because of the high multicollinearity in our data, a generalized least squares analysis would result in unbiased but highly unstable estimators. That is, the

estimated absolute sizes of the effects would tend to be too large and, more importantly, small changes in the data could result in changes even in the signs of the effects (Marquardt and Snee, 1975, Hoerl and Kennard, 1970a, Hoerl and Kennard, 1970b). Because we assumed that it was more important to have a reliable estimate than it was to have an unbiased but highly unstable one, we employed ridge regression.

Essentially, ridge regression reduces the variance of the estimators by allowing a little bias. The focus in such a strategy is on accomplishing a low "mean square error" (which is the sum of the variance of the estimated coefficient and the squared bias of the estimated coefficient). Ridge regression proceeds by consecutively adding a constant bias factor to the diagonal of the correlation matrix of the independent variables (making the correlations of all the variables with each other smaller relative to 1). As this constant (k) which is added to the diagonal increases, bias increases but variance decreases, up to a point. As the regression is carried out, one can carry out a "ridge trace," which shows how the coefficients change with increasing values of the bias factor, k . Such a procedure gives an indication of the stability of the coefficients obtained using unbiased estimating

techniques. At the point at which the coefficients appear to stabilize, the estimated coefficients are assumed to be reliable. Because of the bias introduced in the technique, tests of statistical significance are not reasonable, however the standard errors give an idea of the significance of the estimated effects.

The results of our analysis are shown in table 34. The independent variables are: year, from 1945 through 1975, which we included since the variables rose so consistently through the years; total fertility rate (i.e., the number of children per 1,000 women, based on age-specific fertility rates for each year); average weekly men's real wages; average weekly women's real wages; consumer debt (in constant dollars) per 1,000 people; the availability of part-time work (i.e., the percentage of people working 1 to 34 hours per week of the total number of men and women with jobs); and a dummy variable for 1945 (since there was a large positive residual for that year in the regression without one). A comparison of the coefficients for the ordinary least squares regression with those for the ridge regression, $k=.05$, shows how unstable the former are. (The signs for both "year" and "fertility" changed immediately, with $k=.05$, such that under ridge regression techniques the results make intuitive

sense.) Actually, the coefficients stabilized after $k=.05$. (See the ridge trace, graph 4.) As the data in table 34 indicate, there is a positive effect of time, a negative effect of fertility, and positive effects of men's wages, women's wages, consumer debt, part-time work, and the dummy for 1945. (Though we cannot carry out statistical significance tests, we might note that the standard error for men's wages is over half the size of the coefficient, unlike the case for the other variables; so, that result is not as likely as the others to be reliable.)

Although it is surprising that the apparent effect of changes over the years in men's wages was positive, men's and women's wages are so highly correlated that their effects cannot really be separated. A positive effect of changes in men's wages is not necessarily inconsistent with our reasoning, however. At the level of the whole society (which is what we are concerned with here), men's wages can be expected to rise when, among other things, there is a growing demand for labour and consequent decrease in the size of the male labour reserve. Such a state of affairs could result in a rising demand for women workers. The problem with such an explanation, of course, is that the labour market is sex-segregated enough that demand for women

may have little to do with demand for men.

Changes in fertility had a negative effect on women's labour force participation. As the unstandardized coefficient shows, an increase of 1 child per woman per year should have meant a decrease of 7% in women's labour force participation rate. Consumer debt (per 1000 people) had a positive effect on women's labour force participation rates. An increase of a dollar of debt per 1000 people per year (in constant, 1945 dollars) should have resulted in an increase of .025% in women's labour force participation rates. Part-time work had a substantial, positive effect on women's labour force participation. An increase of 1% in the percentage of working people who are part-time should have resulted in a rise of .56% in women's labour force participation rates. This demand variable seems to have exerted a significant effect.

Without a variable measuring the cost of living, the effects of changes in men's and women's real wages cannot be accurately determined. Nor can the two wage effects be separated, since the variables are so closely related. That increasing female labour force participation was related to rising consumer debt, however, lends support to our initial doubt that financial pressures on households were nonexistent over

this period of time. The importance of the increasing availability of part-time work is also interesting. Such work is clearly tailored for married women with children. Its growing importance indicates an attempt to activate the reserve of married female labour, in the face of a scarcity of unmarried women. Furthermore, given not only the growing creation of part-time jobs but also the rise in women's real wages we might tentatively conclude that married women from middle-income households have moved increasingly into the paid labour force not only because of the economic pressures we have described but also because of positive attractions.

A Test of the "Women as Reserve Army" Hypothesis

In order to test the notion that women represent a reserve army of labour, we used the age-specific labour force participation rates for census years 1931 through 1971, and determined the combined and net effects of differences in period (or time) and age. Age effects will obviously be important: age is usually found to have a major effect on the pattern of women's labour force involvement. The effects of "period" are what we are chiefly concerned with here. If there are significant differences in women's involvement in wage

work in different periods, then we have some support for the hypothesis that married women working in the household represent a reserve army which capital has activated to meet its changing needs. That is, it could be legitimately argued that capital's needs for labour, which, it could also be argued, change over the years, are a major factor in changing female involvement in wage work: when capital's needs for female labour rise, women have responded. (Either that, or it would indicate that substantial changes have occurred in the organization of the household or in the relation between household resources and household needs which are distinctly correlated with time.)

With age and period (or census year) as our independent variables and women's labour force participation rates our dependent variable, we fit a series of log linear models. Table 35 presents our findings. The G statistic for the model of independence (which assumes that the independent variables are related to each other, but not to the dependent variable) is 198,000. The statistic indicates that this model fits very poorly. The model assuming both an effect of age and one of period fits the data very well, however: G is only 15,000, with

$R = .923$. That is, the main effects of age and period together explain almost all of the variation in women's labour force participation rates. (Adding "cohort" as a third independent variable, which is actually one type of statistical interaction of period and age, and fitting the model with all three main effects improves the fit very little; the R becomes .974.)

The effect of age is actually greater than that of period (i.e., subtracting model 2 from model 4, in table 35, leaves a smaller difference, than subtracting model 3 from model 4). Our suspicion that the effect of period was substantial was, however, justified.

In graph 5, we display women's labour force participation rates, by period and age. In table 35 too we show the effects of the different categories of each variable, period and age. As can be seen in graph 5, women's labour force participation appears to decrease systematically with increasing age. Surprisingly, there does not seem to be a decrease in labour force involvement during women's child-bearing years. With respect to period, 1961 and 1971 had positive effects on women's labour force participation rates, while the earlier years had negative effects: the 1950s and the 1960s were the decades of the largest increases in women's labour force involvement.

Conclusion

In Canada, as in the United States, married women from all households increasingly sought wage work, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. During this period of influx of married women into wage work, real wages were rising, even relative to the cost of living (at a minimal level). Therefore, though we again have some evidence that lower-income households have required a second wage through the twentieth century, we must determine fairly subtle economic changes in the case of middle-income women. Again, we argue that there has been a closer relationship established between the Canadian household and the capitalist economy. Commoditization of household means of production represented a cost to households, but also a saving in labour time. As costly commodities, they signify the generally rising cost involved in the reproduction of daily life, and at the same time they fail to enable the housewife to contribute materially to necessary means of subsistence, and reduce these rising costs. The entry of married women into wage work both symbolized a closer integration of household and "economy" - since household means of production and the product expected of the household worker (i.e.,

subsistence) are increasingly commoditized - and itself brought about a closer integration. Moreover, we found some evidence, in our log linear analysis, that capital's changing needs for labour have a clear effect on women in the home, if only on lower-income women: they activate that labour reserve.

CHAPTER 6

A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE GROWING DEMAND FOR WOMEN'S LABOUR

To understand the rising demand for women's labour, it is obviously not sufficient to analyze changes that have occurred in the productive activities of the household. Even the shift of many productive tasks from the domestic sphere to the sphere of wage work does not explain the growing availability of jobs for female wage workers. A cursory look at the occupations in which the female labour force is concentrated indicates that many are neither jobs formerly carried out in the household, nor those largely female at the turn of the century. Clerical occupations, for example, account for almost a third of the Canadian female wage labour force. (See table 38.) They absorbed more of the influx of women into wage work than did any other type of job, and they now involve a larger portion of the female work force than any other occupation.

Clearly, a focus on changes in the demand for female labour involves an exploration of changes in the

capitalist economy, the sector of value production. And the growing importance of clerical work indicates further that changes in the very organization of the production of commodities may be behind the rising demand for women's labour. Moreover, clerical work is probably associated more with the state sector than it is with the private corporate sector. Therefore, the growth of state services, which are often involved in the reproduction of labour power, must also be examined in the attempt to explain the growing demand for women workers. In fact, because professional occupations such as teaching represent the second largest employers of women, an expanded consideration of changes in the production and reproduction of labour power (outside the home as well as inside it) is called for. In short, to explain the rise in the demand for women, we must consider both changes in the process of the production and reproduction of value and changes in the production and reproduction of labour power, especially on a generational basis.

A Look at the Occupations Women Have Entered

The classification of occupations most in accord with census distinctions reveals some strong trends. Distinguishing among primary, manual, white-collar, and

service occupations, we find that the percentage of the labour force in primary occupations has decreased tremendously, and that in white-collar occupations has increased almost as much, since the turn of the century. In fact, white-collar occupations now involve, in Canada, the largest concentrations of workers. (See table 36.) Among white-collar jobs, clerical work has expanded more rapidly than any other type of work. Of course, a more powerful categorization of occupations, according to level of skill required, control over work process, level of pay, etc., would probably indicate that less change has occurred over time than appears here. It may even indicate less difference between men and women, in terms of their distribution in the work force. However, this crude occupational classification (which suffers most in its confounding of industry with occupation) will serve to address some simple questions about women's influx into wage work.

An examination of the changing sex composition of these occupations reveals that the percentage of service workers who are female has decreased since 1901, and the percentage of manual workers who are female has decreased very slightly (although it increased during the Depression, as some cheap labour

was substituted for men's more expensive labour). (See table 37.) Women have increased as a percentage of workers in primary occupations (from a miniscule per cent in 1901). However, the most significant increase in the female component of any occupational group has been that occurring in white-collar jobs. Women represented 21% of white-collar workers in 1901, and 50% in 1971. Moreover, of white-collar occupations, clerical ones experienced the greatest feminization.

We can analytically separate the growth in different categories of occupations from increases in the female proportions of workers in the different occupations. Specifically, we can estimate (through "indirect standardization") the number of women there would be in the labour force in Canada in 1971 if occupations had grown since 1901, but the sex composition of them had remained the same. We can compare that to another estimate (made through "direct standardization") of the number of women who would have been in the labour force in Canada in 1971 had there been a growing feminization of the work force in each occupation, without any growth in the occupation. Such an exercise is shown in table 39.

On the one hand, the estimate of the number of women in the work force in 1971 based on the assumption

that the percentage of workers who are female remained constant in each occupation since 1901, and only the numbers of people in the different occupations increased (as they did in 1941 and 1971) is 59% of the actual number in 1971. On the other hand, that estimated on the assumption that the percentage of workers who are female changed in each occupation (as it did in 1941 and 1971), but the numbers of workers in the different occupations remained as they were in 1901, is only 13% of the actual number of Canadian women in the work force in 1971. Similarly, following the same indirect and direct standardization procedures for the changes between 1941 and 1971 (shown in table 40), we obtain an estimated number of female wage workers which is 74% of the actual number when based on the assumption of occupational growth alone, and one which is 37% of the actual number when based on the assumption of increasing feminization alone. Therefore, we can tentatively conclude that the change in the sex composition of occupations - at least of gross occupational categories - is not as important as the fact that the occupations women were in in 1901 grew throughout the twentieth century. That is, especially the growth of white-collar occupation, but also that of service occupations must be explained to

understand the trend of rising involvement of women in wage work. Certainly, it is at least as crucial to focus on the expansion of particular occupations, and the shift in the occupational distribution, as it is to focus on the rise in women's labour force participation rates alone.

Because of the growth of white-collar jobs, the distribution of the female work force has shifted into white-collar work. Sixty percent of female wage workers were in white-collar jobs in 1971, while only 24% of them were in such jobs in 1901. (See table 38.) The distribution of women wage earners has shifted out of service occupations (i.e., 42% of the female labour force was in service jobs in 1901; 15% of it was in such work in 1971), and out of manual jobs (i.e., 31% of the female labour force was in manual jobs in 1901; 10% of it was in manual work in 1971). For women in the work force, white-collar occupations have been the most important paid jobs since 1921. (The distribution of male workers has also shifted into white-collar jobs, as well as manual and service jobs; men have experienced a substantial shift out of primary occupations (Connelly, 1978, 101-102). Manual occupations are, since 1951, the most important ones for men, followed by white collar occupations.)

A more detailed analysis of the growth in this white-collar work has been carried out for the United States, by Peter Meiksins (1980). He finds that professional and technical occupations and clerical occupations have expanded more over the course of the twentieth century than any other jobs that might be classified as white-collar. Managerial and sales jobs have increased only slowly in the United States. Furthermore, at least 50% of the expansion of "professional, technical and kindred" occupations is accounted for by the rising numbers of teachers, nurses, engineers, technicians and accountants-auditors. In fact, teachers account for 20% of the expansion, while the other four occupations together account for 33% of it (Meiksins, 1980). Among clerical occupations, in 1970 stenographers, typists and secretaries; bookkeepers and cashiers; office machine operators; shipping and receiving clerks; and telephone operators were most important. The first four occupations represented over 55% of all clerical work, and accounted for 60% of the twentieth-century growth in clerical jobs. Moreover, bookkeepers and cashiers and stenographers, typists and secretaries were dominant clerical jobs in 1910 as well as later, in the United States (Meiksins, 1980).

If these occupations were most important to the growth of the whole labour force, then they were especially important to the increase in the female part of the labour force. Moreover, at this crude level of detail, differences between trends in Canada and those in the United States are probably minor. Clerical work, of the type listed above, and professional occupations such as teaching and nursing have grown tremendously in Canada, as they have in the United States (Connelly, 1978). The large shifts in the occupational distribution of women wage workers - the proportional shifts into white-collar occupations and out of service occupations - occurred during the two decades of the World Wars. (See table 38.) Apparently, it was during the Wars that occupational trends developed - and they continued thereafter.

These shifts during wartime are understandable, from the perspective of labour supply. As Noah Meltz (1965) points out, until 1951 there were large educational differences between professional and clerical workers, but slim earnings' differentials; indeed, clerical workers earned high wages, considering their educational achievement. At the same time, service jobs involved much lower wages than any others. Women moved into the more preferable and accessible

white-collar jobs when the opportunity presented itself. Table 36 indicates that, in fact, during these two war decades there were shifts into white-collar jobs and out of service jobs for the whole labour force. Probably some substantial changes in the economy were precipitated by the Wars. Increases in the state sector were no doubt part of these changes. Perhaps substantial gains in the centralization of capital also occurred during the Wars. We can only speculate here that these were the developments occurring during the Wars that influenced these labour force shifts. The question is, how are such developments related to the growing wage labour of married women?

The Growth of Certain White-Collar Occupations

The expansion of white-collar jobs in the twentieth century is understandable when seen as a direct or indirect consequence of the growing monopolization of the commodity sector of the economy. Monopoly capitalism, which began to develop in the last decades of the nineteenth century in both Canada and the United States, involved the vertical integration of industries and the horizontal expansion of corporations, principally via mergers and product

diversification. The transformations of the production process which accompanied and helped make possible monopolization (by improving the process of accumulation of capital) included the tremendous elaboration of the division of labour, the breaking down of occupations into detail operations, and the simultaneous deskilling of the work (Braverman, 1974). Higher-paid labour was increasingly allocated work that only cheaper labour could not do. Furthermore, "science" was increasingly applied to industry, in a rampant process of progressive mechanization of production.

The characteristics of the large corporation in a monopolized industry, according to both Braverman (1974) and Meiksins (1980), include the growth of marketing departments within the firm, the predominance of the finance department as "brain center" of the organization, and the development of bureaucracy as a means of coordinating and managing the large and complex organization. All of these aspects of the corporate structure entail the expansion of white-collar work. First, because the development of a national market was a possibility in the United States (given transportation and communications improvements) when monopoly developed, economies of scale became

possible even in the area of marketing. Marketing became part of the production process in a real sense: the image of a product as created by advertisers became as important as its use value, and was manufactured along with the product. Consequently, a marketing subdivision of the corporation replaced outside agents and wholesalers. Moreover, it expanded rapidly, as the fields of advertising and consumer research were developed. The larger the corporation (i.e., the more capital it embodied), the greater the need for stable market demand - and the more crucial the marketing department. Such an additional and ever-expanding department is made up of managers and salesmen, but even more of bookkeepers and clerks.

Second, as the finance department increasingly dominated the corporation, and decisions about investment became more crucial with the expanding amount of capital under the control of each corporation, more information about the variety of operations within the corporate structure was necessary. Bookkeepers and accountants, as well as technical and market researchers, were in greater and greater demand. Moreover, the simple task of keeping track of the flow of capital expanded, probably exponentially, with growing vertical integration and

horizontal diversification of the corporation.

According to Braverman (1974,302),

As capitalism becomes more complex and develops into its monopoly stage, the accounting of value becomes infinitely more complex. The number of intermediaries between production and consumption increases, so that the value accounting of the single commodity is duplicated through a number of stages. Just as in some industries the labor expended upon marketing begins to approach the amount expended upon the production of the commodities being sold, so in some industries the labor expended upon the mere transformation of the form of value (from the commodity form into the form of money or credit) - including the policing, the cashiers, and collection work, the recordkeeping, the accounting, etc. - begins to approach or surpass the labor used in producing the underlying commodity or service. And finally...entire industries come into existence whose activity is concerned with nothing but the transfer of values and the accounting entailed by this.

That is, clerical work is central to the development of monopoly capitalism.

Finally, and more generally, the tasks of coordination and management soar, as old boundaries of size and complexity are burst for business organizations in monopolized industries. Paperwork grows tremendously as a means of communication and, with it, the numbers of secretaries and clerks. More specifically, however, bureaucracy develops as the organizational solution to the growing size and

complexity of business, and especially of the expanding distance between labour and the owners of capital. As Meiksins (1980) points out, bureaucracy is characterized by a complex division of labour and an elaborately structured system of communication, accounting, and budgeting. Bureaucratization of the firm builds in coordination and control over the labour process. For example, personnel departments have generally replaced foremen; so, bureaucratic structures have replaced individuals (dealing with each other face-to-face) and methods of cost accounting have replaced guessing, both necessary to managerial control over labour.

Bureaucratization also involves the progressive breakdown of occupations into detail jobs, which cheaper and cheaper labour can be given. Moreover, to promote the cheapness and efficiency of the work, office jobs have been increasingly mechanized. In other words, the work that collectively represents management control over the labour process has experienced the same degradation that has affected all work under monopoly capitalism.

The secretaries and office workers who people bureaucracies are, of course, mostly women. In fact, women began replacing men in clerical jobs around the

turn of the century, during the transformation of that work from a craft, with the potential of upward mobility, into a low-skilled, very specialized, low-paid, and fairly mechanized job with no mobility ladder (Holcombe, 1953, Braverman, 1974). No doubt, feminization of the occupation was a means of forcing these radical changes in an occupation which had involved a fair amount of status and worker control. Women would have been attractive to employers at that time not only because they were cheap labour, but also because their presence itself implied a redefinition of the job.

Today, besides the continued cheapness of women's labour power, women are desired workers in bureaucratic offices for several sociological reasons. First, they sustain the "clean" image of white-collar work, and in the process provide a "side attraction" to the men they work with. Second, they provide personal services to their male bosses and co-workers, many of whose jobs are increasingly distinguished from blue-collar jobs only by a status differential. Finally, in offices that deal either in person or over the telephone with the public, women's presumed skills in interpersonal interaction are attractive.

Also related to the development of monopoly capitalism is the growth of the state sector. As we saw above, teaching and nursing were two professional occupations that contributed substantially to the increase in white-collar work. Social work jobs are also among those increasing most rapidly since World War II, at least in the United States (Meiksins, 1980).

How is state sector growth related to monopoly capital? Because of its high fixed capital costs, among other things, monopolized industries require - and can pay for - a stable and high-quality labour force (Gordon, 1972, Reich et al., 1973, Doeringer and Piore, 1971, Averitt, 1968). Education inputs to the reproduction of labour power become more and more important, since schooling instills not only the all-round skills and aptitude expected in high-quality labour (e.g., reading and writing, and the ability to learn new tasks easily), but also because it socializes people to industrial work discipline. Furthermore, besides its labour requirements, monopoly capital seeks to create an assured market for its products. In that education increases peoples' desires for self-fulfillment and satisfaction, which can be channelled into consumption, it is additionally functional to monopoly capital.

The counterpart of the stability of the labour force in monopolized sectors of the economy (i.e., in terms of their reliable behaviour and commitment to the firm, and the relative security and clear career pattern associated with their jobs - largely due to unionization) is the instability of the lives of workers whose jobs become redundant through mechanization and those in competitive sectors of the economy whose jobs are perpetually unstable. In fact, while workers' jobs in monopolized sectors of the economy are generally better protected than those of other workers, because mechanization is central to monopoly accumulation so too is the build-up of the "industrial reserve army." Resulting additions to the reserve army of the unemployed must be maintained in some minimal state of "health and decency" by the state, both in order to prevent outbreaks of social unrest and to keep workers in condition for work when they are needed. Therefore, growing welfare services are also related to monopoly capitalism, especially because progressive mechanization - and the release of workers over time - is characteristic of monopolized industries.

Finally, there has been an increase, over the course of the century, in the numbers of women in

service jobs, although there has also been a shift in the percentage distribution of female workers out of service jobs. About 100,000 women were service workers in 1901, while about 450,000 women were in service occupations in 1971. Braverman (1974) argued that there has been an expansion in the service sector of the economy (i.e., in service industries) primarily because of the accumulation there of labour reserves, repelled from or not absorbed into the monopoly sector of the economy. That is, because labour is available and cheap (given competition among workers), investment in services is spurred.

Braverman additionally argued, however, that capitalism, in its unceasing expansion into new investment outlets, has taken over virtually all production and services formerly carried out in the home. Even the education of children and care of the sick and the old have been, to a large extent, transferred into "the economy," according to Braverman. Thus, jobs women formerly did in the home, are increasingly done by them as wage workers.

This formulation is problematic not only because it fails to explain why women would have followed such work out of the household and into "the economy," but also because it involves a misleading notion of

domestic labour and of the tasks women do as wage workers. Braverman assumed that housewives are now involved in very little in the way of productive activities. However, the services women do in the household have expanded as manual chores necessarily done in the home have decreased (Vanek, 1974). One of the services that has increased considerably over time is that of child care. Coincidental to the expansion in the time children spend being formally educated has been the expansion of the time women feel they must spend socializing their children. "Personality" and "character" are built at home. Indeed, they are aspects of the commodity labour power, which people sell when applying for white-collar jobs. And mothers have increasingly, over time, been told by the "experts" that they alone are responsible for the child they produce (Ehrenreich and English, 1978). In short, education has increased both inside the home and outside the home, as standards have risen.

The same is true of health care. Over time, standards have risen but, more importantly, better means of health care have developed. Therefore, while women continue to spend considerable time caring for sick family members at home, the numbers of doctors and nurses have risen. Similarly, with respect to service

jobs, the cleaning jobs that women do for wages do not represent a shift in work from the household to "the economy." Only in the case of food preparation and distribution could the argument be made (with respect to white-collar jobs) that work has shifted out of the home and into the commercial sector.

Therefore, Braverman's argument about the "commoditization of daily life" was insightful. Indeed, it assumed central importance to our explanation of women's influx into wage work. However, he misrepresented women's role in the home when he labelled it a sphere of consumption. Such an assumption is unhelpful when attempting an explanation of the trend in women's work (i.e., how women decide to allocate their work time), and would be even more deleterious to political analysis of women's consciousness.

Conclusion

We have argued that the rising demand for female labour is a product of the development of monopoly capitalism. However, it is not simply the case that goods and services formerly produced in the household have been taken over by an imperialist economy. Rather, changes in the structure of firms due to the

development of monopoly have created new types of work, especially clerical work. As we argued in chapter 4, the development of monopoly capitalism in this century has meant the transformation of the means and the product of household production, as well as a transfer of some material production out of the household. These changes in the household entailed a transformation in the process of the reproduction of labour power. Further changes in that process, which involve growing labour inputs by employees of the state, have contributed substantially to a growing demand for female labour. In chapter 7, we shall examine the possible effects that changes in state labour legislation and welfare policies might have had on women's involvement in the wage work force.

CHAPTER 7

THE STATE AND MARRIED WOMEN'S INVOLVEMENT IN WAGE WORK: LABOUR LEGISLATION AND WELFARE POLICIES IN BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND CANADA

A consideration of the way the reserve army of married female labour has been activated would be incomplete without accounting for the role of the state in either directly encouraging or discouraging women's labour force participation, or indirectly shaping the household in ways which encourage or discourage that participation. Therefore, in this chapter, we shall consider the histories of labour legislation and welfare policies in Britain, Canada and the United States. Our chief concern is, of course, the effects of changing legislation and other forms of government intervention. However, the question of the sources of changes in government policy is one we cannot ignore when discussing the role of the state in capitalist society. Whether the argument is made that class struggle forced the state to enact legislation, or that such intervention occurred because of state officials' perceptions about the long-run interests of capital,

the argument specifies a definition of the role of the state. And without any attempt, however inadequate, to discuss the forces that have pushed the state into action, our discussion of the effects of that action would be misleading and wholly inadequate.

On the question of the origins of both changes in labour legislation and in welfare provisions, most writers concerned with women and the family have taken one of two positions. One argument is that the working class, through strikes and other disruptions, forced the state to enact measures such as protective labour legislation and general assistance welfare benefits. Jane Humphries (1977) argued that because family and neighbourhood ties were held to be a more secure source of social security than any an impersonal state might provide, the working class fought through the nineteenth century in Britain for a "family wage." That is, they fought for a raising of the level of men's wages to one that would cover family subsistence needs, which during the period of the Industrial Revolution generally required the wages of two or more household members - or poor relief in the event both adults could not find work. Humphries argued that if family subsistence were covered by the wage of one household member, that household would attain a degree of control

over the price of labour, since women's presence in the labour market exerted competitive pressure on all wages (and their withdrawal should not only provide the household with a labour reserve but also should raise wages). She specifically assumed that individual households could determine the value (or price) of labour power. Her reasoning was faulty, however, since the actions of one household cannot significantly affect socially necessary labour time (which determines the value of labour power) or the price of labour (as it results from supply-demand interactions in the marketplace).

Humphries' argument emphasizing the importance of class struggle represents one side in a general debate on the role of the state. Her emphasis on working-class struggles for improved conditions of family reproduction differed, however, from that of Heidi Hartmann (1979). In addressing the question of the gradual exclusion of married women from industry, Hartmann stressed sexism on the part of male unionists, who fought to rid the labour market of low-paid female workers. The importance of class struggle has been emphasized as well in some explanations of the origins of state responsibility for the relief of unemployment and poverty. Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward

(1971) provided the provocative argument that working-class agitation and unrest explain changes in welfare policies and the availability of benefits in the twentieth century in the United States.

The antithesis of this position, the argument that the state directly intervenes in the history of the development of labour and the family in order to protect the long-run interests of capital, has been favoured by Michele Barret and Mary McIntosh (1979). They (1979, 12) maintained that "the working-class family [the privatized household in which the woman is housewife and dependent on the male wage earner] as it developed in this period, was rather more an imposition from above, a creation of the bourgeois state." This was largely McIntosh's (1978) position, and it should be noted that Barret and McIntosh (1979,6) also stated that "in relation to the demand for a family wage, ... the relegation of women to the home cannot be explained solely with reference to 'the needs of capitalism' but was an object of struggle, and therefore choice, of the working class." However, in reading Barret and McIntosh (1979), we are mostly reminded of arguments that the state intervenes to ensure the continued, healthy reproduction of labour power.

No doubt, the role of the state varies, from calculated intervention to grudging response to labour unrest, from one time to another, one issue to another, and one area to another. And the joint existence of both types of motivating forces is no doubt also probable in many instances. A reading of secondary historical sources will allow us to speculate here on the forces that brought about changes in labour and welfare legislation. In so doing, we shall focus on the actors in motion (especially labour) and on capital's needs with respect to state control over the labour process and the reproduction of labour power, at the time of the legislative changes. We discuss Britain as well as the United States and Canada, both because of Britain's importance in establishing precedents for North American legislation and because of the abundance of historical descriptions and analyses of this aspect of British history.

The key question we must concern ourselves with is whether state labour legislation and state welfare programs discouraged married women's involvement in wage work in the latter part of the nineteenth century and whether they promoted such involvement especially in the decades since World War II. Specifically, was the growing sex segregation of the work force largely

due to protective legislation for women workers? Did this legislation, which restricts women's work, contribute to a move of married women out of the wage work force? Has recent legislation for "equal pay for equal work" stimulated the influx of married women into the wage work force? Has welfare legislation (or poor relief) promoted the formation of the privatized nuclear-family household in which the wife is dependent on the man's wage (or, if that is inadequate, on her own wage-earning abilities)? Has it supported this one-wage-earner family, or has it instead served labour market needs for cheap female labour by withholding financial support to those wives and mothers who need it?

Nineteenth-Century Britain: Protective Labour Legislation

The major pieces of protective legislation in Britain were passed over a brief period of time in the nineteenth century. Two early Factory Acts, one passed in 1802 to protect child apprentices from overwork and one passed in 1819 to prohibit work for children under nine years of age and restrict the work of children 9 to 16 years of age, remained totally ineffective because no funds were allocated for their enforcement.

Protection by the state really began with the Factory Act of 1834, which prohibited work in factories for children below the age of nine, restricted to eight hours a day (between 5:30 a.m. and 8:30 p.m.) the work of children 9 to 13 years of age, and restricted to 12 hours a day (again between 5:30 a.m. and 8:30 p.m.) the work of children 13 to 18 years of age. The response of manufacturers to such restrictions involved the development of elaborate relay systems, which effectively hid the overwork of children from the inspectors. Because the hours of work for adults were not restricted, work time continued to be extremely long and often round-the-clock in factories - and every economic incentive to work children long hours remained.

The Factory Act of 1844 limited the work time of women over 18 years of age to 12 hours a day, between 5:30 a.m. and 8:30 p.m., the same as the hours for children. Furthermore, in an attempt to destroy relay systems, this law stipulated that the hours all children had been working, in any factory on any day, were to be figured from the time the first child started work that day. In 1847, the hours of work for women over 18 and all children between the ages of 13 and 18 were further restricted to 10 a day (actually,

11 in 1847 and 10 from 1848 on). Finally, in the face of the continued existence of the relay system, which ensured operation at full capacity between 5:30 a.m. and 8:30 p.m., the Factory Act of 1850 specified a workday for women and young people of 10 to 10 1/2 hours, Monday through Friday, and 7 1/2 hours on Saturday, between the hours of 6 a.m. and 6 p.m., with work breaks of not less than 1 1/2 hours for meals. All workers subject to the restrictions were to follow the same schedule (i.e., begin, break, and stop work at the same time). When the Factory Act of 1853 additionally forbade the employment of children before and after the hours of employment of young people and women, the relay system was destroyed.* The state thus curtailed the exploitation of women and children working in factories (that is, industrial workplaces with over 15 to 20 workers) by the middle of the nineteenth century.

Perhaps as important as the factory legislation is the absence of any legislation protecting homeworkers, for outwork involved as many or more workers as did factory work, for much of the nineteenth century.

 *This description of the legislation is mainly from Marx (1954), Capital. Vol. I.

Moreover, the overwork of workers at home and in small domestic shops was frequently comparable to that occurring in the factories. Although legislation passed in 1843 barred women from work in mining pits (where they had done the hard and unpleasant manual labour that men and boys refused to accept), only in the latter part of the nineteenth century were some of the restrictions in the Factory Acts extended to shops, laundries and certain domestic settings (i.e., those employing more than a specific number of workers, often five). Of course, the enforcement of all protective legislation, and its extension to more and more work settings, was actively and persistently fought by the employers.

The forces that led to state restriction of the factory work of women and children must be described in the context of the tumultuous historical changes occurring in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Masses of peasant households lost access to the means of the production of their subsistence during the major period of wholesale enclosures of "the commons," between 1760 and 1820 (Thompson, 1963). Without access to land, which represented the basis of the peasant economy, masses of households became dependent solely on wages. That is, some fell back

entirely on traditional activities such as spinning and weaving, for the market, which developed into wage work with increasing dependence on middlemen suppliers of raw materials. Others sent some household members into agricultural or factory work, to supplement the earnings of such handwork done in the home. In general, this dependence on wages which followed the enclosures meant both heightened financial insecurity and a lowered standard of living.

Families apparently struggled to stay together in production and to continue working at home. Factory work was especially resisted, but even in the early factories families often worked together and were paid a "family wage" (i.e., a wage that covered the work done by the whole family, paid to the man) (Smelser, 1959). However, the rapid changes that occurred in the organization of production, especially the revolutionization of the means of production, and the progressive centralization of production continually upset old patterns of work, and changed the sexes and ages of the workers required for different jobs. Significantly, individual wages became the norm, at the same time that work was increasingly spatially segregated along the lines of age and sex.

Because men earned wages sufficient only for their own subsistence, women were forced to earn the means of their subsistence. The nineteenth century witnessed a new group of workers in Britain: female agricultural wage workers (Pinchbeck, 1930). Moreover, factory workers were predominantly women and children. According to Engels (1858), in 1839, 31% of British factory operatives were women over the age of 18, 46% were children, and only 23% were adult men. Consequently, the factory operatives whose work directly competed with that of adult male handworkers and craftsmen working in the home were frequently female (Thompson, 1963). Women also exerted competitive pressures on men in handwork occupations. Of greatest significance was their mass adoption of the handwork occupation of weaving, after the mechanization of the traditionally female occupation of spinning meant its takeover by men. Weaving was the most common occupation of men who attempted to resist factory employment and earn a living at home.

Women's wages were typically well below those earned by men during the early decades of industrialization. Two factors appear to have been responsible. First, it was traditionally women's duty to meet the material needs of their children. With

access to farm and grazing land, space for a garden, room to keep chickens, household equipment to home produce clothing, etc., such a responsibility was not necessarily a liability. However, it became such when women were thrown on their personal resources and forced to sell their capacity to work for wages: the dependence of their children forced them to accept wages and working conditions men would and could refuse (Pinchbeck, 1930). Second, there were apparently tremendous oversupplies of women in those occupations available to them, and the resulting competition beat wages down (Pinchbeck, 1930).*

Apparently, the meagerness of women's wages served to depress men's wages in the early part of the nineteenth century. Amidst constant technological change in the organization of production, jobs could be and frequently were redefined in terms of their sex composition. Men's jobs could become women's jobs, that is, low-paid jobs. And generally it appears that proletarianization was proceeding at a quicker pace than the creation of wage jobs, so competition among

 *The same is true today, and it explains much of the wage differential between men and women. The question that still remains is why women have been confined to a relatively small number of occupations.

workers characterized the period. With respect to female competition, Pinchbeck (1930,102) concluded that,

the necessity which first brought women's labour into the market to eke out the wage of the married man, not only prevented his wage from rising to an adequate standard, but resulted in a competition by means of which it was still further reduced. Moreover, had that competition been eliminated, the net family income would have been as high from the wages of the man alone as it was by the combined earnings...

Moreover, men were apparently conscious of the effects of women's presence in the labour market (Pinchbeck, 1930).

The most damaging personal effect of these changes in the economic order was the crippling of the working-class family. In this period of the proletarianization of masses of peasants, the trend towards setting individuals on their own, to earn an individual wage, meant not only that parents were separated from each other and their children for most of the day, but also that the wages of both parents were often inadequate for the support of their children. Children were typically forced to work on their own for wages, and as a consequence "there was a drastic increase in the intensity of exploitation of

child labour between 1780 and 1840..." (Thompson, 1963, 331). Children were often severely exploited, and forced to work as many as 16 hours a day, in horrible work conditions. Additionally, because women often had to work outside the home, infants not uncommonly were deprived of the minimum of care essential for healthy survival. Not infrequently, they were handed over to "wet nurses" to be raised for a small fee in the country; or they were simply left under the supervision of a neighbor, older relative, or another child, to be drugged into contentment and quiet. It is not surprising that infant mortality rates were higher than 500 per 1,000 children (infancy to 5 years of age) in Sheffield and Manchester in the early nineteenth century (Thompson, 1963).

The healthy reproduction of the working-class family was, then, severely impaired by proletarianization. Moreover, the horrible sanitary conditions, the intense crowding and total absence of household amenities (documented by Engels in Manchester in the 1830s) precluded the kind of family life (separated from work life) that the working class now experiences. More importantly at that time was the fact that these living conditions, coupled with the removal of work from the household, precluded the

family interaction and neighbor sociability characteristic of peasant communities.

This impairment of family life - and crippling of the family - was part of a process that involved the destruction of a complete moral order. The peasant community, based on household possession of the means of production and on production for use, involved market subordination to the needs of the household and an integration of work with the rest of daily life. Proletarianization involved tearing the household from its economic foundation, but also from its social support in the village community. Among the old stabilities that were thus thrown into flux were sex and gender roles, namely the traditional authority the man held as household head, which was disrupted as women began earning individual wages.

The fact that there were so many paupers in evidence through the nineteenth century in Britain (i.e., apparently as many as a million at any time during the century*) not only attests to the profound destruction the process involved, but also indicates the abundance of wage labour available to the early industrial capitalists. Furthermore, it must be

*Leo Johnson, lecture on Feb. 21, 1980.

remembered that proletarianization was occurring in the towns as well as in the countryside. As competition in the marketplace among master craftsmen intensified and the ties between master craftsmen and commercial capitalists tightened, shops grew in size. Consequently, the amount of capital required to set up an independent shop grew until a worker's usual progress from the status of journeyman apprentice to that of master craftsman was blocked. Artisans increasingly became wage workers for life - and their wives lost the opportunity to learn the craft informally and to assist their husbands in the trade.

As for the bourgeoisie, perhaps their most significant characteristic, aside from the accumulation of capital which earmarked the class, was the growing ideological importance they placed on the nuclear family. Whether this sanctity of the family, which characterized the Victorian period especially but also the entire nineteenth century, can be traced directly to the importance of the individual accumulation of wealth or not, there is no doubt that it represented a heightened emphasis on the nuclear-family household, the importance of childhood, and therefore the primacy for women of motherhood. The petit-bourgeoisie and professionals (i.e., the middle classes) adopted the

notion of the sanctity of the family as bourgeois ideology came to permeate society. Therefore, faced with the chaos of proletarianization and industrialization, and the resulting destruction of the peasant/working-class family, the paternalistic landed aristocracy, the middle classes and even some of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie were horrified. It was their protest and the militant uprisings of the working class that led to state intervention in the economy, in the form of protective legislation.

The period between the late eighteenth century and 1833, as described by E.P. Thompson (1963) in The Making of the English Working Class, was characterized by a popular Radicalism and a newly militant trade unionism, which frequently erupted into violent and organized unrest. There were the Luddite movement (1811-17), the Pentridge Rising (1817), the Peterloo massacre (1819), frequent trade union activities (in the 1820s especially), the revolutionary situation in the early 1830s, and the Ten Hour Movement (lasting to the end of this period). Since handworkers (e.g., handloom weavers) and artisans were the dominant industrial workers in the period, they provided the nucleus and dominant ideology of the labour movement. Uprisings generally expressed protest against the

changing economic and moral order, specifically the end of producers' independence and their lowered social status, the transparency of capitalist exploitation, the destruction of the "family economy," and growing market dominance over customs such as that of a "fair price" and a "fair wage."

Workers' uprisings, therefore, often involved non-factory workers protesting the factory system. And because women were the predominant adult factory workers, they symbolized the factory system and the industrial capitalist order. Consequently, even though families sometimes survived by sending some of their members into the factories while others continued to work at home - often the man continuing to weave at home on the handloom while the woman worked in a textile factory - hostility was sometimes directed at women. Thompson (1963, 303, emphasis in the original) quotes a weaver protesting (in the early nineteenth century) "the adaptation of machines...to children, and youth, and women, to the exclusion of those who ought to labour - the men." The anger is not difficult to comprehend. According to E.P. Thompson (1963, 248), "manufacturers in the first half of the nineteenth century pressed forward each innovation which enabled them to dispense with adult male craftsmen and replace

them with women or juvenile labour," both of whose labour power was much cheaper than men's. Yet, as we noted above, it was not only female factory workers who threatened male handworkers and craftsmen. Contemporary observer, Henry Mayhew (quoted in Thompson, 1963, 250), referred to "the number of women and children who are being continually drafted into the different handicrafts with the view of reducing the earnings of the men..."

With respect to factory workers, whose discontent was also expressed, E.P. Thompson (1963, 203) concluded that "the issues which provoked the most intensity of feeling were very often ones in which such values as traditional customs, 'justice,' 'independence,' security, or family-economy were at stake, rather than straightforward 'bread-and-butter issues.'" Such feelings were expressed in an organized movement for the ten-hour work day, many strikes for the right to have trade unions - and some control over work conditions and job security - and mass demonstrations in the 1830s against the overwork of factory children. Thompson (1963, 340) quoted a contemporary who, in describing the factory movement, said the discontent sprang less from wages than "the separation of families, breaking up of households..." Such sentiment

cannot be explained so simply as the anger of men who were losing their patriarchal control over women and children. Women themselves were highly visible in these same worker uprisings. In fact, the Female Reform Societies that women workers organized at the time represented the first independent trade union activity by women.

At the same time that the working class was protesting the new economic order, there was a public outcry, seemingly against the abuses of the factory system, by members of the middle class and sections of the bourgeoisie. For some philanthropists among them, the exploitation that the factory system entailed was genuinely disturbing, even shocking - and the source of the outcry. For others, however, the chaos it wrought was no doubt far more upsetting. Bourgeois and Victorian order, grounded in the solidity of the family, was clearly threatened by that upon which it partly rested: the work of women employed in the factories. Among other things, that work seemed to be the source of some of the dissatisfaction causing general worker unrest.

Apparently, the public outcry from respectable parts of society was loudest concerning the inability of factory women to keep house, and thus keep their men

under their fingers (Hewitt,1958). The sex roles which were central to bourgeois order were being overthrown, it was thought. A contemporary named Ashley (quoted in Hewitt,1958,49, emphasis added) argued that factory owners "are poisoning the very sources of order and happiness and virtue..."

Part of the middle-class outcry was over the very real problem that infants were not being properly cared for. However, it is suggestive that the neglect of older children was never mentioned and that the use of birth control and abortion was frequently mentioned alongside concern for the infants. Again, bourgeois order, in the shape of Victorian morality, was mainly at issue. As mentioned above, women were regarded primarily as mothers.*

The unrest of the working classes, both factory workers and handworkers, combined with the middle-class outcry and some efforts by non-industrial sectors of the bourgeoisie to hinder the success of the industrial bourgeoisie, brought about enactment of protective labour legislation. Although the legislation served the long-run interests of capital, in that it protected

*This same sentiment, among middle-class women, later led to the development of the social work profession, which focussed its efforts on stabilizing the family.

the normal reproduction of labour power on a daily and a generational basis, industrialists fought the legislation and avoided conforming to its stipulations. Therefore, at least in this instance, the state was not responding to the interests of capital. Rather, it was forced to act as a result of public unrest and outcry. And it would be difficult to say whether working-class agitation or middle-class campaigning was the more important causal force behind enactment of the legislation - if that were even a useful question to address.

The early Factory Acts of 1802 and 1819 were, according to E.P. Thompson (1963), the final attempts of a dying paternalism to extend traditional protection over young children being worked like slaves. The important state intervention, that which was enforced and had significant consequences, began with the 1833-34 legislation. And there is no question that working-class struggle was crucial to its adoption.

In discussing these Factory Acts, Marx (1954,268) argued that, "their formulation, official recognition and proclamation by the state, were the result of a long struggle of classes." According to E.P. Thompson (1963,340), "the Factory Movement, in its early stages, represented less a growth of middle-class

humanitarianism than an affirmation of human rights by the workers themselves." Indeed, the government investigations and their summary in the Blue Books, were a routine response to discontent, a means of "handling and channelling" it, according to Thompson (1963).

Let us be clear about the reasons behind working-class protest. For centuries, wage workers either still partially working the land and living in peasant communities, or with peasant memories, resisted long work days, long work weeks, and regular, disciplined work schedules. From the fourteenth through the seventeenth centuries, the state legislated the minimum length of the work day because workers would work the minimum number of hours necessary to cover the costs of their subsistence, and then miss the rest of the day (Marx, 1954). The length of the work day was extended gradually, against resistance, until in the eighteenth century 12-hour work days were normal. Then, with the mechanization of the factory, beginning in the latter third of the eighteenth century, hours of work were extended even further, and the differentiation between day and night became blurred. Marx (1954, 253) summarized what happened:

It is not the normal maintenance of labour power which is to determine the limits of the

working-day; it is the greatest possible daily expenditure of labour power, no matter how diseased, compulsory, and painful it may be, which is to determine the limits of the labourers' period of repose. Capital cares nothing for the length of life of labour power. All that concerns it is simply and solely the maximum of labour power that can be rendered fluent in a working-day. It attains this end by shortening the extent of the labourer's life, as a greedy farmer snatches increased produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility.

Indeed, the ample reserves of labour which were available from the latter part of the eighteenth century, indicated by the large numbers of paupers, made concern about the reproduction of labour power unnecessary.

Workers were, in fact, worked to death, a fact attested to by the relatively low life expectancies of the working class. Therefore, one of the key aims of factory workers' agitation was for reduced hours. The Ten Hour Movement was in full strength by the 1838 elections. Although that agitation often concentrated on aims to restrict the hours of women and children, there is evidence that such a goal represented a strategy to achieve restriction of the hours of all workers.* This motivation is fairly clear in struggles

*At the end of the century, in the debate that occurred among women about the merits and the effects of

in the cotton mills, by organizations composed of both men and women workers (Hutchins, 1902, Black, 1902). Clearly, men were not alone in struggling for the protection - or restriction - of women and child wage workers. Women were apparently a significant force in protest movements; they were apparently able to make their demands felt. "The presence of women, almost as shock troops in these violent demonstrations, is certainly well established at least up to 1842..." (D. Thompson, 1976, 119).

protective legislation, Clementina Black (1902, 198-99) commented that "it is an amazing perversity which can construe this agitation as a device of male workers, to put a fetter on their female competitors from which they themselves were to be free."

In general, it seems that middle-class feminists argued that protective legislation harmed the struggle for women's equality because it restricted women, while working women continued to campaign for even more encompassing protective legislation. In 1927, the British House of Commons refused a private member's bill to kill protective legislation. Speaking against the bill, Margaret Bondfield (quoted in the 1927 Labour Gazette) argued that

we have never raised this question of special regulations for women unless we have had direct experience of the necessity for such regulations, and it seems a very amazing thing that all the objections to protective legislation should come from women who are not themselves working women. The main argument is that it is going to restrict the field of women's employment. I do not think this a sound argument at all. Since we have had our Factory Regulations,...there are more, and not fewer, women working in connection with these trades.

The short-run and long-run interests of the working-class family seemed, in fact, to be the restriction of married women to the household, given the inadequacy of their child rearing when it was a secondary occupation. Because the peasant household, which for centuries was the dominant form, involved female responsibility for maintenance of the children and the expectation of high fertility, there was no question (in the early nineteenth century) of the emerging working class taking the strategy of demanding an end to the sex segregation of occupations, equal pay for women, and socialized child care. Therefore, workers fighting for the protection of the family focused on demands which distinguished between women and men, and may in the long run have contributed to increased sexual inequality.

No doubt the other major factor behind working-class pressure for protective legislation was the threat women labourers represented to male wage earners. To artisans, women factory workers stood for the force that was driving down their wages and making obsolete their source of livelihood and status, and the basis of their way of life. In factories and among handworkers, women's low wages exerted downward competitive pressures on men's wages. Thus, the

patriarchy of the peasant household, which had few consequences in the work lives of women when the family worked as a productive team, was transformed into an active battle between the sexes when individuals were set on their own in the labour market. The objective, immediate interests of men and women were opposed, in the labour market.

The other key force behind enactment of protective legislation, the middle class, was, as we indicated above, probably distressed primarily with the visible threat to order that the financial independence of single women earning their own wage, married women neglecting their primary duty of motherhood, and male workers protesting the competitive threat of women workers all presented. The fact that protection was not sought for the horribly exploited outworkers, women doing piece work in small shops and at home, provides one indication of the strength of humanitarian motives on the part of the middle class. Equally, however, it indicates the importance of agitation by organized workers, in both bringing the "abuses" to the attention of the public and directly pressuring the state to act.

The origins of the legislation and the intentions of those who fought for it were one thing. The consequences were not necessarily the same. What were

they? First, the inhuman exploitation of women and children was no doubt curbed. In describing early factory conditions, Marx (1954,711-12) stated that "[If money]...'comes into the world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek,' capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt." From the Factory Commission reports, Marx (1954,236), quoted the story of a man whose son worked in a factory:

That boy of mine... when he was 7 years old I used to carry him on my back to and fro through the snow, and he used to have 16 hours a day... I have often knelt down to feed him as he stood by the machine, for he could not leave it or stop.

That work days of 16 hours without dinner breaks, and work forces of seven- and eight-year-old children were no longer possible in factories after 1853 was a tremendous victory.

Second, the involvement of women in factory work was not affected in a significantly different way than that of men, by the legislation. Although women tended to be used to replace children after the enactment of the Factory Act of 1834 (which restricted children's work), men were not generally substituted for women after the Act of 1844 (which restricted women's work). In fact, according to several accounts (Marx,1954,

Tuckwell, 1902), the chief consequence of the Factory Acts was that there was a reduction in the hours of all workers, including those of adult men. Marx (1954) stated that after the Factory Act of 1844 took effect, some factory owners tried to instigate a repeal of the legislation, by releasing women and children from jobs and pressuring men to take their places and to work even longer hours than they had previously, and especially to work at night. These attempts to work men longer hours than the women and children now worked were successfully resisted, according to Marx. Thus, "one of the first consequences [of the protective legislation for women and children] was that in practice the working-day of the adult males in factories became subject to the same limitations, since in most processes of production the co-operation of the children, young persons, and women is indispensable." Twelve-hour days became the norm in factories, in the latter 1840s.

As a consequence of this general reduction in the hours of work, capitalists were forced to further revolutionize their means of production. Tremendous advances in the mechanization of factories proceeded from around the mid-nineteenth century (Marx, 1954). It is generally agreed that industrialists concentrated

on increasing productivity (and extracting "relative surplus value" rather than "absolute surplus value") from approximately this time on (Barret and McIntosh, 1979).^{*} Consequently, according to Marx (1954), industry flourished between 1853 and 1860.

Apparently, the legislation failed to provide enough incentive for employers to fire women and replace them with men, since women continued to earn wages that were, at most, half the amount men earned. Their low wages probably subsidized much of the further mechanization of the factories. One study by Clara Collett, an examination of census data from 1851 to 1891, provided no evidence that women were displaced as a result of the protective legislation (Black, 1902).

Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the probability that protective legislation promoted the increased sexual segregation of the wage work force. The heightened mechanization forced by the legislation probably drove many marginal capitalists - those surviving only through the extreme exploitation of

^{*}Our interpretation differs markedly from that of Barret and McIntosh, who argue that mechanization was the basis of capital's support (sic) for factory legislation, that the shift from extracting absolute surplus value to relative surplus value predated the legislation.

their workers - out of business. These may have been the industrialists who relied more heavily on the labour of women and children, and so these workers would have lost their factory employment in the process. Moreover, the next effect in this sequence of reactions to the protective legislation which curtailed extreme exploitation may have been the growth of the productivity, skill, and wage gap between factory work and outwork (carried out in small shops and private homes). Outwork may even have been stimulated by the enforcement of the restrictive legislation. No doubt it continued to be a necessary counterpart to factory work through the century.

Perhaps women's employment in outwork, as well as in nonmanual occupations (like teaching and nursing) grew faster than their employment in factories for the rest of the century. Lee Holcombe (1973) reported that although the numbers of women in the wage work force increased between 1861 and 1911, the percentage of the whole work force that was female fell from 34.1% to 29.7%. Given that professions for women developed during this period, we suspect that the portion of the industrial labour force that was female declined. That is, the eventual results of the increasing mechanization of the factories probably involved the

capture by men - who were likely to be organized - of larger and larger shares of factory work, which could be more highly paid after the significant productivity increases resulting from the mechanization drive triggered by the legislation. In short, women's involvement in wage work probably did not decrease in the latter half of the nineteenth century, after the protective legislation, but the sex segregation of the industrial work force may have increased.

Nineteenth-Century Britain: Welfare Legislation

Poor relief, which was administered by the local parishes, was developed by a paternalistic landed gentry, as a necessary support to a population violently dispossessed of its means of production, adrift from a supportive village community, paid poverty wages, and faced with rising prices. Relief legislation varied over the years, and through the nineteenth century, between required confinement to a workhouse as a condition of relief, and payment of outdoor benefits to ease the ravages of poverty wages or unemployment. For example, because households used to a situation of near self sufficiency avoided wage work even when impoverished, the Poor Law Act of 1722 required confinement to a workhouse as a "test" of

destitution. The principle of relief as a punishment, and goad to wage work, was thus established early.

The Relief Act of 1782 made outdoor relief once again available, and the 1795 "Speenhamland decision" provided relief subsidies to wages. The subsidies were tied to the price of bread. Though instigated by a paternalist landed aristocracy (according to E.P. Thompson, 1963), the consequence of the Speenhamland policy was that pauperism became both a precondition and a consequence of wage work. Employers preferred hiring people already dependent on the parish - and therefore indirectly on them - before hiring independent workers; and because the relief subsidy (when obtained) brought wages up to the level of subsistence, it preserved low wages (Pinchbeck, 1930). In fact, according to Pinchbeck (1930), the system was maintained some time after the Wars at the turn of the century because capitalist farmers needed a reserve of cheap, occasional workers.

Nevertheless, the costs of this type of relief system apparently came to outweigh its benefits in the eyes of those groups determining government policy. In 1834 (i.e., the time the first major protective legislation was passed), outdoor relief was abolished for all able-bodied men and their families. Relief was

to be given only in workhouses, in which the conditions were "less eligible" than those in which the lowest-paid worker lived. Poor Law Commissioners, according to one of them (quoted in Webb and Webb, 1910, 87),

considered the main object of the legislature in passing the Poor Law Amendment to have been the extinction of the allowance system, or the system of making up the wages of labourers out of the poor's rate. With this view their regulations have been almost exclusively applied to the able-bodied.

Actually, able-bodied men were the target of the legislation; women were not mentioned at all in the regulations. Women continued to receive outdoor relief, without being subject to the workhouse "test" - provided they had no illegitimate children. Moreover, there were major differences in relief practices, according to geographic area. In some areas, which for the most part were rural, outdoor relief was forbidden to men and often women. In other areas, however, those where cities and towns tended to be, outdoor relief was available to both men and women. (Perhaps because rural areas could send their unemployed elsewhere to look for work, to cities in the final resort, they could be restrictive in a way that more urban areas could not.)

The first poor relief regulation concerning women appeared in 1850 (several years after legislation protecting women working in factories was passed). This order advised that able-bodied women not receive outdoor relief, and that they be submitted to the workhouse "test" of destitution. In fact, women continued to obtain outdoor relief, in those areas that since 1834 had been more liberal. Indeed, these areas grew relatively faster than the others in population (perhaps indicating that women's earnings were crucial, and that households were migrating to these more lenient districts) (Webb and Webb, 1910). A significant reduction of the numbers of women on relief came only after a formal policy on women was passed in 1871 (Webb and Webb, 1910). In an over-all tightening of the regulations and their enforcement, outdoor relief was discouraged for women, even for widows with children and certainly for women with able-bodied husbands, even if those husbands could not support their families and there were many children.

During the same period, the state began to assume the task of education. Over the course of the latter part of the nineteenth century, workhouse children were increasingly placed in foster homes, where they were raised and educated in circumstances better than those

of children in households living on outdoor relief or low wages. In 1870, education was made compulsory for all children. Apparently from then on, the state began a gradual assumption of some of the tasks formerly assumed to be the responsibility of parents. That process seemed to involve increasing state encroachment on the rights of individuals. For example, parents' control over their children was no longer absolute: children could be taken from their parents if the latter were frequently "in and out" of the workhouse, or seemed inadequate as parents in other ways.

One final shift in welfare policy occurred in the nineteenth century in Britain. After 1885, there began a gradual liberalization of relief policy. The "less eligible" condition of relief vanished, in a growing practice of separating workers from vagrants. The former were provided with public works projects to prevent dependency on relief, while the latter - essentially assumed to be morally defective - were treated punitively in order to discourage others from following in their footsteps.

What were the effects of this early state welfare policy? Did it promote a particular family form, in which women's primary responsibility for child rearing was reinforced, and their dependence on men encouraged

(as a new development, and part of the process of proletarianization)? More generally, did it even affect family form? The primary focus of state relief at this time was the labour market. Did it, unlike the labour legislation of the period, lend support to a withdrawal of married women from wage work?

Poor relief, though instigated by a landed gentry opposed to the development of industrial capitalism, assisted its development. This early state involvement in the provision of welfare relief served to maintain a reserve of workers, ready and eager to accept wage work. Such an end was accomplished by the payment of outdoor relief sufficient to maintain the population of potential workers in reasonable health, but inadequate enough to make wage work preferable. Workhouse relief more directly forced men to work, and made wage work preferable to the work and living conditions that accompanied the acceptance of relief. In so ensuring that able-bodied men were forced to accept wage work, the system of poor relief upheld poverty-level wages. The Speenhamland system even more directly upheld low wages and, therefore, during a period of massive enclosures, it impoverished a whole segment of the population and created for them total dependence on wage labour. According to E.P. Thompson (1963), this

system of relief, operative over the first three decades of the nineteenth century, served to remove the "last vestige of control by the labourer over his own wage or working life."

Because it aimed to force men's involvement in wage work, Speenhamland relief policy failed to support the nuclear-family household form, in which women depend on men's income. Rather, it assumed it, and used its existence for punitive purposes. In fact, relief policy was generally highly destructive of the working-class family. According to Ivy Pinchbeck (1930), the Speenhamland system undermined the family in several ways. First, because relief subsidies to wages kept wages low, and workers were generally impoverished, the normal and healthy reproduction of the working-class family was clearly endangered. Second, because poor relief rates varied from one area to another, families were frequently either uprooted in the search for more favorable rates, or separated from the often-migrating husband and father. Third, poor relief encouraged quick and frequently unstable marriage, by paying higher rates to married adults.

Finally, these relief policies did not serve to stabilize sex roles. In fact, they intensified trends that made for their instability. So, no stretch of the

imagination could construe the policies as supportive of the housewife role of female dependence on a male wage earner. Rather, they intensified the opposition of the interests of men and women in the labour market. Under "Speenhamland," in some areas, because men could be paid wages as low as those women earned (which the state then supplemented), employers replaced women with men, especially in agricultural work. In other areas, women and children were forced to work for wages by the husband and father, whose low wages necessitated additional earnings.*

With the 1834 legislation, promotion of men's involvement in wage work not only took the punitive form of enforced residence in a workhouse as a condition of receiving benefits, but also involved requiring (or, at least formally requiring) male support (rather than the possibility of state support) of a dependent wife and children. That is, married women were defined as dependent and were increasingly cut off from relief, for the purpose of forcing men to

 *We have already discussed the effects of widespread poverty and dependence on low wages. The resulting oversupply of women seeking wage work led to further undercutting of men's wages, and a demand by the working class for protective legislation to arrest the destruction of the family.

work for low wages.* Concern for the stability of the working-class family was apparently nonexistent, since that goal in fact would have conflicted with the clear intention of forcing men into wage work. Therefore, only punitively, in that it increasingly denied married women state support, did relief policy promote the dependent-woman-wage-earning-man family form. This family form was not, however, positively supported by relief policies. That women often continued to obtain outdoor relief until the stricter policies of 1871 attests to the impossibility of the nuclear-family household headed by a male wage earner at this time, rather than to any intention on the part of the state to support women.

If men were unable to find employment, families were forced to enter the workhouse, wherein people were segregated by age and sex (Webb and Webb, 1910). That is, families were broken up in the workhouses. Thus, only in areas where women could obtain outdoor support was the working-class family not seriously undermined by state policies.

 * Another, punitive, way in which the nuclear family and marriage were advocated by the state was in the restriction of outdoor relief to women without illegitimate children.

The policy of 1871 especially withdrew state support of the working-class nuclear family and simultaneously promoted female dependence: the law specified that married women be prevented from receiving relief. Marriage and female financial independence were antithetical, according to the practices of state policy during this period. Because marriage meant female dependence, it increasingly became possible only if the man earned wages high enough to support a family, or if the woman were able to work for wages. That is, it was something that the working class could strive for, not something supported by the state. On the whole, then, in withdrawing support of women's financial independence, nineteenth-century British state welfare policies forced, in many households, the dependence of the housewife on the man's wage; but it did not encourage the formation of households with one wage earner.

In sum, this brief review of nineteenth-century British labour legislation and poor relief policy has argued that protective labour legislation was won as a result of working-class struggle. Protective labour laws represented a direct curb on the severe exploitation characteristic of early industrial capitalism. Relief legislation, on the other hand,

though probably initiated (before 1834, anyway) for paternalistic reasons, by non-capitalist interests, promoted the development of capitalism, with a clear focus on shaping the labour market.

Factory legislation probably indirectly served to promote the growing sex segregation of the labour force, in part by supporting a growing concentration of adult males in the factories, although we think it cannot be argued that it directly pushed women out of the factory work force. These laws were enacted partly in response to working-class concerns that female workers were undercutting the wages of the male labour force. However, in order to end this competition between the sexes in the labour market, the British government would have had to lend financial support to married women. Such was not forthcoming. Poor relief policies actually undermined possibilities for working-class nuclear families composed of male wage earner and dependent wife and children. British welfare policies, increasingly over the course of the nineteenth century, forced married women from low-income households onto the labour market, where they continued to exert some pressure at least on men's wages. Thus, one of the aims of labour, with respect to the protective legislation, was counteracted through

welfare policies.

Female dependence was legislated, as a goad towards wage work for men - and women. Only in this backhanded way was the nuclear family promoted. Because marriage was equated with female dependence, it represented a possibility only for men who earned relatively high wages.

Before turning to North America, we might briefly review major characteristics of British welfare policy in the twentieth century. First, the state has become increasingly concerned with ensuring the healthy reproduction of labour power on a generational basis. This development stands in contrast with the nineteenth-century undermining of the working-class household. Such concern has taken the forms of direct intervention in family life, and indirect intervention through policies to shore up the working-class household (so it will more likely produce healthy citizens and workers). For example, after the Boer War made clear the inadequate and unhealthy reproduction of the working class, for purposes of "national efficiency" the state continued the practice of removing children from unusually inadequate households, but more importantly (since it affected more people) the government began programs of free lunches for

school children whose parents were unable to provide adequate meals. After World War I, direct support of the family in the shape of Family Allowances, began: concern about poverty from then on was clearly a concern about children (Wilson, 1977). Apparently, an even keener concern about childrens' welfare developed after the World War II evacuations placed poor children in middle-class homes. After the Beveridge Report of 1942 (which laid out the modern principles of British welfare policy), further income supports to the family were provided by the government, and the sanctity of the family became a cornerstone of British welfare policy. Moreover, the social work profession assumed a growing role, and its aim was and is to strengthen the family (Wilson, 1977).

Another current Welfare State practice involves continued withholding of support (and, therefore, financial independence) for married women. Married women are assumed to be dependent on a man, and entitled to support from him. For example, Social Security payments are worse for married women than for single women, who in turn are treated worse than men (because they are assumed to be without dependents). Similarly, the infamous cohabitation rule treats single women like married women if they live with a man: when

a man is in residence, women are assumed to be economically dependent on him, and thus cannot claim supplementary benefits. However, today in Britain this promotion of the housewife role of female dependence occurs in the context of some state support of the working-class household, for the sake of the children. Therefore, on the one hand there is now state support for the family, and the housewife-as-mother; on the other hand, women are not provided with enough support to give them financial independence. The state thus both discourages and encourages their involvement in wage work. The former effect may, in sum, predominate since it affects all married women. For working-class women, however, the influence of state welfare policies is negligible. State relief policies continue to maintain women in low-income households as a cheap labour reserve.

Labour Legislation in the United States

Protective labour legislation was adopted later in the United States than in Britain, and it seems that as a consequence working conditions in American factories were worse than those in British factories for much of the nineteenth century (i.e., after the first few decades). The tardiness of such legislation was

largely due to Constitutional (i.e., Fifth Amendment) protection of the liberty of the individual: the Supreme Court generally overruled state legislation of a protective nature, especially if it affected men, or involved protection of union activities (Faulkner, 1924). Only with the New Deal legislation of the 1930s, which gave workers the right to unionize and made collective bargaining compulsory, was protective legislation likely to be upheld.

Nevertheless, the state's police power to ensure the health and safety of the people (i.e, future generations of mothers and the next generation of workers) allowed some protective legislation to stand. The long hours children worked in nineteenth-century factories (comparable to British practice) were curtailed, but at an extremely late date. Only in the last decades of the nineteenth century did many of the states enact protective legislation for children. In 1916 and 1919, attempts by Congress to enact federal laws were declared unconstitutional. Not until the 1930s did most states have legislation curtailing child labour; in that decade, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of the New Deal banned child labour (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976). Compulsory school attendance legislation was a much more popular attack

on child labour. In 1870, school attendance became compulsory under federal law, and by 1914 most states had compulsory school attendance laws.

With respect to women wage workers, protective legislation concerning hours and working conditions was not passed until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in most states. The earliest law specifying a ten-hour maximum day was passed in Massachusetts in 1874, although federal legislation for federal employees had established such a limit earlier. The eight-hour day was fought for, and won, in many plants during the labour shortages of World War I, but only in 1938 did the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) put a federal ceiling on hours: 44 in 1938, 43 in 1939, and 40 thereafter (Faulkner, 1924 and 1943). This ceiling affected men as well as women workers. Yet, by 1964, when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment practice, was passed, 40 states had maximum-hour laws for women but not for men (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976).

The first minimum wage law was passed in 1912. Between 1912 and 1923, fourteen more states enacted them. Despite a 1923 Supreme Court ruling against their legality, states continued to enact such laws. In 1937, in the face of strong public opinion, the

Supreme Court reversed its stand. The next year, when the Fair Labor Standards Act set a floor (i.e., one floor) under men's and women's wages, 22 states had minimum wage legislation - all but one with such laws applying only to women. Despite this precedent, in 1964 (when Title VII was passed) 15 of the 32 state minimum wage laws applied to women alone. However, by 1975, 41 states had minimum wage legislation, 39 of them covering both men and women (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976).

With respect to overtime pay laws, when Title VII was passed in 1964, of the dozen or so such state legislation, half applied to women only. In fact, the year before, the FLSA amendment required such laws to apply to men as well. Following that ruling, some states had rescinded their legislation. Nevertheless, by the mid-1970s, 29 states had overtime pay laws, and almost all applied to both sexes (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976).

Various types of protective legislation, such as bans on female night work, required meal times, required seats for female employees, etc., had been passed by many of the states early in the twentieth century. They all became illegal, with the adoption of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

Laws requiring equal pay for equal work and nondiscriminatory employment practices existed before 1963-64. During World War I, the National War Labor Board enforced a policy of equal pay for women. In 1919, two states enacted such legislation, but for the next 25 years no other equal pay laws were passed. During World War II, United States government agencies supported the principle of equal pay, with regulatory orders and policies to that effect. Ten states passed equal pay laws during and after the War. Twenty-two states had them by 1963, when the Federal Equal Pay Act made the principle mandatory. By the 1970s, 37 states had such laws (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976).

Fair Employment Practice laws have more fundamental consequences than equal pay laws. Not surprisingly, then, only two states prohibited sex discrimination in employment before the 1964 Civil Rights Act - although 25 prohibited racial discrimination in employment. By the mid-1970s, after sex discrimination was made illegal in Title VII (1964), 40 states had fair employment practice laws (i.e., only 10 southern states were without them) (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976).

The tardiness of the enactment of protective legislation in the United States is explained by the

economic-historical differences between that country and Britain. First, the factory work force was different in the two countries until almost mid-century. Because so many people lived on family farms, until the depression in 1837 there was no permanent rural proletariat forced to do factory work (Foner, 1979). The daughters of farmers, working only temporarily, composed the factory work force for the first several decades of the nineteenth century. Conditions were bad in the early factories, and there were strikes to protest them, but the transiency of the work force prevented development of a permanent workers' struggle. The industrial proletariat which developed around the middle of the century involved a mixture of immigrants from different countries besides those American-born, so the problems of organizing must have been worse than those ordinarily faced.

Second, industrialization took place in the United States in the absence of a paternalistic feudal upper class, antagonistic to industrial capital. Indeed, the political and juridical setting was one fashioned to encourage capitalist development. The Constitution was framed to protect the rights of individuals (i.e., property owners), and the government designed to embody a laissez-faire attitude towards the unpropertied.

Finally, workers' militancy (all through the nineteenth century) was probably lower in the United States than in Britain, and the middle class may have been less aware of, or threatened by, industrial conditions in the former than in the latter.

It seems fairly clear that in the United States protective legislation was won as a result of struggles by the working class, with some support from middle-class reformers. The state remained laissez-faire until the Great Depression. Let us review the history of working-class militancy, as described by Philip Foner (1979).

Before 1837 (when a male proletariat began to form), there were at least twelve organized strikes in the New England textile factories, by the female workers, protesting wages, hours, and working conditions. There were other strikes by women workers as well, in other industries (e.g., one by shoe makers). Some of these early strikes by women were supported by male workers, even though their unions excluded women. Foner (1979) reported that the early male trade unions, begun in 1790, excluded women because they were associated with machine technology and the cheapening of skilled labour which accompanied its adoption. As in Britain, women were a competitive

threat.* In fact, the 1790s marks the period when merchant capitalists were destroying small shops owned by master craftsmen, and establishing large shops in which competition among workers led to reduced wages and longer hours, and an increasing division of labour meant men were often replaced by women and children who were paid $1/4$ to $1/2$ what men were paid. Not surprisingly, the demand that men be paid wages sufficient to support a wife and children at home surfaced in the United States during this period. (For example, an 1809 strike declaration by New York Journeymen Tailors (i.e., a group particularly threatened by women workers) included such a demand (Foner, 1979).)

From the late 1830s to the Civil War, men and women fought, often together, for the ten-hour day. Some states adopted such legislation. However, in the second half of the nineteenth century, men and women workers found fewer and fewer common interests. Women

 *That the exclusion of women from unions was not pure sexism is made clear in one incident Foner (1979) described. The Mechanics Union of Trade Associations of Philadelphia published material on the "cult of true womanhood" in their newsletter, yet they also asked a well-known militant feminist to give the July 4 keynote address the same year. She was not a wage worker. Male workers also were said to buy feminist literature, unlike their middle-class brothers.

increased as a proportion of the work force in many industries, and continued to replace men at lower wages. After the 1850s, workers' organizations tended to take the form of craft unions, which were hostile to women in a way apparently unprecedented in American union history. The guild-like protection characteristic of craft unions was not a surprising feature of the latter nineteenth century, given the mechanization and female and immigrant competition which characterized it. Especially during the Civil War, when women replaced many men at half-pay, there developed a fear that men's wages would fall to the level of women's.

It was at that point in time, when women seemed a permanent part of the work force in some industries and therefore a constant threat to men's wages, that some unions allowed women members (e.g., the Cigarmakers Union, the Typographers' Union). While this was certainly a response to female competition more favorable to everyone's long-run interests than direct moves to push women out of work, women's interests continued to be either ignored or sometimes worked against even within unions that allowed their membership. For example, when the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was formed in 1881, it adopted the

principle of "equal pay for equal work," yet the intent here (for this organization dominated by craft unions) was that women be priced out of the labour market. AFL locals often excluded women from the union, and kept them out of apprenticeship/training programs. In most years, not a single woman organizer was hired by the AFL. However, the interests and demands of working women were not totally invisible. An organization of women in different trades (and some middle-class women), the Ladies Federal Labor Union, which was affiliated with the AFL, focused its attention on struggles for the education of children, the protection of child labourers, and the appointment of female factory inspectors (presumably to protect women workers).

In spite of the lack of union support, there were many strikes by women through the latter part of the nineteenth century, and especially militant ones during the depression of 1873. It seems that a shorter work day was a primary demand of all nineteenth-century strikes, but especially of those by women, as the extension of hours represented one way capitalists used to lower their wages. The organized strikes by women were not confined to factories, either; sweatshop workers in New York carried out several strikes, with

the help of some middle-class female organizers.

The early twentieth century was a time of major unrest among workers, women as well as men. The first national body dedicated to organizing women, the National Women's Trade Union League (WTUL), was formed in 1903 by wage-working women and middle-class female reformers, for the principles of the eight-hour day, a minimum wage standard, and equal pay for equal work. The WTUL agitated for protective legislation, although it focused more on investigation than political action. (The AFL, however, was opposed to minimum wage legislation: men and women workers seemed to separate on the issue of this type of protective legislation, although on the issue of curtailed hours they were united.) The famous waistmakers' strike in New York City in 1909, "women's most significant struggle for unionism in the nation's history," saw 20,000 women walk out of small shops and factories the first day, and remain on strike until most of the demands were granted (Foner, 1979, 328). In 1910, 60,000 cloak-and-suit workers were on strike at the same time in New York. Strike activity in the garment industry was common in the large centres throughout the pre-War period. It was a time of major unrest and extreme worker militancy.

Nevertheless, protective legislation seemed to be passed only after the middle classes were immediately affected by the conditions of labour, or at least made painfully aware of them. Foner (1979) noted that sweatshops were regulated in New York City around the turn of the century, after the middle class became fearful of the possibility of infection being carried in the garments. The New York State Factory Investigating Commission was formed only after the horrible Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire of 1911. The next year, the New York State legislature made 54 hours the maximum for a normal work day, and banned women's work at night.

Many states passed protective legislation, both maximum hour and minimum wage standards, in those early decades of the twentieth century, when workers' unrest and general militancy was very high. Working women were clearly in favor of protective legislation. However, it would be risky to conclude that their efforts were important in the enactment of the legislation, especially without a full examination of the demands of other strikes, those by male workers, and in light of the relatively little organization among women wage workers.* Male-dominated unions

*A detailed study of political alliances, within the

probably were agitating for protection/restriction of women workers. Nevertheless, a 1911-12 Labour Gazette (817) report on the history of American women's unions concluded that while for the most part they had been ephemeral,

by trade union methods women have won occasional strikes for improvement in their conditions, but their greatest success has been in the direction of a united stand for protective legislation.

Moreover, it should be remembered that during World War I women were in fact quite essential to the economy, and thus fairly powerful. It was during the years of the War that women won eight-hour days in many factories, and shortly after the War that many states passed protective legislation.

Of course, the major government curtailment of the exploitation of labour came during the Depression, also in the context of substantial labour unrest. During those years, however, wages were falling drastically (about 1/3 between 1929 and 1932), and thus a probable component of the New Deal legislation was an attempt to shore up the working-class household, to ensure the

union movement, between labour and government, and within the government is called for.

reproduction of labour power.

The effects of protective legislation on the sexual segregation of the labour force and women's involvement in work outside the home are not easy to determine. In fact, only a case study, on a state by state basis, would allow an understanding of these effects, since the legislation varies so much. However, it is clear that factors promoting sex segregation, and women's marginalization, in the work force were prior to and probably more powerful than any effects of the legislation itself. Most significantly, the legislation took place in the context of trends towards a shifting of women into unskilled industrial work. In some trades, this was a result of male craft unions' efforts to exclude women from skilled industrial work. Because men were generally likely to be organized, even through the nineteenth century, they were able to protect themselves in a way women could not. For example, in the printing industry women were allowed into the union in the nineteenth century, but they were prevented by the union from entering apprenticeship programs (Abbott, 1910). In other trades, the availability of immigrants - that is, male workers who could be paid low wages - drove women out of jobs. This occurred in the cotton mills after 1850.

In other industries, women replaced men when mechanization led to a decrease in skilled work. In cigarmaking, women partially displaced men early in the nineteenth century when it became an outwork industry, and again later in the century they flooded into the factories after intense mechanization deskilled the work (Abbott, 1910).

In general, women workers were in demand by industry through the nineteenth century, especially since they were paid $1/3$ to $1/2$ what men earned (Abbott, 1910). However, in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, women decreased as a proportion of the industrial work force, especially after 1850, probably because of immigrant competition and craft union restrictions. In 1870, less than 20% of women gainfully occupied were in the industrial work force. For the rest of the century, they gained slightly relative to men: by 1900 about 25% of wage-earning women were in the industrial labour force. Then, during the War, women increasingly entered factory work. Yet, after that period, the percentage of women in industrial employment steadily decreased, in part possibly as a result of the protective legislation, but more likely because of the growth of other occupations increasingly available to women.

In the case of equal pay and fair employment practices legislation, the role of class struggle is not apparent. Without the latter legislation, and in the context of a sexually segregated labour market, equal pay laws are fairly impotent. Consequently, equal pay principles have historically been implemented by the state in order to attract women into wage work or, after pressure from male-dominated unions, to undercut their competitive pressures on men's jobs and wages, rather than after concerted demands for their enforcement. The demand for equal pay is, in fact, an old one. However, when made in early nineteenth-century strikes of women workers, when sex segregation was looser than it is now (and the principle would have some effect), the demand took second place to one for subsistence wages. Furthermore, equal pay tended to be the demand of organizations for working women formed by middle-class women with interests different from those of their wage-working sisters.

That the equal pay principle was enforced by the state only during the two World Wars, until the legislation of the mid-1960s, is instructive. It clearly had two purposes during the Wars. First, it was intended to attract women into the industrial work

force. Second, because men leaving jobs to enter the Armed Forces were afraid of losing them permanently to the women who replaced them, the government attempted to abort the female threat, by raising their wages to the level of men's wages.

The enactment of equal pay laws during the 1950s, when women were beginning to enter the labour market en masse in the United States, may have been a consequence of union efforts. The states passing such laws were the older, industrial ones of the Northeast, so union efforts to prevent women from undercutting men's wages may have been behind the legislation. Even federal legislation may have been prompted by the unions, since a major threat to their power in the 1950s and 1960s was the shift of industry to the South, where unorganized and often female labour worked at much lower wages than the unions demanded in the North.*

The impetus for the legislation of the mid-1960s is also unclear. Coming before the development of the modern women's movement, and in a period not distinctly marked by strikes of women workers, we can only hypothesize that again it is meant to protect men's

*We can only speculate here, without a detailed study of the political alignments behind the legislation.

jobs from the encroachment of women, who were by then clearly a permanent part of the labour force. However, we must also remember that it was part of the civil rights legislation, and thus its enactment was not necessarily a direct consequence of a concerted drive which was concerned about women.*

The fair employment practice/equal opportunity legislation included in the Civil Rights Act, while potentially more powerful legislation (in its aim to end sex segregation), must not be seen as a major breakthrough. Individuals must bring cases against employers, and therefore the law remains weak in its practice. Nevertheless, it does have long-run potential for change.

Just as protective legislation cannot be held responsible for effecting the sexual segregation of the labour market, equal wage and fair employment laws cannot be seen to have drawn many women into the work force. First, they occurred after the influx of women into the work force was well under way, although the enactment of equal pay laws during World War II no

 * If civil rights legislation passed only because of white guilt over the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., then the reasons behind the presence of legislation on women in that package may be even more haphazard.

doubt indirectly helped begin the influx. Second, in practice their results are no doubt minimal, and since their existence has not been advertized in the way it was during the Wars, it has probably not even served the function of attracting women into wage work.

Welfare Policies in the United States

The history of welfare programs in the United States is thoroughly reviewed in Regulating the Poor by Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1971). They argued that the enactment of welfare assistance legislation by the federal government was initiated as a response to unrest, aimed at restoring order. They also argued that the provisions of state welfare assistance, its regulations and its administration, maintain people - even women - in so degraded a state that those with jobs keep them, and those receiving assistance are sustained as a cheap labour reserve which is periodically forced to work (for low wages). In other words, because welfare assistance programs, in the United States as in Britain, provide no support for women living with a man, they have at least indirectly promoted the influx of married women into wage work. Let us review this American history, as interpreted by Piven and Cloward.

Because the belief in self-help and economic individualism has been so strong in the United States, and given its material support in the availability of land through the nineteenth century and the growth of industrial jobs in pace with population expansion, poor relief remained a local responsibility until the 1930s. And those depression years witnessed growing amounts of destitution before any federal relief became available. By the end of 1931, localities' charity funds and their bond money were exhausted. By the spring of 1933, one-third of the work force was jobless. More importantly, according to Piven and Cloward (1971), the unrest of these people, as well as those with jobs, whose wages were falling severely, was considerable.

With the new Democratic administration in 1933, the federal government assumed responsibility for relief for the first time in American history. Moreover, relief was given to categories of people usually not entitled to assistance: "needy unemployed people and/or their dependents" and those receiving poverty wages. Yet, as early as the end of 1933, the year this type of general assistance began, work relief was started, to prevent people from coming to assume that general welfare assistance was a right and to prevent men without jobs from becoming demoralized (and

their families from breaking down).* Thus, in the United States as in Britain, the needs of the labour market gave the welfare programs their shape. Interestingly, the business community opposed work relief, although Roosevelt saw himself as saving capitalism.

The year 1935 marked the end of general welfare assistance, or direct relief, by the federal government. Stability in the ranks of workers and the unemployed had been restored, although the economy remained severely depressed. The states were again responsible for assistance for the unemployables, but now such assistance came under the provisions of the Social Security Bill (1935), which set out the foundation of the American welfare system today. That legislation provided for unemployment insurance (paid for through a federal payroll tax, but administered by the states), old age pensions (to begin in 1942, and cover only certain classes of workers with sustained labour force participation and in preferred

 *With respect to family life, several studies had shown what people expected to find, namely, that the unemployed adult male lost power within the household, and in the resulting instability of sex roles, people were disoriented (Cavan and Ranck, 1938, Komarovsky, 1940).

occupations), and direct relief to various categories of unemployables (e.g., orphans) (paid through federal aid to the states). The public works program (WPA) continued for awhile, but it only accounted for one-fourth of the unemployed, at most, through its duration.

Categorical assistance became the principle behind the general welfare assistance provided by the states, and impoverished children became, in the United States as in Britain, a category worthy of assistance. However, the absence of a parent was necessary before poor children were helped; poverty itself was not sufficient for families to receive benefits. Apparently, sustaining the working-class family has not been as important to the government as maintaining a reserve army of cheap female labour and ensuring that adult men continue to work. Accordingly, married women have not been maintained, or supported, as long as a man was present. Women have been kept dependent on men, or, if receiving welfare assistance, partially dependent on wage supplements to the benefits - and, therefore, in reserve for low-paid work.

Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC), the program of assistance for poor children, has reinforced low-paid work for men and women, in several ways.

First, those in need are often excluded from aid outright. Those impoverished who are potential workers are generally kept off the rolls. "Man-in-the-house" rules, for all women, keep men off "the dole," but also serve to break up families (as men leave so their women can obtain benefits). Second, the informal discouragement of applicants has always been substantial; people who are eligible for assistance are not infrequently refused. Especially blacks suffer from such treatment, which keeps them available and ready for work at even very low wages. Some southern states hosted, in the 1940s and 1950s, "employable mother" rules, which specified that families in which the children were over seven years of age could be denied assistance if the mother were employable for field work (Piven and Cloward, 1971). Moreover, black women have typically been paid less than white women, in some areas.

Finally, recipients of welfare benefits are sometimes given only partial assistance, on the condition that they work while receiving it (i.e., take part in "training programs"). Piven and Cloward (1971, 165) sum up the practice:

Depriving AFDC families of full benefits exerts great pressure on mothers to stay in the marginal labor market - for example, as field hands or as domestic servants. In

effect, relief agencies deduct potential earned income in advance. (And if recipients do find some work, for which they are ordinarily paid in cash and by the day, they may then try to conceal this fact from welfare officials who would otherwise typically deduct these earnings again - that is, twice). Administrative practices which lead to underbudgeting are thus similar in their work-enforcing results to a formal 'employable mother' rule.

At other times, in some places, relief payments are simply cut back during periods of labour demand.

In sum, the American welfare programs developed after the Depression, represent the elaboration of principles that serve to support the labour market - for the best interests of capital, not the workers - and only provide a minimal support to needy families. The principle of local responsibility allows the eligibility criteria to be shaped to mesh with local labour requirements - and payments and practices vary greatly from state to state. "Less eligibility" precludes any competition welfare grants might exert on wages, even low wages. Finally, residence laws (i.e., residence for a certain period of time as a prerequisite for assistance) hold people to particular areas so that these labour-market-serving functions can be fulfilled. Thus, in the United States in the twentieth century the state has failed to support the

working-class household, and women's role as housewife: poor women with husbands have had to work for wages to supplement household income.

The explosion of welfare benefits in the 1960s, especially after 1964, was a response to unrest, an attempt to defuse it, as well as to build a new voting power bloc of black Democrats, according to Piven and Cloward (1971). They (1971,198) wrote:

It was concurrent with the turmoil produced by the civil rights struggle, with widespread and destructive rioting in the cities, and with the formation of a militant grass-roots movement of the poor dedicated to combatting welfare restrictions. And the welfare explosion, although an urban phenomenon generally, was greatest in just that handful of large metropolitan counties where the political turmoil of the mid and late 1960s was the most acute.

The new programs offered information and aid to the poor, to help them procure the assistance to which they were entitled. Yet, the principles underlying the welfare programs remained virtually unchanged. More support was provided for the family, but the migrations of blacks to American cities represented an uprooting and massive dislocation great enough to absorb the extra outlays without representing a substantially new welfare practice.

As before, because women cannot acquire support of any kind if they live with a man, though they might need it for their children, the welfare system encourages the movement of married women into wage work. It continues, in fact, to maintain women from low-income households as a cheap labour reserve. The consequence of these policies is, then, that the economic pressures for a second wage, in working-class households, have not been alleviated at all by welfare programs. Moreover, equal pay and fair employment practices laws may encourage some middle-class women to enter the labour force, but they have no consequence - and provide no incentive - for working-class women.

Canada: Labour Legislation

In Canada, the history of labour legislation can be separated into essentially two periods: that before the 1960s, when laws were protective and clearly restrictive, and recent years when equal pay and equal opportunity laws have been passed, without a removal of the earlier legislation. The two World War periods were, as in the United States, characterized by special, uncharacteristic labour legislation.

As in the United States, protective legislation that set minimum ages and maximum hours was passed late

in the nineteenth century in Canada, and it applied particularly to factories. By about 1910, the provinces had prohibited factory work for boys under 12 and girls under 14, and had restricted the hours of work of boys under 14, girls under 18, and all women to 10 a day and 60 a week (Lorentsen and Woolner, 1950)*. Restrictions were extended to other types of work, and tightened, through the early twentieth century, but especially after World War I, in the early 1920s. In fact, in 1918 the Civil Service Commission was given the authority to limit competition for jobs on the basis of sex. By 1921, married women were barred from public service employment unless they were self-supporting (Nogiec, 1978). According to Connelly (1978, 39),

If a sufficient number of 'qualified candidates' was not available, married women were hired on a temporary basis. A woman working in the public service who married was obliged to resign. If she wished to continue working and if the service needed her, she was rehired on a temporary basis and paid the minimum rate for her classification.

Also by the early 1920s, minimum wage legislation that applied only to women began to appear in most

*Because matters concerning civil rights and property are under provincial jurisdiction, labour laws are provincial concerns (Department of Labour, 1924).

provinces. The legislation did not apply to all wage work: it did not cover the jobs of farm workers or domestics. During the Depression of the 1930s, minimum wage laws for men were passed, in some provinces, and these established minimums above those set for women. Also during the Depression some attempts were made to begin the regulation of homework. As in the United States, provincial laws passed in the late 1930s gave labour the right to organize and to bargain collectively.

During the Second World War, part of the Wartime Wages Control Order (1942) demanded adherence to the principle of equal pay for equal work, for women in all occupations. Additionally, the federal government released restrictions on hiring married women in public service employment. Simultaneously, however, the Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act of 1942 guaranteed men's right to return to their pre-War jobs (Nogiec, 1978). After the War, in 1947, public service restrictions on women's employment were reintroduced.*

 *As well, during the 1940s, unemployment insurance had become available; vocational training became part of provincial services; vacations with pay became standard; and provincial legislation was passed which protected workers' right to organize, promoted collective bargaining, and set up machinery for settling disputes.

By the mid-1950s, there were minimum wage laws in all provinces (except Prince Edward Island), usually applying to both sexes but, in all provinces except Manitoba, setting different rates for men and women. After 1960, minimum wage laws that set the rates equal for the sexes were introduced. By 1974, the rates were the same for men and women in all the provinces (Department of Labour, PLS).

Equal pay laws began to appear in the 1950s, but often applied only to the situation in which women did the "same work" as men. In the 1960s, most provinces passed equal pay laws that applied to "substantially the same" work for men and women. By 1969, all provinces except Quebec had equal pay laws.

With respect to fair employment practices legislation, the late 1960s and the 1970s were important times. It was 1955 before the Public Service of Canada removed its restrictions on the employment of married women. Fair employment practices laws were passed throughout the 1950s, but not until 1964, in Quebec, was sex mentioned as a basis upon which discrimination was prohibited (Department of Labour, PLS). Nevertheless, by 1974 all Canadian provinces except Prince Edward Island prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex in employment; in all provinces

except Saskatchewan, Quebec, and Nova Scotia, even discrimination on the basis of marital status was prohibited (Department of Labour, PLS). It should be noted, however, that violations must be reported, and pursued, by individuals.

The 1960s and 1970s also saw the legislation of maternity protection laws in all provinces except Newfoundland. (Interestingly, there was such legislation in British Columbia as early as 1921.) In 1971, the Unemployment Insurance Commission extended benefits to women during "confinement," if working or unemployed.

The same forces were behind the enactment of protective labour laws in Canada as in the United States and Britain. In the late nineteenth century in Canada, "the mills were filled with women and children working in miserable conditions at miserable rates" (Lipton, 1973, 58). Apparently, both worker demands and middle-class outcry led to the two Royal Commissions that investigated labour conditions in 1881 and 1887. In Canada as in Britain and the United States, female and child labour undercut men's wages. Here too, demands for a nine-hour day and control of child labour dominated workers' strikes of the late nineteenth century (Lipton, 1973).

The two facts were, of course, related: concern about protecting child and female labour was in part due to the competitive pressures these workers exerted on men's wages. Lipton (1973) quoted a nineteenth-century carpenter complaining about children who were given jobs in the trade without receiving the proper training, and without going through the normal apprenticeship. Child labour represented a clear means by which capital circumvented mechanisms (such as apprenticeship programs) by which labour exerted some control over the trade. When the Toronto Trades and Labour Council called for nine-hour work days for women and children, and an end to their night work, they were demanding constraint on that source of competition as well as a general restriction of the extent of exploitation of all workers.

There are many examples of the seemingly sexist complaints of male workers which make clear the underlying source of the anger directed at women: namely, female competition. During a 1913 strike in Montreal, by members of the United Garment Workers' Union, the complaint was made by the men that "girls were taught various branches of garment making by the men; when these were proficient the work was given to the women and paid perhaps \$3 to \$6 per week," while

men received \$15 to \$20 per week (Labour Gazette, 1913-14, 422). "The objection, it was stated, is not to the women working, but to the extremely low wages paid, which alone constitutes the rivalry" (Labour Gazette, 1913-14, 422). Similar complaints came from cigarmakers, namely "that machines are being used that can be run by women and girls, the latter thus replacing men at lower wages" (Labour Gazette, 1913-14, 897).

Besides wage workers, middle-class women reformers, who sometimes worked with wage-earning women, were also agitating for the protection of children and women workers. Additionally, they demanded compulsory and free education, day care, and better housing (Labour Gazette, 1913-14). In Toronto in 1913, the Local Council of Women, the Board of Associated Charities, and the Playground Association sent petitions to the Ontario Legislature "strongly urging the importance of protecting children from overwork by amending the Factory and Shops Act, prohibiting the employment of girls under 14 in shops and fixing a standard eight-hour day for women employees" (Labour Gazette, 1912-13, 1078). The Local Council of Women also urged minimum-age labour laws, and mothers' pensions when families with children

required extra wages (i.e., so they would not send their children into the factories instead). The National Council of Women called for compulsory education for children under 15 years of age, technical and trade education for girls, employment bureaus and hotels for working women, equal pay for equal work, and "reasonable" hours of work for both sexes.

The relative importance of working-class demands and middle-class outcry in the passing of the earliest protective legislation is not clear.* In contrast with Britain and even the United States, however, labour scarcity due to the availability of land in the West and migration to the United States may have given labour a stronger hand vis-a-vis the Canadian government - and thus a greater role in legislative changes. The heavy immigration during the early part of the century, among other things, indicates labour scarcity in Canada (Urquhart and Buckley, 1965, 23).

In fact, the further restriction, or protection, that followed upon the First World War was undeniably

 *To some extent, bourgeois and middle-class women may have turned their energies away from demands on government, to accomplishing some improvements themselves. For example, in 1912 in Toronto, there were five creches for children of working women, run by middle-class volunteers; they accomodated 25,350 children (Labour Gazette, 1912-13).

largely a state response to worker demands, at a time of incredible worker militancy and strike disruption. As can be seen in table 41, the period around 1919 marked a high point of strike activity in Canada, until the 1940s. Real wages plummeted after World War I, and 1919 witnessed the General Strike in Winnipeg, as well as serious disruption by labour across the country (for the Winnipeg strike involved only one-fourth of the workers on strike that year) (Lipton, 1973). Despite early protective legislation, women and children had continued to present a competitive threat to men through the early decades of the twentieth century. As table 42 shows, in several strikes of that period female competition was the key issue. Government restrictions on female workers following World War I, and even minimum wage legislation, were clearly largely responses to male unions (Lorentsen and Woolner, 1950). As yet unclear, however, is the proportion of strikers during that turbulent period who were women, and the extent to which they also demanded protection - or, opposed it.

As in the United States, the Second World War precipitated strenuous intervention by the state into the labour market, to attract women, "the most important available reserve of manpower (sic)," (Labour

Gazette,1942), into the labour force. The government undertook: (1) recruitment campaigns, (2) provision of facilities especially geared to interviewing women, (3) establishment of job information and placement services for women, (4) provision of cash advances as transportation money for women having to move to be near employment openings, (5) provision of hotels and other housing arrangements, (6) the building of nurseries, (7) the establishment (under government auspices) of training programs, in industry, especially designed for women, (8) changes in civil service requirements with respect to married women, and (9) "pressure upon employers who may be reluctant to engage female labour" (Labour Gazette,1942).

At the same time, as we saw, steps were taken to ensure men their jobs, at wages that were not undercut by the presence of women in industry. It should be noted here that because all labour was scarce during the War, men's unions were able to win demands they otherwise might not have (e.g., unemployment insurance, institutional supports to the right to bargain collectively) (Lipton,1973). Were male unions (ironically enough) in favor of equal pay for women, at that time? Or was that legislation simply another means of the state intervening to attract women into

the labour force? Or was it something that women workers, whose labour power was also scarce, were able to demand?

Equal pay laws were passed a bit earlier in Canada than in the United States, and again the causal forces are not clear. However, since there is some evidence of concern by male unions about female competition (see table 42), again we can hypothesize pressure from men's unions, as well as from working women, to enact equal pay laws. These pressures by labour were exerted during another period of labour scarcity, again evidenced by the large inflows of migrants from Europe (Urquhart and Buckley, 1965, 23).

The 1960s and 1970s, in Canada, witnessed even more significant legislative gains for working women: minimum wages were set equal for men and women, equal pay laws were made applicable to work "substantially the same" as men's, fair employment practices laws and maternity protection laws were passed.

Again, we can only speculate on the forces behind this progressive legislation. While equal pay laws benefit both male and female workers, equal opportunity laws serve the interests of female workers and capital, but not male workers. If effective, they increase competition between men and women in the labour market.

In the face of heightened strike activity (see table 41), was the government moving to undermine the position of male workers by increasing the possibility of female competition (since equal pay laws have little effect)?*

The effects of changes in Canadian labour legislation are, as in the United States, difficult to determine. Curtailment of hours for women restricted men's hours as well, at least in unionized industries (Labour Gazette, 1923). Nevertheless, either the increasing restrictions of female labour (in the 1920s), or those coupled with other changes, resulted in a shifting of the female wage work force from industry to service and sales occupations: women were 25.9% of the manufacturing and mechanical labour force in 1911, 24.3% of it in 1921, but 18.7% of it in 1931 (and about the same percentage in later years) (See table 37.) The legislation and other changes in industrial production thus served to increase sex segregation in the wage labour force. It is not at all clear, however, that protective legislation inhibited women's labour force involvement.

*In 1980, the first equal pay case was won in Ontario.

Efforts by the state to activate the female labour reserve during the Second World War were highly successful. Women's labour force participation rates increased significantly in those years. (See table 32.) Even the efforts to reduce the female wage work force after the War were successful.

The consequences of adoption of equal pay legislation have not included a decreasing gap between the wages of men and women. It is too early to tell whether fair employment practices legislation has decreased sex segregation in the labour force. However, the larger economic trends which we identified in chapters 4 and 5 were no doubt of far greater significance than this legislation of the 1960s and 1970s, apparently promoting women's interests, in contributing to the influx of married women into wage work.

Canada: Welfare Policies

Welfare policies in Britain and the United States were fashioned primarily with an eye to the labour market, and the needs of capital with respect to labour power. The Canadian state has a history of more direct, purposeful intervention in the economy than

either of the other two governments we have discussed.* Indeed, there is less evidence in Canada than the United States to support an argument that poor relief was provided during the Depression only after mass disruption. Assuming that the Canadian state has initiated welfare programs under less compulsion than was the case in the United States, what have its purposes been in the provision of welfare benefits?

Among the first income-support programs of the Canadian government was the Mothers' Allowance program. While there was a campaign by middle-class women reformers for such benefits before the First World War, the provinces began their programs only after the War, and then they were set up in rapid succession. This move clearly represented a concern over loss of manpower, and an effort to reduce the infant mortality rate.* Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario instituted Mothers' Allowances by

 *In 1826, the government of Upper Canada solved the problem of the absence of a proletariat (due to the presence of free land) by giving existing land to three private land companies, which in turn sold it at high prices. By 1850, a Canadian proletariat existed (Leo Johnson, lecture in Toronto, Feb. 7, 1980). Similarly, Confederation occurred primarily in order to amass the large amounts of capital necessary to build the railroad (Easterbrook and Aitken, 1967).

*Similarly, we saw in chapter 4 that during the Second World War, in the United States, Ladies Home Journal seemed more concerned about fostering good mothering than urging women to enter industry.

1921; in 1919, the Federal Division of Child Welfare was established (and a commission appointed to investigate the effects on children of custodial institutional upbringing). According Veronica Strong-Boag (1979,39), "the goal of all such legislation was 'desirable citizens and social assets to the community,' in other words 'the development of wholesome, healthy citizenship.'"

Accordingly, Mothers' Allowances and the growing social work profession, which developed the "case work" approach in the 1920s and 1930s, sought to "reinforce and strengthen the endangered family by drawing in the community's resources, not only in material relief, but in character and strength as well" (McGill School of Social Work, quoted in Strong-Boag, 1979, 38). However, support for the family was likely to be given only to women without the possibility of a man's support. Needy widows with two or more children always received support, but the wives of insane, ill or imprisoned men did not always receive it. Moreover, unmarried mothers and divorced mothers faced discrimination in its allocation (Strong-Boag, 1979). In other words, the working-class family itself was supported by Mothers' Allowances, but immediate labour market concerns dominated more long-run concerns about the labour

force. Consequently, children in single-parent families were supported while those in poor families that included a man were largely neglected. The primary goal of enforcing wage work on adult men dominated efforts to support the family and protect the production of the next generation of labour.

Unemployment relief measures were taken by the Canadian state very early during the Depression of the 1930s (Health and Welfare Canada, 1975). In fact, in Canada emergency relief was available for families with inadequate support well before the worst years of the Depression. Therefore, while workers' strikes, efforts to organize the unorganized, and unrest by the unemployed characterized this decade in Canada as in the United States, it is not clear that such disruption brought about relief measures, since it occurred after their initiation. The Canadian state may have acted directly to prevent, to a minimal degree, family disruption.

During the Second World War, in Canada, concerns about the nation's next generation took the form of the Family Allowance Act (1944), by which all mothers were to be sent monthly cheques for the support of each of their children. The amount paid depended on the child's age, and there was a reduction in payment after

the fourth child (Health and Welfare Canada, 1975). In 1949, the reduction for more than four children was ended. Payments were increased in 1957, and again in 1973 (when they became \$20 per month for each child under 18 years of age). Canada has, therefore, since World War II, supported married women in their role as mother. Although Mothers' Allowance payments are too low to approximate providing women with financial independence, the program does shore up the family, and the role of mother, in a way that American government policies do not.*

Generally, the Mothers' Allowance program, as it existed before World War II, kept poor women in a state of dependency on low-paid jobs; it maintained them as a cheap labour reserve because payments were low enough to require supplementary earnings. The new program, coming at the end of the Second World War, no doubt provided some encouragement to married women to withdraw from the wage work force. In fact, it may have contributed to the generally lower female labour force participation rates in Canada relative to those

*We can only hypothesize that the Canadian and British economies are more centralized, and the concerns for a stable labour force more pressing, and that these factors are related to the policies.

in the United States. Again, however, the payments were and are low enough that married women remain dependent either on their husband - or on wage work.

The effects of other provincial welfare policies on married women are difficult to determine, especially since the programs themselves are not advertised, and their provisions not easily available to the public for scrutiny. Programs such as Unemployment Insurance and the Canada Pension Plan, however, treat married women differently from other women who work. Domestic labour is not regarded as work. Also, even if married women work for wages, they have tended to be treated differently than men. For example, in 1940 the Unemployment Insurance Act generally disqualified married women who worked for wages from receiving assistance in the event of unemployment. By 1952, married women were allowed to be considered eligible for assistance provided they could prove they had worked at least 60 days beyond their marriage (Labour Gazette, 1952). Thus, this program too has assumed that women who are married are dependent upon a husband, and without need of state support. Similarly, under the Canada Pension Plan (1965), widows receive only a portion of the value of their dead husband's retirement pension, although Social Security payments do not

discriminate by sex (Ontario Welfare Council, 1977). Without information that will allow a detailed review, we finally merely note that general welfare assistance programs in Canada assume the same dependence of married women on a man as their counterpart programs in the United States. Therefore, since they do not offer an alternative form of support, they have lent encouragement to the influx of married women into the wage work force.

Changes in Canada and the United States with respect to Biological Reproduction and Assistance with Child-Rearing

Besides its labour laws and welfare policies, the control the state maintains over the means of biological reproduction, and the provisions of assistance with child rearing affect women's productive role. We have already referred to the rising importance of the family in the nineteenth century, and the corresponding primacy of motherhood in socially defining women. Accompanying this growing fixation on childhood and increasing self-absorption of the family, was a severe social repression of sexuality, evidenced in legislation such as the "Comstock Law" of 1873, in the United States, which made birth control information

and materials illegal.* Despite the law, American women continued to practice birth control: the American birth rate steadily decreased after 1800 (Gordon, 1974).

Because the birth rate was declining especially among bourgeois, white women in the latter part of the century, and because many of these women were actively campaigning for "voluntary motherhood," race suicide fears erupted into arguments for bigger families and attacks on women's employment outside the home (Gordon, 1974). Not until World War I was the suppression of birth control information lifted. At that time, the potential hazards of a massive spread of venereal disease forced the state to undertake the dissemination of birth control information. That is, in order to protect the family and future labourers, the state had to reverse its policies on birth control.

At the same time, eugenics arguments began to conclude that if the wealthy were using birth control, the interests of "the race" would best be served if the poor were allowed to use it also - since it was by now obvious that the rich could not be persuaded to have

*That is, the selling of "obscene" literature through the U.S. mails was illegal.

large families. As well, the consumerism fostered from World War I on, ran counter to the personal repression at the heart of the Victorian moral code. Twentieth-century physicians and psychiatrists rejected the ideal of continence, an ideal which had been espoused by both sides of the "voluntary motherhood" struggle (Gordon, 1974). Finally, after decades of campaigning, the birth control movement in the United States won a Court decision in 1934 which removed all federal bans on birth control. By then, birth control was already a large industry; the Depression had forced more and more couples to use birth control. Linda Gordon (1974, 340) summarized this history as follows:

Four decades previously the cry had been that birth control was race suicide, as its practice by educated, prosperous women challenged sex roles, sexual inequality and the family structure within their class. In the 1930s, birth control became the alternative to class suicide, a means of heading off the militancy of an increasingly powerful working class. Yet in both eras the impact of birth control was double. In the 1900s race suicide represented not only a women's rebellion but also a deepening of class divisions among women. In the 1930s, birth control not only represented an effort to prevent social explosion but also, simultaneously, was an explosion of new demands and expectations from among working class and poor women.

As was the case with labour legislation and welfare

programs, growing working-class demands and rising militancy played a major role in the state liberalization of its hold over the means of control of reproduction.

With the 1942 founding of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, the movement for birth control lost all trace of its former radical content, and became a movement to strengthen the family (Gordon, 1974). Control over family size and spacing was seen as a means of building a strong family; during the War, birth control was promoted as a means of ensuring future generations of healthy workers and citizens. Since the War, the "consumption" of sex has become central to the "selling" of consumer America, and popular Freudianism has also boosted the phenomenon.

The development of "the pill" and the eventual end to the illegality of abortion therefore were not surprising developments. In both Canada and the United States, birth control technology and information became increasingly available in the 1960s, and in both countries abortions became legal.* These developments

 *In 1969 in Canada, section 237 of the Criminal Code was amended to exempt from prosecution a medical doctor using an accredited or approved hospital to procure the

no doubt contributed to the influx of married women into the work force.

In contrast, the history of state support of child rearing has been in the direction of a decreasing availability of day care facilities. From the latter part of the nineteenth century until World War II, in Canada at least, day care facilities were made available by organizations of philanthropic bourgeois and middle-class women, in order to allow poor, single mothers to work, preferably as the domestic servants of this same class of women (Shultz, 1978). Until World War II, such facilities were quite limited. However, during the War, part of the government's effort to attract women into jobs involved the provision of day care facilities. In 1942, provision was made for the provinces to support the building of day care facilities under a cost-sharing arrangement with the federal government. There followed an unprecedented expansion of day care facilities in Ontario and Quebec

miscarriage of a woman, if a "therapeutic abortion committee" for the hospital reviewed the case and certified that continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the woman's life or her health. Also that year in Canada, the Food and Drugs Act and the Narcotics Control Act were amended to make legal the selling or advertizing of drugs or articles intended as means of birth control.

(Shultz, 1978). However, part of the campaign to move women out of jobs after the War involved closing down these same facilities (and offering Family Allowances). There followed a decline of day care facilities in Canada, to a low point in 1962 (Shultz, 1978). Since then, commercial centers have probably contributed to a rise in day care, for the market clearly exists. However, the trend in day care provision has certainly run counter to the trend in women's labour force participation.

Conclusion

We have seen that in Britain, despite a surplus of labour, the high degree of militancy of the working class (including both men and women) during the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution placed considerable pressure on the state to put curbs on the exploitation of labour. The unrest was successful in bringing about legislative reform probably because it involved the middle class and parts of the upper classes as allies. When protective legislation was passed, it focused on women and children partly because their visible exploitation disturbed the middle-class desire for order, but also partly because women and children exerted competitive pressures on wages which

depressed even male workers' wages. However, the working-class desire for a "family wage," that is a wage earned by the man sufficient to support a family, was not achieved in the nineteenth century. Moreover, poor relief policy was used by the state to ensure that able-bodied men submitted to factory discipline and low wages (which they resisted in whatever ways they could, despite a lack of alternative means to produce their subsistence).

Enforcing wage slavery - not the support of the reproduction of labour power - was the key concern of poor relief policy in the nineteenth century. (This was so no doubt partly because there was a surplus of labour.) Consequently, to ensure that able-bodied men worked, state support for women and children (outside the workhouse) was increasingly withdrawn over the course of the century. Women were therefore increasingly forced to work for wages. To the extent that female competition was weakened because of the protective labour legislation, it was heightened through the century because of welfare policies.

Meanwhile, a key consequence of protective legislation was probably a further burst of mechanization, and the beginnings of the concentration of industrial capitalists on increasing worker

productivity. These changes may be seen as promoting a growing gap between the factory labour process and other kinds of productive work. Because greater masses of capital are required for business, and great amounts made, with industrialization, monopoly concentration developed. In the twentieth century, monopoly came to dominate the economy and therefore the concern for a stable, educated and healthy labour force became paramount. Consequently, the working-class family began to be supported by the state (through Family Allowances). British families are supported enough to prevent the starvation of children, but not enough to keep some married women from composing a reserve army of labour ready to enter the labour force when work is available. In effect, the middle-class married woman is supported in her domestic role, but the working-class married woman, who requires more supplementary income, is left in need of wage work.

In both Canada and the United States, protective legislation came much later than in Britain. However, as in Britain, the desire of militant workers for such legislation is clear. Working men and women, for perhaps different reasons, wanted curbs on the exploitation of female and child labour. While such legislation may have contributed to a shifting of

female labour out of factory work, there were other forces (older than factory protection laws) at work doing the same. Moreover, because other occupations were opening up for women, their involvement in wage work nevertheless increased slowly in the early decades of the century, in both countries. Similarly, equal pay and fair employment practices laws had little effect on the trend of female involvement in wage work, a fact especially clear in the United States, where they were enacted well after the large influx began.

The state has influenced married women's involvement in wage work chiefly in two ways, in both Canada and the United States: through direct activation of the female reserve during the two World Wars, and by shaping welfare policies so as to maintain some married women as a perpetual reserve of cheap labour. Through various forms of attraction, including equal pay laws which not only attracted women but also minimized their chances of taking jobs from men when the emergency ended, the Canadian and American governments recruited women for wage work during the Wars. They also systematically drove women out of many jobs at the ends of the Wars. However, pressures on households for a second wage earner were so strong that married women continued to press for jobs. At the same

time, the economy in both countries had grown in such a way that female labour was in increasing demand. The lifting of restrictions on married women's employment in the Public Service in Canada, in the mid-1950s, is only one indication of the overwhelming demand for more female labour than the population of single women could provide. Once the barriers to the employment of married women broke down, the weight of the "institutionalized reserve" of women still doing only domestic labour in the home was brought to bear on the wages of women in the labour force, preventing them from rising relative to men's.

Especially in the United States, welfare policies have kept poor married women in the state of a cheap labour reserve. Welfare policies not only perpetuate the financial dependency of married women (by providing no support alternative to that of a man if a man is present), in the United States they clearly are designed to directly serve the changing needs of the labour market. In fact, it appears that there has been a direct manipulation of the reserve of cheap female labour, by frequent changes in welfare policies and practices at the local level (Piven and Cloward, 1971). In Canada, such generalizations are less accurate. The Canadian government has, in fact, since the mid-1940s,

provided minimal payments to mothers for the rearing of children. Perhaps this practice was partly responsible for the slower beginnings of the trend of women's rising involvement in wage work here.

Finally, it should be noted that the trend has been probably slowed by the dearth of day care facilities in both countries. However, the liberalization of state restraints on means of birth control has provided women with the ability to plan and reduce child bearing in a way that has no doubt contributed substantially to the trend. Women can now, to a large degree, plan when to have children; they can plan for this considerable expense. And the resulting higher quality of child care (of children themselves), borne by the private household to a large extent, has no doubt meshed with the growing needs of an increasingly monopolized economy for a high quality, stable labour force. Though refusing to assume substantial social support of the production of the next generation of workers (especially American workers), the Canadian and American governments have eased up on former handicaps to married women in their role as mother: they have supported the privatized work of child rearing by providing the means of birth control (which promotes higher-quality children) and

encouraged women to earn a second family wage (with equal pay and fair employment practices laws).

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The growing involvement of married women in wage work is a trend too complex for representation by mathematical models comprising a few measurable causal variables. At least the models that orthodox economists work with are inadequate, and especially so since they begin with the assumption that the problem is one of explaining individuals' choices. The larger questions involve the social context which establishes the options that structure peoples' lives, and the choices they make. Our work was guided by the conviction that nothing short of an historical-materialist discussion of changes in the way daily life is produced and reproduced will reveal the nature and causes of the trend of married women's rising labour force participation.

Most profound of the changes in production in the last century has been the socialization of much of the work that produces and reproduces the means of daily living.* Unchanged, however, is the privatization of

the manner in which people reproduce their labour power and produce the next generation.* Because individuals stand on their own and compete with each other on the labour market, and especially because workers are paid individually, the nuclear-family household, in which the individual housewife is responsible for daily subsistence, seems to be characteristic of capitalism..

From the perspective of the individual household, livelihood must be procured from the products in the capitalist marketplace, which is characterized both by a total absence of planning to meet social needs and a rapid and confusing proliferation of goods and services. Responsibility for procuring and preparing the means of daily life for the family rests with the housewife. She is the person who balances the wage against the needs of the family, and ensures (as best she can) that the latter are satisfied.

Assuming that the housewife is the worker responsible for reproducing daily life indicates a

 *By "socialization" of work, we mean its shift to spheres co-operatively organized (i.e., characterized by a division of labour).

*By "privatization," we mean its occurrence in the absence of co-operation and a division of labour, the fact that the individual works alone.

perspective with which to look for ways in which the capitalist economy affects the household. Here, we have attempted to begin an analysis of that relationship between "economy" and household, by focusing on changes in the means of household production and the product of domestic labour, both of which are influenced (and indeed defined) by the capitalist marketplace. In addressing the issue of the effects of changes in "the economy" on the household, we were also beginning to specify the mechanism by which the female labour reserve is moved into wage work.

Let us briefly review some of our conclusions. We described the commoditization of food and clothing, and the increased assumption by the state of much of the distribution of the essentials of shelter. Our focus in discussing the shift of production from the household to "the economy" was to understand the way in which the reproduction of labour power that occurs outside the household structures that which occurs inside it. Specifically, the assumption by the state of the distribution of water and energy meant a reduction in the drudgery of housework and the possibility of labour-saving devices for the home. The latter, in turn, altered the organization of household

work (e.g., by allowing greater integration of the various domestic tasks) and changed the social relations of domestic labour (e.g., by heightening the isolation of the worker). The transfer of food production and processing from the household to the capitalist economy meant less production by the domestic labourer, but more time required for shopping, co-ordination and planning - in the face of rising expectations about meals. With the mass production of clothing came the easy and cheap availability of commercial products, and thus the incentive to the housewife to earn wages rather than rely on homemade products. Even the expansion of formal education requirements for children altered household labour. It increased the isolation of the housewife during the day and reinforced her role of providing services to family members when they return to the home at the day's end.

In many ways, the household has become more closely integrated with capitalist commodity production over the course of the twentieth century. The growing presence of married women in the wage labour force is one indication of this trend. In examining this history of the relationship between household and "economy," we assumed differences between working-class and middle-class households. Making the distinction

between households according to the adequacy of the man's wage, relative to real living costs, highlighted the differences in the means of household production of working-class and middle-class housewives, as well as the pressures they experience daily. The nature of domestic means of production is important here, since they shape women's household labour; as products of the capitalist marketplace they represent a means by which "the economy" affects the household. Because of the inadequacy of household facilities, the working-class family has been almost totally dependent on commodities throughout the century, while the middle-class family has only gradually been won over to dependence on commodities.

Our evidence indicates that there has existed an absolute cash shortage for the lower-income half of the population since the turn of the century. Yet, in the early decades of the century the working-class housewife was able to contribute only minimally to the material means of family subsistence. The pressure in working-class households for income supplementary to that contributed by the man resulted typically in the housewife performing some domestic tasks for cash and especially, when they were old enough, the children taking on wage work. Housewives could improve the

family budget if they were skillful shoppers and creative about the use of food and clothing, but there remained a need in most working-class households for them to earn money.

As education requirements for children expanded through the decades, and especially when jobs became available for married women, there was a growing involvement of married working-class women in wage work. That is, changes in demand for female labour alone account for the influx of married working-class women into the wage work force. By the time working-class households began to acquire better housing, and improved household facilities, it was cheaper (in many cases) to work for wages and buy subsistence goods than to make them at home.

For housewives from middle- and upper-income households, those who do not work in the context of an absolute cash shortage and who have many domestic facilities, commoditization of the means of subsistence involved two trends, both of which contributed to a move by these women into paid work. First, productivity increases in commodity production meant that it increasingly made economic sense, for these women who can make choices about how to allocate their work time, to buy means of subsistence with the wages

they could earn instead of spending all their time working at home. Second, many of the large durable means of subsistence came to be necessities, and they were things the housewife could not produce at home. Thus, to the extent that this trend led to a feeling of scarcity of income relative to what had to be purchased, these women were urged towards an economically rational allocation of time.

Working-class housewives clearly compose a reserve army of labour, perpetually in need of wage work. The changing availability of jobs for them can be expected to move them into and out of the labour force. Indeed, we found some evidence that changes over time in capital's needs for labour explain much of the move of women into the wage labour force. Moreover, the presence in the household of those women without paid jobs places pressure on women's wages, keeping them low relative to men's wages (and the wages of professional women).

Middle-class housewives have increasingly assumed the form of a labour reserve, in that their desire for wage work has risen since World War II, as the relationship between their domestic means of production and the product expected of them changed. Perhaps unlikely to respond to changes in capital's labour

needs in the way working-class women are, middle-class housewives are nevertheless increasingly dependent upon a second wage to meet their families' subsistence needs.

What do these changes mean in terms of the woman's labour time? Because of the substantial productivity increases in the consumer goods sector of the economy, less labour time, at the level of the whole society, is required to produce necessary subsistence goods. This change served to lower the value of labour power. Moreover, the mass production of food and clothing and other subsistence goods no doubt reduced the labour time women must spend in order to produce material necessities, even if they take on a wage job in addition to their household responsibilities.

The labour time spent producing services necessary for the reproduction of labour power has risen, however.* This rise has contributed to an increase in the value of labour power. To the extent that the cost has been borne by capital (through taxes), it has been

 *By "services," we mean something non-material, a personal facility, which may or may not be sold on the market, rather than a material item. The census has a more limited definition of service occupations, based on the content of the product and the wage level, education level and status of the workers involved.

covered by the influx of women into wage work: the presence of two workers from a household means twice the potential for the appropriation of unpaid labour. However, the private household also bears the costs of a rising value of labour power due to increased service inputs to its production. And as the economy worsens, torn by its own contradictions, capital can force a reprivatization of some of those services; it can force the housewife to increasingly perform essential services.* Even without a trend towards reprivatization, the necessary services performed by the housewife, to keep the household "running," have grown over the years. In sum, we would argue that the time a woman spends in order that labour power be reproduced has probably risen over the course of the century.

The growth in services necessary for reproducing labour power (e.g., education) does not explain the rise in the demand for female wage workers. We argued that because clerical jobs were so important to the

*By "reprivatization," we mean a move of work back into a setting characterized by an isolated worker; a setting which has not experienced a division of labour. An example is the state cutbacks in health care services, forcing more women to care for helpless relatives in the home.

influx of women into the labour force, the growing monopolization of the economy is behind this rising need for female labour. Bureaucracy in private industry, essential for exerting formal management control over the increasingly large and complex labour process, and bureaucracy in government, consequent to its growth as a necessary accompaniment to the rise in monopoly capital (e.g., to ensure stable markets for monopoly products), involves clerical jobs. Even the growth of jobs in education are a consequence of monopoly capital's need for a stable labour force (and a receptive home market).

We finally addressed the question of a direct role of the state in shaping the nuclear-family household and the non-earning housewife role and, recently, in activating the female reserve for wage work. An examination of nineteenth-century British Poor Laws allowed us to test the argument that the state was chiefly responsible for the development of the working-class household, in its present form, and female dependence. Although Poor law policy (especially in the period after 1871) attempted to ensure wives' dependence on their husbands, in order to force men into wage work, it is not at all clear that women were thus encouraged to stay out of the wage

labour force. In fact, dependence on a man who earned an insufficient wage - in the absence of the possibility of state support - surely must have heightened pressures on married women to enter the labour market. Moreover, the apparently widespread working-class desire for a "family wage" to be paid the man no doubt came from both sexes, at a time when women's presence in the labour market beat down men's wages and the wages a man and his wife earned together often barely covered family subsistence.

The issue of state implication in the development of the housewife role of dependence, in proletarian households, rests, then, on the extent to which the state lent material support to working-class families. And the attempt of the British government to force female dependence involved the progressive withdrawal of poor relief for married women, that is, the decreasing availability of sustaining income from a source outside the married couple. Indeed, relief often involved residence in the workhouse, which meant the physical separation of family members, along sex and age lines. So, while women no doubt desired the possibility of staying home and caring for their children, the state did not support such a course of action. Moreover, the removal of the production of the

means of subsistence from the household, consequent to the development of capitalism, is of utmost significance in shaping a context in which work carried out in the home is invisible and unrewarded. And it seems that the struggle of the working class for a family wage, and not state support, is of immediate importance in allowing married women to remain out of the labour force.

In North America, in the late nineteenth century and the early part of this century, the growing sexual segregation of the labour force in wage jobs and the minimal participation of married women in paid jobs outside the home were apparently largely consequences of factors other than labour legislation (i.e., protective legislation). However, during the World Wars government manipulation of the female reserve of labour was direct. In both the United States and Canada, the government directly enticed women into wage work when they were needed during the World Wars, and strongly pressured them to leave their jobs when the men returned. Nevertheless, the rising entry of married women into wage work in recent decades does not seem to be an indication of enticement out of the home by the state (with its equal pay and fair employment practices laws). Indeed, state legislation not only

has had little effect, equal pay laws also may have been an attempt - forced by the unions - to prevent female competition for men's jobs, by discouraging the employment of women. Enactment of the fair employment practices laws might then have been aimed at counteracting the possible effectiveness of the equal pay laws.

Welfare relief policies, clearly formulated with a view to labour market needs, have served to maintain low-income housewives in the state of a perpetual labour reserve, by failing to provide them with financial support sufficient to compensate for the inadequacy of the husband's wage, through the twentieth century in Canada and the United States. The increased wage work of these women is thus related to government policies. In Canada, however, "mother's allowances" have been paid to all mothers since World War II. This policy, coupled with a withdrawal of support for day care, surely counteracted some of the forces pushing and pulling married women into the wage labour force. Thus, except for state policies during the World Wars and except in the case of women needing welfare relief, the state has not had a major influence on women's work.

Directions for Future Research

Our discussion has provided some answers and raised many questions. The first of these involves the extent to which housewives experience the pressures that characterize work in the production of commodities. In-depth interviews with housewives are called for, to determine the ways in which they decide how to allocate their time. Do housewives, or some of them, make calculating choices? For what kinds of tasks do they do so? Aside from housework, this may even involve activities such as child bearing. Does child bearing fit any economically rational plan? To what extent do the demands of child rearing interfere with plans to organize labour time rationally?

One of the key purposes motivating an attempt to understand women's household work is the goal of understanding their consciousness. There are instances in history of women having been manipulated by capital or the state for purposes harmful to the interests of their class. Certainly the possibility always exists, given women's isolation in the home, and the primacy of the roles of mother and wife for even those women involved in wage work, that women will betray their class interests.

In-depth interviews with housewives, and the rest of the household, may further attempt to determine the extent to which (i.e., proportions of households in which) women work for wages or desire such work because they feel the economic need - and thus represent a labour reserve - and the extent to which households with a second wage earner could survive loss of that second earner. What proportion of households are locked into dependence on that second wage? And (in light of an understanding of women's consciousness) what is the likelihood that housewives would organize themselves to protest cutbacks to household income, in the event of another major depression?

A second potential topic for research involves changes in bourgeois concerns about the family. No doubt, there have been variations through the twentieth century in the intensity of the belief that the family is being "destroyed." Are these related to changing economic conditions, especially changes in the need for labour and changes in the type of labour required? An answer to this question would raise the additional issue of changes in state policies that affect the family (i.e., support it, or maintain it as a reserve of cheap labour). A detailed study of local and provincial welfare relief programs is called for.

Finally, having documented and attempted to explain the development and mobilization of the female labour reserve, we must next turn to the question of the effects of the growing presence of women in the wage labour force. Do women exert indirect competitive pressures on men's wages? We propose an occupational linkage for census years 1941 through 1971, in order to examine the effects of the changing sex composition of jobs on wages. After separating occupations according to the education and training requirements of the labourers, one should then be able to examine the effects of changes in sex composition on the differential between men's and women's wages, and between men's wages in occupations with a significant presence of women and those of men in virtually all-male occupations. The effects of women's growing presence in the labour market will be difficult to measure, but in the absence of any serious attempts to date, some efforts in that direction may be fruitful.

Table 1. Women's Rates of Participation in Gainful Occupation or the Labour Force, by Marital Status, the United States, 1890 to 1970

Year	Total	Single Women	Married Women	Married Women, Husband Present	Widowed, Divorced Women
1890	18.9%	40.4%	4.6%		29.9%
1900	20.6	43.5	5.6		32.5
1910	25.4	51.1	10.7		34.1
1920	23.7	46.4	9.0		*
1930	24.8	50.5	11.7		34.4
1940	25.8	45.5	15.6	13.8	30.2
1950	29.0	46.3	23.0	21.6	32.7
1960	34.5	42.9	31.7	30.6	36.1
1970	41.6	50.9	40.2	39.6	36.8

*There is no separate figure for widowed or divorced women; they are included with single women.

source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, part 1, p.133.

Table 2. Women's Rates of Participation in Gainful Occupation or the Labour Force, by Marital Status, Canada, 1931 to 1971

Year	Single Women	Married Women	Widowed, Divorced Women
1931	32.0%	3.5%	21.0%
1941	44.1	2.7	14.0
1951	58.4	11.2	19.3
1961	54.9	22.1	23.1
1971	53.5	37.0	26.6

sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1936. 1931 Census, vol. VII, p.36; DBS, 1946. 1941 Census, vol. III, p.94, and vol. VI, p.70; Statistics Canada, 1976. 1971 Census, vol. III, part 1, p.3-1.

Table 3. Women's Labour Force Participation Rates by Age, the United States, 1930 to 1970

Year	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65-74 years
1930	34.4%	27.8%	22.6%	20.4%	16.1%	9.8%
1940	30.5	32.9	26.9	22.1	16.4	7.5
1950	35.0	31.8	35.0	32.9	23.5	10.3
1960	35.5	35.2	42.6	46.7	35.0	13.5
1970	38.4	45.2	50.6	52.9	42.4	13.6

sources: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1933. 1930 Census, vol. V, p.115; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1943. 1940 Census, vol. III, p.19; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1953. 1950 Census. Special Reports PE 1A, p.21; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1963. 1960 Census. Subject Reports. Final Report PC(2)-6A, p.15; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. 1970 Census. Subject Reports. Final Report PC(2)-6A, pp.1,2.

Table 4. Married Women's Labour Force Participation Rates and Numbers of Married Women in the Labour Force, by Age and Presence of Children, the United States, Selected Years from 1948 to 1970.

Year	Married Women with No Children Younger than 18 Years of Age, at Home		Married Women with Children 6 to 17 Years of Age Only, at Home		Married Women with Children Younger than 6 Years of Age at Home	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
1948	28.4	4400	26.0	1927	10.8	1226
1952	30.9	5042	31.1	2492	13.9	1688
1956	35.3	5694	36.4	3384	15.9	2048
1960	34.7	5692	39.0	4087	18.6	2474
1964	37.8	6545	43.0	4866	22.7	3050
1968	40.1	7564	46.9	5693	27.6	3564
1970	42.2	8174	49.2	6289	30.3	3914

source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, p.134.

Table 5. Urbanization in the United States

Year	Percentage of the Popu- lation Living in Towns, 2,500 to 24,999 in Size	Percentage of the Popu- lation Living in Cities, 25,000 to 249,999 in Size	Percentage of the Popu- lation Living in Metropolises, 250,000+ in Size	Total Urban Places
1820	3.58	3.63	—	7.21
1870	9.86	6.74	8.21	24.81
1920	15.23	16.00	19.64	50.87
1970	28.34	24.03	20.75	73.12

source: Warner (1975, 70)

Table 6. Urbanization in Canada and Its Provinces:
Percentage of the Population in Urban Places
over 1,000 in Size

	1861	1881	1901	1921	1941	1961
CANADA (excluding Newfoundland)	15.8%	23.3%	34.9%	47.4%	55.7%	70.2%
Newfoundland	—	—	—	—	—	50.7
Maritimes	9.9	15.3	24.5	38.8	44.1	49.5
P. E. I.	9.3	10.5	14.5	18.8	22.1	32.4
Nova Scotia	7.6	14.7	27.7	44.8	52.0	54.3
New Brunswick	13.1	17.6	23.1	35.2	38.7	46.5
Quebec	16.6	23.8	36.1	51.8	61.2	74.3
Ontario	18.5	27.1	40.3	58.8	67.5	77.3
Prairies	—	—	19.3	28.7	32.4	57.6
Manitoba	—	14.9	24.9	41.5	45.7	63.9
Saskatchewan	—	—	6.1	16.8	21.3	43.0
Alberta	—	—	16.2	30.7	31.9	63.3
British Columbia	—	18.3	46.4	50.9	64.0	72.6

source: Stone (1961, 29)

Table 7. Facilities in Urban Dwelling Units, Canada and the United States, 1940 to 1971

Percentage of Units with:	1940-41		1950-51		1960-61		1970-71	
	Canada	U.S.	Canada	U.S.	Canada	U.S.	Canada	U.S.
indoor running water	90.8	93.5	94.2	96.4	98.3	-	99.2	99.7
-hot & cold	-	-	76.5	85.7	91.8	-	97.4	98.5
indoor flush toilet	80.2	90.8	91.7	92.5	97.4	-	97.7	99.2
electricity	96.5	95.8	99.3	98.8	-	-	-	-
central heating	55.7	58.2	62.4	62.6	76.9	-	86.4	82.4
cooking fuel								
-wood	28.2	6.0		2.4	-	-		0.8
-coal	9.0	8.0	23.1	5.8	-	-	10.1*	0.4
-gas or electricity	60.9	78.1	69.1	83.3	-	-	89.9*	92.5
mechanical refrigeration	31.2	56.0	58.8	86.1	95.8	-	99.1	-
electrical vacuum	36.2	-	53.1	-	-	-	-	-
automatic washing machine	-	-	-	-	-	-	30.4*	68.4

*Refers to all Canadian households, not just urban households.

sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1950. 1941 Census, vol. I, p.400 and vol. IX, pp.59,77,81; DBS, 1953. 1951 Census, vol. III, pp.20-1,32-1,36-1,40-1; DBS, 1963. 1961 Census, vol. II, part 2, pp.35-1, 40-1,45-1,55-1; DBS, 1977. 1971 Census, vol. II, part 4, pp.1-1,6-1,31-1; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1943. Census of Housing, vol. II, part 1, pp. 20,21,23,36,40,42; U. S. Bureau of the Census,

1953. Census of Housing, vol. I, part 1, p.1-6, 1-9; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1972. Census of Housing, vol. I, part 1, p.1-53,1-235,1-288, 1-298.

Table 8. Household Means of Production: Their Availability on the Market as Evidenced by Advertisements in Ladies Home Journal, 1890 to 1970*

Year	Tool or Machine
1890	sewing machine, rug machine, embroidery machine, butter churn, ice box/refrigerator, manual wringer washing machine, coal/wood stove
1900	water heater, ice cream "freezer," ice box, coal/wood stove
1910	bread kneader, ice cream "freezer, meat grinder, coffee percolator, radiator, coke-burning cooker, ice box, carpet sweeper, oil/gas stove, electical ironing machine, electrical vacuum, electrical clothes washing machine (i.e., washes only, does not rinse), telephone
1920	jars and preserving pan, jar seals, carpet sweeper, coal cookstove, portable oven, gas/oil stove, electric wringer washer, electric vacuum, electric ironing machine, electric refrigerator, electric mixer
1930	carpet sweeper; electric refrigerator, stove, iron, ironing machine, vacuum, wringer washer, mixer
1940	electric refrigerator and stove
1950	electric freezer, dishwasher, stove, refrigerator, iron, vacuum, wringer washer, washing machine and dryer, roaster, oven, coffee pot, beater, and other small appliances
1960	same plus sewing machine
1970	same plus electric pans, electric broiler, saran wrap/aluminum foil and other small articles

*Pots and pans, brooms and mops, knives, soaps, and (especially before 1930) waxes/varnishes were advertised throughout these years.

source: content analysis described in Appendix A.

Table 9. Percentage of Nonfiction Articles on Home Production in Ladies Home Journal which discuss Food, 1890 to 1970

Year	Percentages	Numbers
1890	17.2	5 of 29
1900	23.1	3 of 13
1910	14.6	6 of 41
1920	16.7	3 of 18
1935-39	61.1	11 of 18
1960	71.4	5 of 7

source. content analysis described in Appendix A.

Table 10. Indexes of the Manufacture of Selected Foods,
in Selected Years from 1899 to 1947, the United
States (1929 = 100)

Year	wheat flour	baking powder	bread, cake	biscuits, crackers	canned fruits, vegetables	canned milk	popu- lation
1899	94				17	6.7	
1904	98				24	10.9	
1909	102				29	18	74.3
1914	108				42	36	81.4
1919	114				55	84	85.8
1921	94				38	69	89.1
1923	106		75	81	67	73	91.9
1925	102		78	86	82	76	95.1
1927	100	88	90	91	82	88	97.8
1929	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1931	91	96	92	86	91	100	101.9
1933	80	74	74	78	88	98	103.1
1935	82	73	86	96	127	115	104.5
1937	86	63	96	106	151	128	105.8
1939*	72	85	105.6	113.4	128	135	107.5
1947	100	115	145	146	198	247	118.4

*Estimated

sources: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1913. Manufactures, vol. X, pp.415; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1949. Census of Manufactures, vol. II, p.18; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. Historical Statistics of the United States, p.10; Fabricant (1940, 124-25).

Table 11. Indexes of the Manufacture of Selected Foods,
in Selected Years from 1917 to 1957, Canada
(1929 = 100)

Year	wheat flour	bread	canned fruits	canned vege- tables	jams, jellies	popula- tion	urban population
1917	89.5	75.5				80.4	
1921	77.6	66.1				87.6	77.1
1925	89.9	81.2				92.7	
1929	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1933	77.1	93.8	122.6	105.5	74.2	106.0	
1937	71.9	102.9	219.7	215.2	77.6	110.0	
1941	105.6	114.1	271.5	244.8	121.4	114.7	113.4
1945	127.1	138.0	180.0	212.2	140.7	120.4	
1949	102.8	144.2	404.1	266.2	139.4	134.1	
1953	119.3	166.5	388.3	289.3	161.2	148.0	145.5
1957	96.5	176.6	473.0	324.5	165.4	165.6	

source: Urquhart and Buckley (1965, 14,15,482)

Table 12. Restaurant Sales, Canada, 1930 to 1971
(net sales, millions \$)

Year	Current \$	1949 \$	Per Capita Index
1930	75	-	-
1932	46	-	-
1934	49	82	100
1936	66	108	128
1938	71	111	129
1940	87	132	151
1942	158	217	244
1944	216	290	318
1946	270	348	369
1948	330	340	344
1950	390	379	366
1952	468	402	362
1954	453	390	333
1956	508	430	349
1958	543	434	331
1960	569	445	326
1971	2077	1204	728

sources: Urquhart and Buckley (1965, 571); Statistics Canada, 1977. 1971 Census. Service Trades, vol. IX, part 7

Table 13. Percentage of Nonfiction Articles in Ladies Home Journal with Instructions for Home Production of Useful Items that are Durable - Mostly Clothing, 1890 to 1970

Year	Percentage
1890	82.8
1900	76.9
1910	85.4
1920	83.3
1935-39	38.9
1960	28.6

source: content analysis described in Appendix A.

Table 14. Ratio of Materials for Home Production of Clothing to Women's Readymade Clothing Available in Stores, in Advertisements in Ladies Home Journal, 1890 to 1970

Year	Ratio
<hr/>	
1890	76 to 7, or 10.8
1900	45 to 18, or 2.5
1910	72 to 25, or 2.9
1920	14 to 15, or .9
1930	6 to 0
1940	6 to 4, or 1.5
1950	26 to 11, or 2.4
1960	1 to 1, or 1
1970	2 to 3, or .7
<hr/>	

source: content analysis described in Appendix A.

Table 15-A. Workers in Commercial Cleaners and Laundries, Canada, 1931 to 1971*

Year	Number
1931	14,578
1941	20,207
1951	19,300
1961	9,198
1971	5,936

*Excludes dry cleaners.

B. Number of Self-Service Laundries and Dry Cleaners

Year	Number
1961	940
1971	1,817

sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1933. 1931 Census, vol. XI, part II, p.44; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1943. 1941 Census, vol. XI, p.410; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1954. 1951 Census, vol. VIII, p.21-2; Statistics Canada, 1965. 1961 Census, vol. VI, part 2, p.42-1; Statistics Canada, 1977. 1971 Census, vol. IX, part 7, p.5.

Table 16. Proposed Series of Married Women's Rates of Participation in Wage Work (or Work in the Family Business), the United States, 1890 to 1970*

Year	Participation Rates
1890	7.7%
1900	8.4
1910	10.7
1920	11.5
1930	13.3
1940	15.6
1950	23.0
1960	31.7
1970	40.2

*1890 through 1930 shows revised rates; 1940 through 1970 shows rates as given in the censuses. See Appendix B for explanation of estimation of series.

sources: see Appendix B.

Table 17. Wives' Labour Force Participation by Husbands' Relative Income, the United States, 1940 to 1970

Popula- tion Fifths	1940 Labour Force Par- ticipation Rates	1970 Labour Force Par- ticipation Rates	Percentage Point Increase	Percen- tage Increase	Approxi- mate Numerical Increase
low 1	22%	67%	45	205	5,066,000
2	18	61	43	239	4,920,000
3	17	58	41	241	4,187,000
4	13	53	40	308	4,239,000
high 5	7	47	40	571	4,146,000

sources: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1943. 1940 Census, Additional Reports. Families, p.151; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1973. 1970 Census. Subject Reports, PC(2)-8A, p.377.

Table 18. Percentage Distributions of Women in Families and of Married Women Earning Wages, by Husbands' Incomes, the United States, 1940, 1960, 1970

Husbands' Incomes (in 1960 dollars)	1940			1960			1970		
	Percentage Distribution of Women in Families	Percentage Distribution of Married Women Earning Wages		Percentage Distribution of Women in Families	Percentage Distribution of Married Women Earning Wages		Percentage Distribution of Women in Families	Percentage Distribution of Married Women Earning Wages	
0	8.74	15.13		1.79	1.66		1.02	1.02	
\$1-999	9.13	10.70		6.60	8.55		2.62	3.11	
\$1000-1999	24.42	28.71		8.85	10.84		10.37	12.47	
\$2000-2999	18.45m	19.73		9.72	11.00		5.71	6.49	
\$3000-3999	19.93	16.62		11.74	12.69		5.95	6.50	
\$4000-4999	9.18	5.31		13.97m	14.55		15.59	16.62	
\$5000-5999	3.67	1.81		14.91	14.54		9.34m	9.72	
\$6000-9999	4.49	1.59		24.08	20.25		37.77	35.16	
\$10,000+	1.99	0.40		8.34	5.92		11.63	9.01	
	100.00	100.00		100.00	100.00		100.00	100.00	

"m" shows the median income category.

Indexes of Dissimilarity: 1940 - 13.53, 1960 - 6.75, 1970 - 5.23

sources: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1943. 1940 Census. Additional Reports. Families, p.151. U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1963. 1960 Census. Subject Reports.
Final Report PC(2)-4C, p.184; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. 1970 Census.
Subject Reports. Final Report. PC(2)-8A, p.377.

Table 19. Minimum Budget Standards for a Family of Five, the United States in the Early Part of the Twentieth Century

Year	City	Researcher	Estimated Minimum Family Income	Method of Estimation
1907	New York	Chapin	\$825	Study of actual budgets of selected working-class households, thus based on prevailing conditions and a consideration of available means of realizing a fair standard; determined by noting the minimum essential before debt is incurred and judging what items are essential.
1908	Buffalo	Howard	\$675	
1908	southern cotton mill towns	U.S. Dept. of Labor	\$408-\$601	
1908	Fall River	"	\$484-\$732	
1907-08	Homestead	Byington	\$915	
1909-10	Chicago	University of Chicago Settlement	\$800	
1913-15	Philadelphia	Little & Cotton	\$1070 ("fair minimum")	
1914	New York	Streightoff	\$876	
1914	Buffalo	"	\$772	
1917	Dallas	Mayor's Commission	\$747 ("bare minimum")	
1916-18	Philadelphia	Bureau of Municipal Research	\$1637	"
1919	"	"	\$1803	"
1920	"	"	\$1988	"
1921	"	"	\$1742	"

Year	City	Researcher	Estimated Minimum	Method of Estimation
1915	New York	N Y. Board of Estimate & Apportion- ment	\$845	Standard established by a panel of experts after a consideration of local prices and actual local stores and available sup- plies; 1919 Bureau of Labor Statistics quantity standard typically used for these. (Not as good as the above method.)
1918	New York	Ogburn	\$1386	
1919	Fall River	National Industrial Conference Board	\$1268	
1920	West Hoboken, Union Hill, N. J.	"	\$1604	
1920	Pelzer, S. Caro- lina	"	\$1374	"
1920	Charlotte," N. Caro- lina	"	\$1526	"
1920	Cinnncin- nati	"	\$1693	"
1920	Worcester	"	\$1733	"
1921	New York	Labor Bureau	\$2334	"
1921	10 U.S. cities	"	\$2067- \$2573	"
1923	Phila- delphia	Bureau of Municipal Research	\$1854	"
1924	Muncie	Lynds	\$1921	"
1926	New York	NICB	\$1880	"
1927	U.S. cities	National War Labor Board	\$2844 (includes new items)	"

Year	City	Researcher	Estimated Minimum	Method of Estimation
1926-27	small U.S. cities	NICB	\$1442- \$1567	"
1926-27	large U.S. cities	"	\$1552- \$1660	"
1928	10 U.S. Labor cities Bureau		\$2055- \$2511	"

sources: Bureau of Applied Economics, Inc. (1920, 1932); National Industrial Conference Board (1921); Chapin (1909); Howard (1909); Byington (1910); Streightoff (1915); Little and Cotton (1920); U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1919, 29-41).

Table 20. Average Men's Wage or Salary Income: Median Income for 1939, 1950-70, Mean Income for 1910-60, the United States

Year	Mean	Median	Year	Mean	Median
1910	\$568		1931	\$1121	
1911	573		1932	850	
1912	611		1933	766	
1913	649		1934	858	
1914	614		1935	906	
1915	606		1936	993	
1916	717		1937	1147	
1917	830		1938	1027	
1918	1080		1939	1106	1047
1919	1242		1940	1204	
1920	1376		1941	1444	
1921	1082		1942	1922	
1922	1155		1943	2403	
1923	1361		1944	2646	
1924	1336		1945	2697	
1925	1402		1946	2721	
1926	1466		1947	2860	
1927	1469		1948	3242	
1928	1454		1949	3225	
1929	1521		1950	3461	2867
1930	1355		1951	3872	3216

Year	Mean	Median
1952	\$4124	\$3360
1953	4344	3607
1954	4313	3592
1955	4592	3822
1956	4870	4074
1957	5096	4200
1958	5113	4377
1959	5494	4696
1960	5711	4331
1961		5060
1962		5218
1963		5418
1964		5610
1965		5926
1966		6245
1967		6587
1968		7046
1969		7597
1970		7977

source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. Historical Statistics of the United States, p.164,304.

Table 21. Modest but Adequate Budget Standards for a Family of Four, the United States in the Period Since World War II.

Year	Large Cities	Small Cities
1946	\$2345-\$2718	
1947	\$3092-\$3546	\$2921*
1949	\$3295-3773	\$2827*
1951	\$3812-\$4454	\$3306*
1959	\$5370-\$6567	\$4775*
1966	\$9396	\$8366

*Estimated, based on the relationship between large and small city figures in 1966.

sources: Kellogg and Brady (1948,152); Knapp (1951,153); Knapp (1952,521); Groom (1967,1-8); Lamale and Stotz (1960,787).

sources: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1953. 1950 Census, vol. II, part 1, p.1-206; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1964. 1960 Census. Subject Reports. Final Report PC(2)-5A, p.23; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1973. 1970 Census. Subject Reports. Final Report PC(2)-5A, p.119.

Table 23. Percentage of Young Adults Working for Wages, the United States, 1910 to 1970

Year	Ages	Percentages
1910	10-15	18.4
	16-20	59.4
1920	10-15	8.5
	16-20	52.3
1930	10-15	4.7
	16-19	43.4
1940	14-15	5.2
	16-19	37.1
1950	14-15	10.2
	16-19	38.6
1960	14-15	11.3
	16-19	37.6
1970	16-19	35.3

sources: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1923. 1920 Census, vol. IV, p.474; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1933. 1930 Census, vol. V, p.345; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1943. 1940 Census, vol. III, part 1, p.26; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1953. 1950 Census, vol. II, part 1, p.1-252; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1963. 1960 Census. Subject Report. Final Report PC(2)-7A, p.31,41; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. 1970 Census. Subject Report. Final Report PC(2)-6A, p.28.

Table 24. Percentage of Households with Lodgers and Subfamilies, the United States, 1930 to 1970

Year	Households with Lodgers	Households with Subfamilies
1930	9.8%	
1940	8.1	4.8%
1960	3.8	
1970	3.5	2.4

sources: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1933. 1930 Census, vol. VI, p.25; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1943. 1940 Census, vol. III, p.28; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1963. 1960 Census. Subject Reports. Final Report PC(2)-4A, p.168; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. 1970 Census. Subject Reports. Final Report PC(2)-4A, pp.237,246.

Table 25. Percentage of American Households with Two or More, and Three or More, Wage or Salary Workers, 1930 to 1970

Year	Households with Two or More Members in the Labour Force	Households with Three or More Members in the Labour Force
1930	32%	11%
1940	31	10
1950	30	7
1960	44	8
1970	51	11

sources: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1953. 1950 Census. Special Reports P-E No. 2A, p.31; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1963. 1960 Census. Subject Reports PC(2)-4C, pp.1-3; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1973. 1970 Census. Subject Reports PC(2)-8A.

Table 26. Percentage of American Families with Installment Debt, by Amount of Debt, 1952 to 1970

Amount	1952	1955	1958	1961	1964	1967	1970
None	62%	56%	52%	53%	53%	52%	51%
\$1-\$199	16	13	14	11	10	9	8
\$200-\$999	18	23	23	21	19	17	17
\$1000+	4	7	11	15	18	22	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

sources: Survey Research Center (1960,155; 1963,98;
 1965,51; 1970,21).

Table 27. The Frequency of Appearance of Specific Themes in Nonfiction Articles in Ladies Home Journal, 1890 to 1960

A. Message	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960
Anti-Male; Against Men Oppressing Women	3	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
How to Take Control of Your Life (e.g. have a career)	5	5	9	5	2	2	0	2
How to Orient to Men, Be Successful in Marriage, or Accept Your Lot	5	6	6	2	4	11	12	6
B. Reader Addressed as...								
Craftswoman Making Useful Goods for Her Family	28	11	34	16	11	13	8	2
Female Consumer	7	8	4	4	16	16	9	7
An Indepen- dent Female, (with a career or the right to one)	12	6	7	7	3	1	0	1
Number of Articles Ana- lyzed	95	83	171	92	89	135	71	39

source: content analysis described in Appendix A.

Table 28. Wives' Labour Force Participation by Husbands' Relative Income, Canada, 1931 and 1971

Population Fifths	1931 Gainful Occupation Rates	1971 Rates of Involve- ment in Paid Work	Percentage Point Increase	Percentage Increase
low 1	5%	24%	19	380
2	4	34	30	750
3	3	33	30	1000
4	2	32	30	1500
high 5	1	26	25	2500

sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1933. 1931 Census, vol. V, p.686; Statistics Canada, data from Public Use Sample Tape (from 1971 Census)

Table 29. Earnings of Male Heads of Households, Canada, 1941 to 1971

Year	Households at the First Quartile of the Population			Households at the Second Quartile of the Population			Households at the Third Quartile of the Popu- lation		
	Current \$	Constant \$ (cpi) (revised cpi)	Current \$	Constant \$ (cpi) (revised cpi)	Current \$	Constant \$ (cpi) (revised cpi)	Current \$	Constant \$ (cpi) (revised cpi)	
1941*	\$680	\$680	\$1200	\$1200	\$1200	\$1625	\$1625	\$1625	
1951	\$1688	\$1000	\$2367	\$1500	\$1400	\$2962	\$1800	\$1700	
1961	\$2726	\$1500	\$4116	\$2200	\$2100	\$7131	\$3800	\$3700	
1971	\$4349	\$1800	\$7039	\$2800	\$2700	\$9723	\$3900	\$3800	

*1941 figures are estimates in a double sense: not only do we interpolate from grouped data, but we also estimate the figures for male household heads from data that include both male and female heads.

sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1943. 1941 Census, vol. V, pp.178,544;
 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1953. 1951 Census, vol. III, pp.128-1,
 136-1; Statistics Canada, 1963. 1961 Census, vol. IV, part 1, pp.2-1,
 2-2; Statistics Canada, 1975. 1971 Census, vol. II, part 2, p.104-1.

Table 30. Cost of Living for a Family of Four (Man, Women, Boy 7-9, Girl 4-6), Toronto, Selected Years from 1939 to 1972

Year	Current \$ per week	Constant \$, cpi adjustment
1939	\$25.45	\$25.45
1944	\$32.33	\$27.40
1949	\$43.38	\$27.46
1964	\$92.47	\$43.21
1968	\$121.48	\$49.38
1972	\$144.63	\$50.57

source: Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, Guides for Family Budgeting. These provide figures, in detail, for adults and children (by sex and age) on the necessary costs for food, clothing, personal care, transportation, recreation, rent, heat, water, electricity, household operation, home furnishings, and medical care. The aim in 1949 was to measure the "minimum level of health and self-respect;" in 1964, when the "basket" of goods was redefined, the object was to measure a level "sufficiently above the subsistence-survival level as to be consistent with the maintenance of good health and a sense of self respect, yet considerably below any level of living that could be called luxurious." In 1972, the "basket" of goods was again redefined. At times of such redefinition items were included (as essential) if 90% of people sampled owned them.

Table 31. Canadian Gallup Poll Results: Percentages of People who Think Prices will be Higher Next Year

Year	Percentage
1949	13
1954*	21
1956	54
1960	52
1966*	85
1969	79
1974*	92

*Refers to the next six months.

Table 32. Time Series Data, Canada, 1940 to 1975

Year	Women's Labour Force Partici- pation Rates	Total Ferti- lity Rates	Men's Wages	Women's Wages	Consumer Debt	Availa- bility of Part- Time Work
1940	24.5%	2,940	21.54	11.74		
1941	24.7	3,097	22.35	12.14	20.16	
1942	26.8	3,276	24.86	13.63	19.29	
1943	33.3	3,173	25.90	14.81	18.99	
1944	33.5	3,204	25.85	15.45	18.91	
1945	33.2	3,157	24.96	14.13	18.87	9.68
1946	25.3	3,748	25.35	14.05	18.18	10.28
1947	24.4	3,996	26.14	14.61	28.33	9.28
1948	24.2	3,725	25.11	14.23	30.55	9.51
1949	24.2	3,750	25.45	14.61	35.81	8.87
1950	23.7	3,669	26.79	15.26	38.39	8.54
1951	24.2	3,682	26.33	14.58	26.52	8.84
1952	24.1	3,845	27.89	15.66	45.65	8.60
1953	23.8	3,905	29.15	16.30	52.99	5.49
1954	23.6	4,047	29.52	16.57	54.84	6.67
1955	24.3	4,043	32.05	17.99	65.53	6.25
1956	25.1	4,092	32.98	18.33	72.56	6.32
1957	26.2	4,168	32.25	17.64	69.49	7.30
1958	26.6	4,073	32.52	18.16	71.71	8.65
1959	26.9	4,100	33.95	18.58	78.89	8.80
1960	27.9	4,119	34.63	18.95	84.99	9.39
1961	29.1	4,159	35.14	18.78	87.71	10.23
1962	29.9	4,134	34.49	18.74	95.31	10.77
1963	29.8	4,017	35.99	19.71	104.40	10.84
1964	30.9	3,886	36.68	20.06	116.80	11.70
1965	32.1	3,467	37.96	20.94	130.99	12.33
1966	33.2	3,150	38.68	21.20	135.25	12.18
1967	34.5	2,879	39.65	21.95	142.93	13.67
1968	35.1	2,681	41.20	22.68	155.47	13.82
1969	36.1	2,563	42.44	23.75	165.04	14.91
1970	36.9	2,571	42.02	25.63	164.53	15.52
1971	37.0	2,503	45.32	26.79	169.63	15.47
1972	37.9	2,302	45.61	27.51	190.62	15.85
1973	40.1	2,931	45.59	27.35	209.60	15.40
1974	40.6	1,875	48.06	29.64	216.66	16.23
1975	42.2	1,866	46.12	29.33	224.34	16.71

source: see Appendix D.

Table 33. Correlation Matrix

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	1.00	0.87	-0.70	0.94	0.96	0.98	0.82
2	0.87	1.00	-0.88	0.91	0.91	0.93	0.94
3	-0.70	-0.88	1.00	-0.78	-0.79	-0.80	-0.88
4	0.95	0.91	-0.78	1.00	0.97	0.96	0.88
5	0.96	0.91	-0.79	0.97	1.00	0.98	0.85
6	0.98	0.93	-0.80	0.96	0.98	1.00	0.88
7	0.82	0.94	-0.88	0.88	0.85	0.88	1.00

variables: 1. year

2. women's labour force participation rates

3. total fertility rates

4. men's wages

5. women's wages

6. consumer debt

7. availability of part-time work

Table 34. Results of the Time Series Analysis

Independent Variable	Standardized Coefficient		Unstandardized Coefficient
	OLS Regression	Ridge Regression (k=.05)	Ridge Regression (k=.05)
year	-0.0622 (.1200) *	0.1715 (.0353)	0.1109
total fertility rate	0.0306 (.0476)	-0.0916 (.0340)	-0.0007
men's wages	0.0005 (.0796)	0.0715 (.0411)	0.0936
women's wages	0.0390 (.1050)	0.1246 (.0378)	0.2066
consumer debt	0.7016 (.1552)	0.2687 (.0322)	0.252
part-time work	0.3863 (.0517)	0.3123 (.0383)	0.5566
1945 dummy	0.2846 (.0194)	0.2580 (.0222)	8.4448
standard error	0.0920	0.1175	

*Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 35. Results of Log Linear Analysis

A. The Data: Women's Labour Force Participation Rate (Percent) by Age and Period

	period				
	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971
15-24	35.3*	35.6*	41.0*	39.5	49.9
25-34	24.4	27.9	25.5	29.1	39.5
35-44	14.3	18.1	22.4	31.2	41.0
45-54	12.9	14.5	21.1	32.9	40.8
55-64	11.3	11.1	13.5	23.1	31.9
65-74	6.2*	5.8*	4.6*	6.2*	5.5

*Figures for women 14 to 24, or 65 and over.

source: Ostry (1968, 3 & 7) and Statistics Canada, 1971.
Internal Memo

B. Results

Model	Marginals	Fit	G^2	d.f.	R^{2*}
1	(12)	(3)	198,159.71	29	
2	(12)	(13)	75,968.17	24	.617
3	(12)	(23)	143,194.66	25	.277
4	(12)	(14) (23)	15,232.22	20	.923

- variables:
- 1. age
 - 2. period
 - 3. women's labour force participation rate

*Squared multiple correlation analogue.

Table 35. Results of Log Linear Analysis - continued

C. Effects on Labour Force Participation Logits, Model 4

Age variable:		Time variable (Period):	
1st category	.8975	1st category	-.3606
2nd category	.4058	2nd category	-.2556
3rd category	.2758	3rd category	-.1082
4th category	.2514	4th category	.1494
5th category	-.1454	5th category	.5751
6th category	-1.6848		

Table 36. Percentage of the Total Labour Force in Major Occupational Groups, Canada, 1901 to 1971

Occupation	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971
White Collar	15.2	16.8	25.1	24.5	25.2	32.4	38.6	42.5
proprietary and managerial	4.3	4.6	7.2	5.6	5.4	7.5	7.9	4.3
professional	4.6	3.7	5.5	6.1	6.7	7.4	10.0	12.7
clerical	3.2	3.8	6.8	6.7	7.2	10.8	12.9	16.0
commercial and financial	3.1	4.7	5.6	6.1	5.9	6.7	7.8	9.5
Manual	32.2	36.1	31.3	33.8	33.4	37.7	34.9	29.2
manufacturing and mechanical	15.9	13.7	11.4	11.5	16.0	17.4	16.4	13.7
construction	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	5.6	5.3	5.6
labourers	7.2	12.0	9.7	11.3	6.3	6.8	5.4	3.2
transportation and communication	4.4	5.7	5.5	6.3	6.4	7.9	7.9	6.7
Service	8.2	7.7	7.1	9.2	10.5	8.6	10.8	11.2
personal	7.8	7.5	5.8	8.3	9.3	7.4	9.3	8.9
protective and other	0.4	0.2	1.3	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.5	2.3
Primary	44.4	39.4	36.3	32.5	30.6	20.1	13.1	7.7
agriculture	40.3	34.3	32.7	28.8	25.8	15.9	10.2	5.9
fishing, trapping	1.6	1.3	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.0	0.6	0.3
logging	0.9	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.9	1.9	1.3	0.8
mining, quarrying	1.6	2.3	1.5	1.4	1.7	1.3	1.0	0.7
N.S., N.E.C.	-	-	0.2	-	0.3	1.2	2.6	9.4
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
% numbers (1000s)	1783	2724	3164	3918	4196	5215	6342	8627

Table 37. Women as a Percentage of the Total Labour Force in Each Major Occupational Group, Canada, 1901 to 1971

Occupation	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971
White Collar	20.6	23.8	29.5	31.5	35.1	38.1	41.3	48.5
proprietary and managerial	3.6	4.5	4.3	4.8	7.2	8.9	10.3	15.7
professional	42.5	44.6	54.1	49.5	46.1	43.5	43.2	48.1
clerical	22.1	32.6	41.8	45.1	50.1	56.7	61.5	68.4
commercial and financial	10.4	19.2	23.1	23.1	29.4	35.2	36.7	30.4
Manual	12.6	10.4	10.4	8.5	11.0	11.5	10.6	12.0
manufacturing, mechanical	24.8	25.9	24.3	18.7	19.1	18.8	16.8	18.5
construction	-	-	0.1	-	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.9
labourers	0.9	0.1	0.2	2.6	4.4	6.0	6.1	10.1
transportation and communica- tion	1.4	3.5	8.4	6.5	5.3	8.2	7.9	8.7
Service	68.7	65.3	58.9	63.0	65.1	55.4	57.8	46.2
personal	71.7	67.2	68.9	69.6	72.9	64.2	66.4	57.4
protective and other	2.7	6.8	11.9	2.1	1.8	3.1	5.1	3.9
Primary	1.1	1.5	1.6	1.9	1.5	3.1	9.2	16.4
agriculture	1.2	1.7	1.7	2.1	1.8	3.9	11.7	20.9
fishing, trapping	0.2	0.8	0.2	1.0	0.6	0.5	1.1	1.9
logging	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	2.1
mining, quarrying	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6
All Occupations	13.3	13.4	15.5	17.0	19.8	22.3	27.8	34.3

Table 38. Percentage of the Female Labour Force in
Major Occupational Groups, Canada, 1901 to 1971

Occupation	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971
White Collar	23.6	29.9	47.9	45.4	44.6	55.4	57.4	59.8
proprietary and managerial	1.2	1.6	2.0	1.6	2.0	3.0	2.9	2.0
professional	14.7	12.5	19.0	17.7	15.6	14.4	15.6	17.8
clerical	5.3	9.1	18.5	17.7	18.3	27.4	28.6	31.7
commercial and financial	2.4	6.7	8.4	8.4	8.7	10.6	10.3	8.4
Manual	30.6	28.0	21.1	16.9	18.5	19.4	13.3	10.1
manufacturing and mechanical	29.6	26.4	18.0	12.7	15.4	14.6	9.9	7.4
construction	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1
labourers	0.5	0.1	0.1	1.8	1.4	1.8	1.2	0.9
transportation and communica- tion	0.5	1.5	3.0	2.4	1.7	2.9	2.2	1.7
Service	42.0	37.6	27.0	34.0	34.4	21.3	22.5	15.2
personal	42.0	37.5	26.0	33.9	34.3	21.1	22.2	14.9
protective and other	-	0.1	1.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3
Primary	3.8	4.5	3.7	3.7	2.3	2.8	4.3	3.7
agriculture	3.8	4.4	3.7	3.6	2.3	2.8	4.3	3.6
fishing, trapping	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	-	-	-
logging, mining, quarrying	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N.S., N.E.C.	-	-	0.3	-	0.2	1.1	2.5	11.2
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
% numbers (1000s)	238	347	489	665	833	1164	1761	2961

sources: table 36 - Connelly (1978, 98-99);
table 37 - Connelly (1978, 103-04);
table 38 - Connelly (1978, 100-01)

Table 39-A. Estimated Female Labour Force in Canada in 1971, Based on 1901, 1941, and 1971 Distributions of the Total Labour Force, and the Percentage Female in Each Occupation as of 1901

Occupation	1901			1941		1971	
	%Female	Distri- bution*	Estimated Distribution*	Distri- bution	Estimated Distribution	Distri- bution	Estimated Distribution
White Collar	20.6	271	56	1057	218	3666	755
Manual	12.6	574	72	1401	176	2519	317
Service	68.7	146	100	441	303	966	664
Primary	1.1	792	9	1284	14	664	7
Total		1783	237	4196	711	8627	1743

*All numbers (besides percentages) are in thousands.

source: data from Connelly (1978, 98, 103-4).

Table 39-B. Estimated Female Labour Force in Canada in 1971, Based on 1901 Distribution of the Total Labour Force, and the Percentage Female in Each Occupation in 1941 and 1971

Occupation	1901 Distribution*	% Female in 1941	Estimated Distribution* in 1971	% Female in 1971	Estimated Distribution*
White Collar	271	35.1	95	48.5	131
Manual	574	11.0	63	12.0	69
Service	146	65.1	95	46.2	67
Primary	792	1.5	12	16.4	130
Total	1783		265		347

*Numbers in thousands.

source: data from Connelly(1978, 98,103-4)

Table 40-A. Estimated Female Labour Force in 1971, Based on 1971 Distribution of the Total Labour Force, and the Percentage Female in Each Occupation as of 1941

Occupation	% Female in 1941	1971 Distribution*	Estimated Distribution*
White Collar	35.1	3666	1287
Manual	11.0	2519	277
Service	65.1	966	629
Primary	1.5	664	10
Total		8627	2203

Table 40-B. Estimated Female Labour Force in 1971, Based on 1941 Distribution of the Total Labour Force, and the Percentage Female in Each Occupation as of 1971

Occupation	1941 Distribution*	% Female in 1971	Estimated Distribution*
White Collar	1057	48.5	513
Manual	1401	12.0	168
Service	441	46.2	204
Primary	1284	16.4	211
Total			1096

*Numbers in thousands.

source: data from Connelly (1978, 98, 103-4)

Table 41. Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1901 to 1970

Year	Number of Strikes and Lockouts in Existence During the Year	Number of Workers Involved	Man-Days	Percentage of Estima- ted Working Time
1901	99	24,089	737,808	-
1902	125	12,709	203,301	-
1903	175	38,408	858,959	-
1904	103	11,420	192,890	-
1905	96	12,513	246,138	-
1906	150	23,382	378,276	-
1907	188	34,060	520,142	-
1908	76	26,071	703,571	-
1909	90	18,114	880,663	-
1910	101	22,203	731,324	-
1911	100	29,285	1,821,064	-
1912	181	42,860	1,135,786	-
1913	152	40,519	1,036,254	-
1914	68	9,717	490,850	-
1915	63	11,395	95,042	-
1916	120	26,538	236,814	-
1917	160	50,255	1,123,515	-
1918	230	79,743	647,942	-
1919	336	148,915	3,400,942	0.60
1920	322	60,327	799,524	0.14
1921	168	28,257	1,048,914	0.22
1922	104	43,775	1,528,661	0.32

Year	Number of Strikes and Lockouts in Existence During the Year	Number of Workers Involved	Man-Days	Percentage of Estima- ted Working Time
1923	86	34,261	671,750	0.13
1924	70	34,310	1,295,054	0.26
1925	87	28,949	1,193,281	0.23
1926	77	23,834	266,601	0.05
1927	74	22,299	152,570	0.03
1928	98	17,581	224,214	0.04
1929	90	12,946	152,080	0.02
1930	67	13,768	91,797	0.01
1931	88	10,738	204,238	0.04
1932	116	23,390	255,000	0.05
1933	125	26,558	317,547	0.07
1934	191	45,800	574,519	0.11
1935	120	33,269	288,703	0.05
1936	156	34,812	276,997	0.05
1937	278	71,905	886,393	0.15
1938	147	20,395	148,678	0.02
1939	122	41,038	224,588	0.04
1940	168	60,619	266,318	0.04
1941	231	87,091	433,914	0.06
1942	354	113,916	450,202	0.05
1943	402	218,404	1,041,198	0.12
1944	199	75,290	490,139	0.06
1945	197	96,068	1,457,420	0.19
1946	226	138,914	4,515,030	0.54

Year	Number of Strikes and Lockouts in Existence During the Year	Number of Workers Involved	Man-Days	Percentage of Estima- ted Working Time
1947	234	103,370	2,366,340	0.27
1948	154	42,820	885,790	0.10
1949	135	46,867	1,036,820	0.11
1950	160	192,083	1,387,500	0.15
1951	258	102,793	901,620	0.09
1952	219	112,273	2,765,510	0.29
1953	173	54,488	1,312,720	0.14
1954	173	56,630	1,430,300	0.15
1955	159	60,090	1,875,400	0.19
1956	229	88,680	1,246,000	0.11
1957	245	80,695	1,477,100	0.13
1958	259	111,475	2,816,850	0.25
1959	216	95,120	2,226,890	0.19
1960	274	49,408	738,700	0.06
1961	287	97,959	1,335,080	0.11
1962	311	74,332	1,417,900	0.11
1963	332	83,428	917,140	0.07
1964	343	100,535	1,580,550	0.11
1965	501	171,870	2,349,870	0.17
1966	617	411,459	5,178,170	0.34
1967	522	252,018	3,974,760	0.25
1968	582	223,562	5,082,732	0.32
1969	595	306,799	7,751,880	0.46
1970	542	261,706	6,539,560	0.39

source: Labour Canada, 1971. Strikes and Lockouts in Canada: 1970, pp.11-12.

Table 42. Strike Issues, Canada, for Selected Years*

Issues	1912		1917		1919		1920		1921	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Wages	104	69**	101	71	224	84	201	77	88	70
Competition of Other Workers	9	1	6	4	3	1	8	3	2	2
-women mentioned	1		1***							
Union Jurisdic- tion	10	1	11	8	11	4	19	7	3	2
Working Condi- tions or Hours	28	19	34	24	107	40	52	20	25	20
Percentage of Strikes Won	27%		58%		59%		25%		17%	
<hr/>										
Issues	1927		1928		1930		1931		1936	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Wages	28	41	56	60	34	52	51	66	65	46
Competition of Other Workers	2	3	0	0	2	3	1	1	1	1
-women mentioned										
Union Jurisdic- tion	12	17	18	19	7	11	7	9	47	33
Working Condi- tions or Hours	23	33	7	7	11	17	13	17	29	21
Percentage of Strikes Won	30%		31%		31%		33%		43%	

*Selected to cover those years of high numbers of strikes, or to cover an important period of time (e.g., the Depression).

**Because a strike can involve more than one issue, percentages do not add up to 100.

***In 1915, also, there was a strike over female competition.

Issues	1937		1938		1939		1940		1941	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Wages	139	53	53	39	43	36	59	37	113	53
Competition of Other Workers	3	1	5	4	4	3	19	12	3	1
-women mentioned										
Union Jurisdic- tion	69	26	43	32	16	13	33	20	47	22
Working Condi- tions or Hours	31	12	20	15	22	18	33	20	36	17
Percentages of Strikes Won	28%		30%		26%		18%		25%	

Issues	1942		1943		1946		1951		1952	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Wages	182	55	141	37	156	74	126	53	142	74
Competition of Other Workers	9	3	6	2	0	0	2	1	2	1
-women mentioned			1						1	
Union Jurisdic- tion	55	17	72	19	28	13	34	14	21	11
Working Condi- tions or Hours	66	20	109	29	26	12	49	21	26	13
Percentages of Strikes Won	31%		36%		30%		24%		20%	

Issues	1956		1957		1958		1960		1962	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Wages	117	51	76	40	110	57	89	54	124	62
Competition of Other Workers	3	1	3	2	1	.5	3	2	7	4
-women mentioned										
Union Jurisdic- tion	28	12	17	9	20	10	21	1	23	12
Working Condi- tions or Hours	54	23	39	21	30	16	34	21	39	20
*										

Issues	1963		1964		1966	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Wages	121	54	113	46	330	90
Competition of Other Workers	5	2	2	1	4	0
-women mentioned						
Union Jurisdic- tion	26	12	27	11	27	7
Working Condi- tions or Hours	46	20	50	20	95	26
*						

*Percentages of strikes won not given.

source: Labour Canada. Strikes and Lockouts in Canada
 (annual issues)

Table 43. Married Women's Rates of Participation in Wage Work or Work in the Family Business: Census Figures and Revisions, the United States, 1890 to 1970

Year	(1) census figures	(2) revisions	(3) proposed series
1890	4.6%	7.7%	7.7%
1900	5.6	8.4	8.4
1910	10.7	10.7	10.7
1920	9.0	11.5	11.5
1930	11.7	13.3	13.3
1940	15.6	-	15.6
1950	23.0	30.7	23.0
1960	31.7	40.7	31.7
1970	40.2	54.1	40.2

sources: (1) U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. Historical Statistics of the United States, p.133.
 (2) U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1895. Report of the Statistics of Agriculture of the Eleventh Census, p.1; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1902. Census Reports:1900, vol. V, p.lxviii; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1913. 1910 Census, vol. V, p.27; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1922. 1920 Census, vol. V, p.24; Hill, Joseph, 1929. Women in Gainful Occupations: 1870 to 1920. Census Monograph IX, p.76; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1932. 1930 Census, vol. IV, p.21, vol. V, pp.10,272; U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1951. Current Population Reports. Labor Force Series P-50, No. 35; U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1961. Current Population Reports. Special Labor Force Report No. 19; U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1974. Current Population Reports. Special Labor Force Report No. 162.

Table 44. The Food Index for the Revised Price Index

Year	Gross Per- sonal Expenditure on Food (\$million) (1)	Population (millions) (2)	(1)/(2)	Index (4)	Per Capita Food Index (5)	Overall Index (4)/(5)
1935	862	10.8	79.8	100.0	100.0	100.0
1936	918	11.0	83.5	104.6	100.0	104.6
1937	995	11.0	90.5	113.4	100.0	113.4
1938	964	11.2	86.1	107.9	100.0	107.9
1939	1009	11.3	89.3	111.9	100.0	111.9
1940	1149	11.4	100.8	126.3	99.7	126.7
1941	1332	11.5	115.8	145.1	101.6	142.8
1942	1461	11.6	125.9	157.8	106.5	148.2
1943	1566	11.8	132.7	166.3	112.6	147.7
1944	1687	11.9	141.8	177.7	113.1	157.1
1945	1809	12.1	149.5	187.3	110.0	170.3
1946	1964	12.3	159.7	200.1	119.4	167.6
1947	2133	12.6	169.3	212.3	111.3	190.6
1948	2479	12.9	192.2	240.8	105.3	228.7
1949	2514	13.2	190.5	238.7	106.9	223.3
1950	2742	13.5	203.1	254.5	109.1	233.3
1951	3176	14.0	226.8	284.2	102.3	277.8
1952	3280	14.5	226.2	283.4	102.2	277.3
1953	3333	14.8	225.2	282.2	104.5	270.0
1954	3516	15.3	229.8	288.0	105.7	272.5
1955	3666	15.7	233.5	292.6	107.2	272.9
1956	3936	16.1	244.5	306.4	110.5	277.3
1957	4242	16.6	255.5	320.2	107.8	297.0
1958	4453	17.1	260.4	320.3	105.9	308.1
1959	4589	17.5	262.2	328.6	106.3	309.1
1960	4776	17.8	268.3	336.2	109.5	307.0
1961	4811	18.2	264.3	331.2	105.0	315.4
1962	5009	18.6	269.3	337.5	103.5	326.1
1963	5257	18.9	278.1	348.5	99.1	351.7
1964	5564	19.3	288.3	361.3	98.8	365.7
1965	5885	19.6	300.3	376.3	100.8	373.3
1966	6274	20.0	313.7	393.1	98.3	399.9
1967	6645	20.4	325.7	408.1	102.7	397.4
1968	6925	20.7	334.5	419.2	101.6	412.6
1969	7445	21.0	354.5	444.2	100.5	442.0

Year	Gross Personal Expenditure on Food (\$million) (1)	Population (millions) (2)	(1)/(2)	Index (4)	Per Capita Food Index (5)	Overall Index (4)/(5)
1970	7923	21.3	372.0	466.2	105.6	441.5
1971	8442	21.6	390.8	489.7	106.4	460.2
1972	9545	21.8	437.8	548.6	106.0	517.5
1973	11431	22.1	517.2	648.1	105.8	612.6
1974	13665	22.4	610.0	764.4	106.5	717.7
1975	16398	22.8	719.2	900.0	107.2	839.0

- sources: (1) For 1935 through 1946: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1956. National Accounts Income and Expenditure, 1926-1956, pp. 90-91 (catalogue no. 13-201) (Note: these figures are deflated 19% to make them comparable to the next series, which is said to represent the best statistics to date, according to Statistics Canada.) For 1947 through 1974: Statistics Canada, 1976. National Income and Expenditure Accounts, 1926-1974, vol. 1, pp. 178-79, 278-79. For 1975: Statistics Canada, 1977. National Income and Expenditure Accounts, 1962-1976, p. 76.
- (2) 1935 through 1960: Urquhart and Buckley, 1965. Historical Statistics of Canada, p. 164; 1961 through 1975: Statistics Canada, 1965. Canada Yearbook, p.188; 1968, p.212; 1975, p.164.
- (5) 1935 through 1956: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1943-44. Canada Yearbook, pp.507-09; 1945, pp.583-84; 1946, pp.590-92; 1948-49, pp.832-33; 1950, pp.877-79; 1952-53, pp.442-43; 1955, pp.433-34; 1957-58, pp.451-55; 1957 through 1977: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, annually. Apparent Per Capita Domestic Disappearance of Food in Canada. For the weights for the different categories of food: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1965. Urban Family Food Expenditure, 1962, p. 38; Statistics Canada, 1977. Urban Family Food Expenditure, 1974, p. 12.

Table 45. The 1935-50 Component of the Housing Index for the Revised Price Index

Year	Approximate Number of Rental Units in Urban Areas (1000s)	Rent Index in Gov't Cost of Living Index	Approximate Number of New Houses Built After 1935, and Rental Units After Jan., 1947*(1000s)	Price Index for Residential Building Materials	Stock of Homes Owned	Index of Residential Real Estate Prices
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1935	684	100.0	0	100.0	500	100.0
1936	701	102.2	3	104.3	500	102.9
1937	723	106.1	3	115.4	500	110.5
1938	738	109.7	5	109.5	500	108.2
1939	758	110.4	4	110.5	500	109.1
1940	777	113.1	4	119.1	500	116.0
1941	793	116.4	10	132.4	520	129.2
1942	817	118.4	20	141.4	550	140.1
1943	827	118.6	17	150.2	580	151.7
1944	835	119.0	20	158.3	610	159.5
1945	843	119.3	25	160.2	640	163.7
1946	858	119.9	38	166.8	700	175.4
1947	856	124.1	63	194.8	800	197.0
1948	854	128.4	82	234.9	900	226.5
1949	853	130.8	122	246.8	1000	237.6
1950	851	141.4	153	262.1	1100	249.5

*These figures are the differences between estimated totals and (1) and (5).

sources: (1) Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1933. 1931 Census, vol. V, p. 1006; DBS, 1943. 1941 Census, vol. V, p. 6; Firestone (1951, 54).

(2) Urquhart and Buckley (1965, 304)

(4) Urquhart and Buckley (1965, 297)

(5) Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1933. 1931 Census, vol. V, p. 1006; DBS, 1943. 1941 Census, vol. V, p. 6; DBS, 1953. 1951 Census, vol. III, p. 12.

(6) Firestone (1951, 99)

Table 46. The Housing Index for the Revised Price Index

Year	Index	Year	Index
1935	100.0	1970	351.2
1936	102.5	1971	366.9
1937	107.9	1972	384.0
1938	109.1	1973	408.8
1939	109.9	1974	444.4
		1975	488.7
1940	113.9		
1941	120.6		
1942	127.3		
1943	132.4		
1944	136.4		
1945	138.8		
1946	145.3		
1947	160.6		
1948	181.3		
1949	192.0		
1950	207.4		
1951	229.2		
1952	234.8		
1953	232.8		
1954	234.2		
1955	234.6		
1956	238.0		
1957	245.6		
1958	252.0		
1959	254.8		
1960	257.8		
1961	268.3		
1962	271.5		
1963	274.3		
1964	278.7		
1965	283.7		
1966	291.6		
1967	304.1		
1968	318.2		
1969	334.5		

Table 47. The Components of the Revised Price Index

Year	Food	Shelter	Clothing	Trans- porta- tion	Health	Recrea- tion	Tobacco & Alcohol
1935	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			
1936	104.6	102.5	101.1	100.4			
1937	113.4	107.9	103.4	101.4			
1938	107.9	109.1	103.4	102.5			
1939	111.9	109.9	102.4	102.7			
1940	126.7	113.9	111.8	103.6			
1941	142.8	120.6	118.6	106.5			
1942	148.2	127.3	112.8	108.5			
1943	147.7	132.4	123.3	109.4			
1944	157.1	136.4	124.3	110.3			
1945	170.3	138.8	124.8	110.8			
1946	167.6	145.3	129.1	114.1			
1947	190.6	160.6	147.2	118.5			
1948	228.7	181.3	178.4	125.0			
1949	223.3	192.0	186.6	130.1			
1950	233.3	207.4	186.0	134.1			
1951	277.8	229.2	204.8	145.1			
1952	277.3	234.8	208.6	150.9			
1953	270.0	232.8	205.4	150.6			
1954	272.5	234.2	204.1	152.7			
1955	272.9	234.6	201.5	154.1	126.7	122.6	107.4
1956	277.3	238.0	202.6	160.4	130.0	125.3	107.7
1957	297.0	245.6	202.4	169.0	138.2	129.8	109.4
1958	308.1	252.0	204.7	173.8	145.4	138.4	110.6
1959	309.1	254.8	205.0	180.1	150.2	141.7	114.0
1960	307.0	257.8	206.9	182.5	154.5	144.3	115.8
1961	315.4	268.3	209.9	182.9	155.3	146.1	116.3
1962	326.1	271.5	211.8	182.6	158.3	147.3	117.8
1963	351.7	274.3	217.0	182.6	162.4	149.3	118.1
1964	365.7	278.7	222.4	184.7	167.8	151.8	120.2
1965	373.3	283.7	226.5	191.6	175.5	154.3	122.3
1966	399.9	291.6	235.1	196.2	180.9	158.7	125.1
1967	397.4	304.1	246.8	204.5	190.2	166.7	128.3
1968	412.6	318.2	254.2	209.8	197.8	174.9	140.0
1969	442.0	334.5	231.3	219.5	207.5	185.3	145.4

Year	Food	Shelter	Clothing	Trans- porta- tion	Health	Recrea- tion	Tobacco & Alcohol
1970	441.5	351.2	266.2	228.3	216.6	191.7	147.1
1971	460.2	366.9	270.1	237.6	221.1	198.1	149.6
1972	517.5	384.0	277.1	243.8	231.7	203.7	153.6
1973	612.6	408.8	290.9	250.2	242.9	212.1	158.5
1974	717.7	444.4	318.8	275.1	264.0	230.7	167.2
1975	839.0	488.7	337.9	307.5	294.1	254.6	187.4

Table 48. The Weights for the Revised Price Index

Years	Food	Housing	Clothing	Trans- porta- tion	Health & Per- sonal Care	Recreation & Reading	Tobacco & Alcohol
1935 thru'							
1949	.32	.32	.11			.25	
1950 thru'							
1959*	.267	.322	.113	.120	.066	.047	.065
1960 thru'							
1969	.248	.314	.113	.152	.045	.069	.059
1970 on*	.215	.341	.101	.158	.040	.083	.062


sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1950. The Cost of Living Index, pp. 32-35 (catalogue no. 62-502); DBS, 1957. The Consumer Price Index for Canada, pp. 33-37 (catalogue no. 62-518);* Statistics Canada, 1970. The Consumer Price Index, p. 85 (catalogue no. 62-546); Statistics Canada, 1974. The Consumer Price Index, p. 67 (catalogue no. 62-546).*

*Involve revisions according to surveys of consumer expenditures.

Table 49. The Revised Consumer Price Index

Year	Index
1935	100.0
1936	102.5
1937	107.5
1938	106.4
1939	107.9
1940	115.2
1941	124.0
1942	127.7
1943	130.5
1944	135.2
1945	140.5
1946	142.9
1947	158.2
1948	182.1
1949	186.0
1950	190.1
1951	214.4
1952	218.2
1953	215.1
1954	216.7
1955	208.6
1956	214.3
1957	223.9
1958	230.7
1959	233.3
1960	232.0
1961	237.9
1962	248.2
1963	250.2
1964	256.2
1965	262.1
1966	273.6
1967	280.6
1968	292.1
1969	304.8
1970	307.5
1971	319.5
1972	340.3
1973	372.9
1974	417.0
1975	469.2

Graph 1. Women's Rates of Participation in Gainful Occupation or the Labour Force, by Marital Status, the United States, 1890 to 1970



Key:

all women	■ — ■
single women	○ — ○
divorced, widowed women	△ — △
married women	□ — □

*1890 to 1930: women 15 years of age or older gainfully occupied;
 1940 to 1960: women 14 years of age or older in the labour force;
 1970: women 16 years of age or older in the labour force.

source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, part I, p.133.

Graph 2. Women's Rates of Participation in Gainful Occupation or the Labour Force, by Marital Status, Canada, 1931 to 1971




Key:

single women ● — ●
 married women ■ — ■
 divorced,
 widowed women ▲ — ▲

*1931 and 1941: women 15 years of age or older gainfully occupied;
 1951 through 1971: women 15 years of age or older in the labour force.

sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1936. 1931 Census, vol. VII, p.36; DBS, 1946. 1941 Census, vol. III, p.94, and vol. VI, p.70; Statistics Canada, 1976. 1971 Census, vol. III, part 1, p.3-1.


Graph 3. Women's Labour Force Participation Rates by Age, the United States, 1930 to 1970




- Key:
- 15 to 24 years ■ — ■
 - 25 to 34 years ▲ — ▲
 - 35 to 44 years ● — ●
 - 45 to 54 years □ — □
 - 55 to 64 years △ — △
 - 65 to 74 years ○ — ○

sources: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1933. 1930 Census, vol. V, p.115; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1943. 1940 Census, vol. III, p.19; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1953. 1950 Census. Special Reports PE 1A, p.21; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1963. 1960 Census. Subject Reports. Final Report PC(2)-6A, p.15; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. 1970 Census. Subject Reports. Final Report PC(2)-6A, pp.1,2.

Graph 4: Ridge Trace for Time Series Regression Analysis



Graph 5. Women's Labour Participation Rates (Logit Scale) by Age and Period, Canada



Key:

- | | |
|----------------|-------|
| 15 to 24 years | ■ — ■ |
| 25 to 34 years | ▲ — ▲ |
| 35 to 44 years | ● — ● |
| 45 to 54 years | □ — □ |
| 55 to 64 years | △ — △ |
| 65 to 74 years | ○ — ○ |

sources: see Table 35

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbott, Edith, 1910. Women in Industry: A Study in American Economic History. New York: D. Appleton and Co.

Acton, Janice, Penny Goldsmith and Bonnie Shepard, eds., 1974. Women at Work: Ontario, 1850-1930. Toronto: The Women's Press.

Alexander, Sally, 1976. "Women's Work in Nineteenth-Century London: A Study of the Years 1820-50." Pp. 59-112 in The Rights and Wrongs of Women, edited by Juliet Mitchell and Ann Oakley. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Anderson, Michael, 1971. Family Structure in Nineteenth Century Lancashire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anthia, Floya, 1980. "Women and the Reserve Army of Labour: A Critique of Veronica Beechey." Capital and Class, 10 (Spring), pp. 50-63.

Aries, Phillippe, 1962. Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life. New York: Vintage Books.

Armstrong, Hugh and Pat Armstrong, 1975. "The Segregated Participation of Women in the Canadian Labour Force." The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 12 (Nov.), pp. 370-85.

Averitt, Robert, 1968. The Dual Economy: The Dynamics of American Industry Structure. New York: Norton and Co.

Baker, Elizabeth, 1964. Technology and Women's Work. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bancroft, Gertrude, 1958. The American Labor Force: Its Growth and Changing Composition. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Banks, J. A. and Olive Banks, 1964. Feminism and Family Planning in Victorian England. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Barrett, Michele and Mary McIntosh, 1979. "The 'Family Wage:' Some Problems for Socialists and Feminists." Paper presented at the Conference of Socialist Economists Conference.

Baxandall, Rosalyn, Elizabeth Ewen, and Linda Gordon, 1976. "The Working Class Has Two Sexes." Monthly Review, 28 (July-Aug.), pp. 1-10.

Becker, Gary, 1964. Human Capital. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Beecher, Catharine and Harriet Beecher Stowe, 1869 (1971 reprint). The American Woman's Home: or, Principles of Domestic Science. New York: Arno Press.

Beechey, Veronica, 1977. "Some Notes on Female Wage Labour in Capitalist Production." Capital and Class, 3 (Autumn), pp. 45-67.

Bennett, H. S., 1938. Life on the English Manor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Benston, Margaret, 1969. "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation," Monthly Review, 21 (Sept.), pp. 13-27.

Beyer, William, Rebekah Davis, Myra Thwing, 1919. Workingmen's Standard of Living in Philadelphia: A Report by the Bureau of Municipal Research of Philadelphia. New York: Macmillan.

Black, Clementina, 1902. "Some Current Objections to Factory Legislation." Pp. 192-224 in The Case for the Factory Acts, edited by Mrs. Sidney Webb. London: Grant Richards.

Blaxall, Martha and Barbara Reagan, eds., 1976. Women and the Workplace: The Implications of Occupational Segregation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Bluestone, Barry, William Murphy and Mary Stevenson, 1973. Low Wages and the Working Poor. Ann Arbor: The Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, The University of Michigan and Wayne State University.

Blumberg, Rae Lesser, 1978. Stratification: Socioeconomic and Sexual Inequality. Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown and Co.

Blumenfeld, Emily and Susan Mann, 1980. "Domestic Labour and the Reproduction of Labour Power: Towards an Analysis of Women, the Family and Class." Pp. 260-300 in Hidden in the Household: Women's Domestic Labour Under Capitalism, edited by Bonnie Fox. Toronto: The Women's Press.

Bowen, William and T. Aldrich Finegan, 1969. The Economics of Labor Force Participation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Brackett, Jean, 1969. "New BLS Budgets Provide Yardsticks for Measuring Family Living Costs." Monthly Labor Review, 92 (April), pp. 3-16.

Branca, Patricia, 1974. "Image and Reality: The Myth of the Idle Victorian Woman." Pp. 179-92 in Clio's Consciousness Raised, edited by Mary Hartman and Lois Banner. New York: Harper and Row.

Braverman, Harry, 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Bridenthall, Renate, 1976. "The Dialectics of Production and Reproduction in History." Radical America, 10 (Mar.-Apr.), pp. 3-14.

Buhle, Mari Jo, Ann Gordon, and Nancy Schrom, 1971. "Women in American Society: An Historical Contribution." Radical America, 5 (July-Aug.), pp. 3-67.

Bureau of Applied Economics, Inc., 1920. Standards of Living: A Compilation of Budgetary Studies. Bulletin No. 7. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Applied Economics.

-----, 1932. Standards of Living: A Compilation of Budgetary Studies. Vol. II. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Applied Economics.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1890. Sixth Annual Report of the United States Commissioner of Labor. Vol. II, Part III. "Cost of Production: Iron, Steel, and Coal." Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office.

-----, 1892. Seventh Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor. Vol. II, Part III. "Cost of Production: The Textiles and Glass." Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office.

-----, 1904. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor. "Cost of Living and Retail Prices of Food." Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office.

Butts, R. Freeman and Lawrence Cremin, 1953. A History of Education in American Culture. New York: Henry Holt and Co.

-----, 1920. "Minimum Quantity Budget Necessary to Maintain a Worker's Family of Five in Health and Decency." Monthly Labor Review, 10 (June), pp. 1307-35.

-----, 1948. "Workers' Budgets in the United States: City Families and Single Persons, 1946 and 1947." Bulletin Number 927. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office.

Byington, Margaret, 1910. Homestead: The Households of a Mill Town. New York: Charities Publication.

Cain, Glen, 1966. Married Women in the Labor Force. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Campbell, Paul, Margaret Luxton, Kathryn Peterson, 1975. "Why Women's Work Is Never Done: Ideology, Labour and Technology: Women's Work in American Prescriptive Literature." Unpublished paper.

Canada, Department of Labour. Labour Gazette, annual issues.

-----, 1924. Legal Status of Women in Canada. Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

-----, 1958. "Survey of Married Women Working for Pay in 8 Canadian Cities." Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

-----, 1959. "Occupational Histories of Married Women Working for Pay in 8 Canadian Cities." Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

-----, Legislation Branch (PLS). Provincial Labour Standards Concerning Child Labour, Holidays, Hours of Work, Minimum Wages, Weekly Restday and Workmen's Compensation, September issues, 1950-55 and December issues, 1956-74.

Canada, Labour Canada. Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, annual issues.

Carnes, Richard, 1978. "Laundry and Cleaning Services Pressed to Post Productivity Gains." Monthly Labor Review, 101 (Feb.), pp. 38-41.

----- and Horst Brand, 1977. "Productivity and New Technology in Eating and Drinking Places." Monthly Labor Review, 100 (Sept.), pp. 9-15.

Cavan Ruth and Katharine H. Ranck, 1938. The Family and the Depression: A Study of One Hundred Chicago Families. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chapin, Robert C., 1909. The Standard of Living Among Workingmen's Families in New York City. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation.

Clark, Alice, 1919. Working Life of Women in the Seventeenth Century. London: G. Routledge Sons.

Copp, Terry, 1974. The Anatomy of Poverty: The Condition of the Working Class in Montreal, 1897-1929. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Connelly, Patricia, 1978. Last Hired, First Fired: Women and the Canadian Work Force. Toronto: The Women's Press.

Cowan, Ruth Swartz, 1974. "A Case Study of Technological and Social Change: The Washing Machine and the Working Wife." Pp. 245-53 in Clio's Consciousness Raised, edited by Mary Hartman and Lois Banner. New York: Harper and Row.

Dexter, Elizabeth, 1924. Colonial Women of Affairs. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.

-----, 1950. Career Women of America, 1776-1840. New Hampshire: Marshall Jones Co.

Dobb, Maurice, 1947. Studies in the Development of Capitalism. New York: International Publishers.

Doeringer, Peter and Michael Piore, 1971. Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis. Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books.

Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1936a. 1931 Census of Population. Vol. V. Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

-----, 1936b. 1931 Census of Population. Vol. III. Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

-----, 1942. 1931 Census of Population. Vol. XII. Monograph. "The Canadian Family." Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

-----, 1953. 1951 Census of Population. Vol. III. Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

Durand, J. D., 1948. The Labor Force in the United States: 1890 to 1960. New York: Social Science Research Council.

Earle, Alice Morse, 1898. Home Life in Colonial Days. New York: Grosset and Dunlap.

Easterbrook, W. T. and Hugh Aitken, 1967. Canadian Economic History. Toronto: Macmillan.

Edwards, Alba M., 1943. Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office.

Ehrenreich, Barbara and Deirdre English, 1978. For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women. Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday.

Eisenstein, Zillah ed., 1979. Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Engels, Frederick, 1858. The Condition of the Working-Class in England. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Fabricant, Solomon, 1940. The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899-1937. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Faulkner, Harold, 1924 (1943 revision). American Economic History. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Feminist Theory Collective, 1976. "Comment on Szymanski." Insurgent Sociologist, 6 (Spring), pp. 35-40.

Firestone, O. J., 1951. Residential Real Estate in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Foner, Philip, 1979. Women and the American Trade Union Movement: From Colonial Times to the Eve of World War I. New York: The Free Press.

Fox, Bonnie, 1976. "The Urban Pattern: Historical Changes in the Distribution of the Population of North America as Reflections of Changes in Economic Organization." Unpublished paper.

-----, ed., 1980. Hidden in the Household: Women's Domestic Labour Under Capitalism. Toronto: The Women's Press.

Gardiner, Jean, 1975. "Women's Domestic Labour." New Left Review, 89 (Jan.-Feb.), pp. 47-59.

-----, 1976. "The Political Economy of Domestic Labour in Capitalist Society." Pp. 109-21 in Dependence and Exploitation in Work and Marriage, edited by Diana Barker and Sheila Allen. London: Longman.

-----, Susan Himmelweit, and Maureen Mackintosh, 1975. "Women's Domestic Labour." Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists, 4 (June), pp. 1-11.

Gavron, Hannah, 1966. The Captive Wife: Conflicts of Housebound Mothers. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Gideon, Sigfried, 1948. Mechanization Takes Command. New York: Norton and Co.

Ginsberg, Eli, 1977. "The Job Problem." Scientific American, 237 (Nov.), pp. 43-52.

Glick, Paul and Robert Parke, Jr., 1965. "New Approaches in Studying the Life Cycle of the Family." Demography, 2 pp. 187-202.

Gordon, David, 1972. Theories of Poverty and Underemployment. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

Gordon, Linda, 1974. Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America. New York: Grossman.

Gordon, Michael, ed., 1973. The American Family in Social-Historical Perspective. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Groom, Phyllis, 1967. "A New City Worker's Family Budget." Monthly Labor Review, 90 (Nov.), pp. 1-5.

Groves, Ernest, 1926. The Drifting Home. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Hartman, Mary and Lois Banner, eds., 1974. Clio's Consciousness Raised: New Perspectives on the History of Women. New York: Harper and Row.

Hartmann, Heidi, 1974. Capitalism and Women's Work in the Home, 1900-1930. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.

-----, 1979. "Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex." Pp. 206-48 in Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism, edited by Zillah Eisenstein. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Health and Welfare Canada, 1975. A Chronology of Social Welfare and Related Legislation, 1908-1974 - Selected Federal Statutes. Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

Hewitt, Margaret, 1958. Wives and Mothers in Victorian Industry. London: Rockliff.

Hobsbawm, Eric J., 1964a. "Introduction." Pp. 9-67 in Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. New York: International Publishers.

-----, 1964b. "The British Standard of Living, 1790-1850." Pp. 64-105 in Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour, edited by E. J. Hobsbawm. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

-----, 1968. Industry and Empire. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Hoerl, Arthur and Robert Kennard, 1970a. "Ridge Regression: Biased Estimation for Nonorthogonal Problems." Technometrics, 12 (Feb.), pp. 55-67.

-----, 1970b. "Ridge Regression: Applications to Nonorthogonal Problems." Technometrics, 12 (Feb.), pp. 69-82.

Hoffmann, Lois W., 1963. "The Decision to Work." Pp. 18-39 in The Employed Mother in America, edited by Lois Wladis Hoffmann. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Hoffmann, Mary, 1926. The Buying Habits of Small-Town Women. Kansas City: Ferry-Hanly Advertising Co.

Holcombe, Lee, 1973. Victorian Ladies at Work: Middle-Class Women in England and Wales, 1850-1914. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books.

Homans, George, 1941. English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Houghteling, Leila, 1927. The Income and Standard of Living of Unskilled Laborers in Chicago. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Howard, John R., Jr., 1909. "Report on the Standard of Living Among Workingmen's Families in Buffalo, New York." In The Standard of Living, by Robert Chapin. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation.

Hughes, Gwendolyn, 1925. Mothers in Industry: Wage-Earning by Mothers in Philadelphia. New York: New Republic Inc.

Humphries, Jane, 1977. "The Working Class Family, Women's Liberation, and Class Struggle: The Case of Nineteenth Century British History." The Review of Radical Political Economics, 9 (Fall), pp. 25-42.

Hutchins, B. L., 1902. "The Historical Development of the Factory Acts." Pp. 75-124 in The Case for the Factory Acts, edited by Mrs. Sidney Webb. London: Grant Richards.

International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, 1951. How High Are Living Costs? Toronto: International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America.

Jaffe, A. J., 1956. "Trends in the Participation of Women in the Working Force." Monthly Labor Review, 79 (May), pp. 559-65.

Johnson, Leo, 1974. "The Political Economy of Ontario Women in the Nineteenth Century." Pp. 13-33 in Women at Work, edited by Janice Acton et al. Toronto: The Women's Press.

Katz, Michael, 1975. The People of Hamilton, Canada West: Family and Class in a Mid-Nineteenth-Century City. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Kellogg, Lester and Dorothy Brady, 1948. "The City Worker's Family Budget." Monthly Labor Review, 66 (Jan.), pp. 133-70.

Kett, Joseph, 1971. "Adolescence and Youth in Nineteenth-Century America." Pp. 95-111 in The Family in History, edited by Theodore Rabb and Robert Rotberg. New York: Harper and Row.

Kirkpatrick, Ellis, 1929. The Farmer's Standard of Living. New York and London: The Century Co.

Knapp, Eunice, 1951. "Family Budget of City Worker." Monthly Labor Review, 72 (Feb.), pp. 149-55.

-----, 1952. "City Worker's Family Budget for Oct., 1951." Monthly Labor Review, 74 (May), pp. 520-24.

Kolko, Gabriel, 1978. "Working Wives: Their Effects on the Structure of the Working Class." Science and Society, 42 (Fall), pp. 257-77.

Komarovsky, Mirra, 1940. The Unemployed Man and His Family: The Effects of Unemployment upon the Status of the Man in Fifty-nine Families. New York: The Dryden Press.

Kreps, Juanita, 1971. Sex in the Marketplace: American Women at Work. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.

Kuhn, Annette and AnnMarie Wolpe, eds., 1978. Feminism and Materialism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Kyrk, Hazel, 1933. Economic Problems of the Family. New York and London: Harper and Brothers.

Lamale, Lelen and Margaret Stotz, 1960. "The Interim City Worker's Family Budget." Monthly Labor Review, 83 (Aug.), pp. 785-808.

Laslett, Peter, 1965. The World We Have Lost. London: Methuen.

----- and Richard Wall, eds., 1972. Household and Family in Past Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lipton, Charles, 1973. The Trade Union Movement of Canada, 1827-1959. Toronto: NC Press.

Little, Esther and William J. Cotton, 1920. Budgets of Families and Individuals of Kensington, Philadelphia. Lancaster, Pennsylvania: The New Era Printing Co.

Long, Clarence, 1958. The Labor Force Under Changing Income and Employment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

-----, 1962. "Comment." Pp. 98-105 in Aspects of Labor Economics, edited by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Princeton: University of Princeton Press.

Lorentsen, Edith and Evelyn Woolner, 1950. "Fifty Years of Labour Legislation in Canada." Labour Gazette, 50 (Sept.), pp. 1412-1460.

Luxton, Meg, 1980. More Than A Labour of Love: Three Generations of Women's Work in the Home. Toronto: The Women's Press.

Lynd, Robert, 1933. "The People as Consumers." Pp. 661-708 in Recent Social Trends in the United States: Report of the President's Committee on Social Trends. New York: McGraw-Hill.

----- and Helen Merrell Lynd, 1929. Middletown: A Study in Modern American Culture. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.

-----, 1937. Middletown: A Study in Cultural Conflicts. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc.

Marquardt, D. W. and R. D. Snee, 1975. "Ridge Regression in Practice." The American Statistician, 29, pp. 3-20.

Marx, Karl, 1954. Capital. Vol. I. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

-----, 1976. Capital. Vol. I. Translated by Ben Fowkes. New York: Vintage Books.

McIntosh, Mary, 1979. "The State and the Oppression of Women." Pp. 254-90 in Feminism and Materialism, edited by Annette Kuhn and AnnMarie Wolpe. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Meiksin, Peter, 1980. The Social Origins of White-Collar Work. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.

Meissner, Martin, Elizabeth Humphreys, Scott Meis, and William Scheu, 1975. "No Exit for Wives: Sexual Division of Labour." The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 12 (Nov.), pp. 424-40.

Meltz, Noah, 1960. "The Female Worker: Occupational Trends." Pp. 34-120 in Changing Patterns in Women's Employment, edited by the Women's Bureau. Canada, Department of Labour. Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

-----, 1965. Changes in the Occupational Composition of the Canadian Labour Force, 1931-1961. Occasional Paper No. 2. Ottawa: Economics and Research Branch, Department of Labour, Canada.

Milkman, Ruth, 1976. "Women's Work and Economic Crisis: Some Lessons of the Great Depression." The Review of Radical Political Economics, 81 (Spring), pp. 73-98.

Mincer, Jacob, 1962. "Labor Force Participation of Married Women: A Study of Labor Supply." Pp. 63-97 in Aspects of Labor Economics, edited by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Princeton: University of Princeton Press.

"Minimum Quantity Budget Necessary to Maintain A Worker's Family of Five in Health and Decency." Monthly Labor Review, 10 (June, 1920), pp. 1307-26.

Mitchell, Juliet and Ann Oakley, eds., 1976. The Rights and Wrongs of Women. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

More, Louise Bolard, 1907. Wage-Earners' Budgets: A Study of Standards. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

National Industrial Conference Board, 1921. Family Budgets of American Wage-Earners: A Critical Analysis. Research Report No. 41. New York: The Century Co.

Nearing, Scott, 1913. Financing the Wage-Earner's Family: A Survey of the Facts Bearing on Income and Expenditure in the Families of American Wage-Earners. New York: B. W. Huebsch.

Neff, Wanda, 1929. Victorian Working Women: An Historical and Literary Study of Women in British Industries and Professions, 1832-1850. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Nogiec, Marjorie, 1978. "Production and Reproduction: A Marxist Analysis of Women's Work in Canada." Unpublished M.A. thesis.

Oakley, Ann, 1974. The Sociology of Housework. New York: Pantheon Books.

-----, 1974. Woman's Work: The Housewife, Past and Present. New York: Pantheon Books.

Ogburn, William, 1933. "The Family and its Functions." Pp. 661-708 in Recent Social Trends in the United States: Report of the President's Committee on Social Trends. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Ontario Welfare Council, 1977. The Province of Ontario: Its Social Services. Toronto: Ontario Welfare Council.

Oppenheimer, Valerie Kincade, 1970. The Female Labor Force in the United States: Demographic and Economic Factors Concerning Its Growth and Changing Composition. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies.

Oren, Laura, 1974. "The Welfare of Women in Laboring Families: England, 1860-1950." Pp. 226-45 in Clio's Consciousness Raised, edited by Mary Hartman and Lois Banner. New York: Harper and Row.

Ostry, Sylvia, 1968. The Female Worker in Canada. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.

Phillips, Charles, 1957. The Development of Education in Canada. Toronto: W. J. Gage and Co.

Pinchbeck, Ivy, 1930. Women Workers and the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850. London: Frank Cass and Co.

Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward, 1971. Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare. New York: Vintage Books.

Rabb, Theodore and Robert Rotberg, eds., 1971. The Family in History: Interdisciplinary Essays. New York: Harper_Row.

Reeves, Pember, 1913. Round About A Pound A Week. London: G. Bell and Sons.

Reich, Michael, David Gordon, and Richard Edwards, 1973. "A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation." American Economic Review (May), pp. 359-65.

Reid, Margaret, 1934. Economics of Household Production. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Rowbotham, Sheila, 1973. Woman's Consciousness, Man's World. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Rubin, Lillian, 1976. Worlds of Pain: Life in the Working-Class Family. New York: Basic Books.

Scott, Joan and Louise Tilly, 1975. "Women's Work and the Family in Nineteenth Century Europe." Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17 (Jan.), pp. 36-64.

Secombe, Wally, 1974. "The Housewife and Her Labour Under Capitalism." New Left Review, 83 (Jan.-Feb.), pp. 3-24.

-----, 1975. "Domestic Labour - Reply to Critics." New Left Review, 94 (Nov.-Dec.), pp. 85-96.

-----, 1980. "Domestic Labour and the Working-Class Household." Pp. 18-99 in Hidden in the Household: Women's Domestic Labour Under Capitalism, edited by Bonnie Fox. Toronto: The Women's Press.

Sennett, Richard, 1970. Families Against the City: Middle Class Homes of Industrial Chicago, 1872-1890. New York: Vintage Books.

Shultz, Patricia, 1978. "Day Care in Canada: 1850-1962." Pp. 137-59 in Good Day Care: Fighting for It, Getting, Keeping It, edited by Kathleen Gallagher Ross. Toronto: The Women's Press.

Simeral, Margaret, 1978. "Women and the Reserve Army of Labor." Insurgent Sociologist, 8 (Fall), pp. 164-81.

Smelser, Neil, 1959. Social Change in the Industrial Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Smith, Dorothy, 1973. "Corporate Capitalism." Pp. 5-35 in Women in Canada, edited by Marylee Stephenson. Toronto: New Press.

Smuts, Robert, 1959. Women and Work in America. New York: Columbia University Press.

-----, 1960. "The Female Labor Force: A Case Study in the Interpretation of Historical Statistics." Journal of the American Statistical Association, 55 (March), pp. 71-79.

Sobol, Marion, 1963. "Commitment to Work." Pp. 40-63 in The Employed Mother in America, edited by Lois Wladis Hoffman. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co.

Statistics Canada, Canada Yearbook, annual issues.

Stearns, Peter, 1974. "Working-Class Women in Britain, 1890-1914." Pp. 401-25 in Workers in the Industrial Revolution: Recent Studies of Labor in the United States and Europe, edited by Peter Stearns and Daniel Walkowitz. New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books.

Stone, Leroy, 1967. Urban Development in Canada. 1961 Census Monograph. Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics.

Strasser, Susan, 1978. "The Business of Housekeeping: The Ideology of the Household at the Turn of the Twentieth Century." Insurgent Sociologist, 8 (Fall), pp. 147-64.

Streightoff, Frank, 1911. The Standard of Living Among the Industrial People of America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.

-----, 1915. "Report on the Cost of Living." Pp. 1461-71 in Fourth Report of the Factory Investigating Commission, New York State, Appendix VII. Albany: J. B. Lyon.

Strong-Boag, Veronica, 1979. "Canada's Early Experience with Income Supplements: The Introduction of Mothers' Allowance." Atlantis, 4 (Spring), pp. 37-43.

Survey Research Center, 1960, 1963, 1965, 1970. Survey of Consumer Finances. Ann Arbor: The Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.

Sweet, James, 1973. Women in the Labor Force. New York: Seminar Press.

Sweezy, Paul, 1942. The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Szymanski, Al, 1976. "The Socialization of Women's Oppression: A Marxist Theory of the Changing Position of Women in Advanced Capitalist Society." Insurgent Sociologist, 6 (Winter), pp. 31-61.

Tilly, Louise and Joan Scott, 1978. Women, Work, and Family. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Thompson, Dorothy, 1976. "Women and Nineteenth-Century Radical Politics: A Lost Dimension." Pp. 112-39 in Rights and Wrongs of Women, edited by Juliet Mitchell and Ann Oakley. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Thompson, E. P., 1963. The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Vintage Books.

Tryon, Rolla Milton, 1917. Household Manufactures in the United States, 1640-1860. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tuckwell, Gertrude, 1902. "The More Obvious Defects in Our Factory Code." Pp. 124-69 in The Case for the Factory Acts, edited by Mrs. Sidney Webb. London: Grant Richards.

United States Bureau of the Census, 1933. 1930 Census. Vol. V. Washington D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.

-----, 1963. 1960 Census. Subject Reports. Final Report PC(2)-7B. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.

-----, 1975. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.

United States Department of Labor, 1959. How American Buying Habits Change. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.

-----, Women's Bureau, 1976. State Labor Laws in Transition: From Protection to Equal Status for Women. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office.

Urquhart, M. C. and K. A. H. Buckley, 1965. Historical Statistics of Canada. Toronto: Macmillan.

Vanek, Joann, 1974. "Time Spent in Housework." Scientific American, 231 (Nov.), pp. 116-20.

Warner, Sam Bass, Jr., 1968. The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

-----, 1969. Notes For A History of Urban America. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, unpublished manuscript.

-----, 1975. The Urban Wilderness: A History of the American City. New York: Harper and Row.

Webb, Mrs. Sidney, ed., 1902. The Case for the Factory Acts. London: Grant Richards.

-----, 1902. "The Economics of Factory Legislation." Pp. 1-75 in The Case for the Factory Acts, edited by Mrs. Sidney Webb. London: Grant Richards.

Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 1910. English Poor Law Policy. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

Wells, Robert, 1971. "Demographic Change and the Life Cycle of American Families." Pp. 85-95 in The Family in History, edited by Theodore Rabb and Robert Rotberg. New York: Harper and Row.

Williams, Faith, 1956. "Standards and Levels of Living of City-Worker Families." Monthly Labor Review, 79 (Sept.), pp. 1015-23.

Wilson, Elizabeth, 1977. Women and the Welfare State. London: Tavistock Publications.

Wilson, Maud, 1929. Use of Time by Oregon Farm Homemakers. Agricultural Experiment Station, Oregon State Agricultural College, Corvallis, Oregon.

Wolf, Eric, 1966. Peasants. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.

Worcester, Wood and Daisy Worcester, 1911. Report on the Condition of Women and Child Wage-Earners in the United States. Vol. XVI. "Family Budgets of Typical Cotton Mill Workers." Senate Document No. 645. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.

Zaretsky, Eli, 1973. Capitalism, the Family, and Personal Life. Santa Cruz: Loaded Press.

APPENDIX A

Content Analysis Methodology

The content analysis of Ladies Home Journal advertisements and nonfiction articles covered the years 1886 to the early 1970s. We chose issues around the beginning and end of each decade: 1889-90, 1899-1900, 1909-10, 1919-20, 1929-30, 1939-40, 1949-50, 1959-60, 1969-70. Also, issues appearing during the two World Wars and the Depression were sampled. For each period, we chose four or five issues, usually in the spring and fall of the appropriate years.

We coded non-fiction articles with respect to the way in which the reader was addressed (e.g., as a consumer, as an unskilled housewife, as a skilled craftswoman), and the content of the article. Advertisements were coded according to a very elaborate scheme that separated items according to content (e.g., food, clothing, home furnishings), and whether they were fully processed items for immediate consumption or those useful to the manufacture of other items (e.g., sewing materials) - that is, whether consumer items or

items for the household producer. Within categories of items, fairly detailed distinctions were made (e.g., food was distinguished according to whether it constituted a complete meal (e.g., frozen dinners), was simply an ingredient (e.g., tomato sauce), was a dish that stood on its own (e.g., canned vegetables), or was something useful for home processing (e.g., canning).)

APPENDIX B

Women's Labour Force Participation as Measured through the Years by the United States Census

United States Census measurements of the percentages of women "working" do not together constitute a time series of comparable figures. The primary reason for this fact is that the definitions used, and the directions given the enumerators, varied from Census to Census. Between 1890 and 1930, the census enumerators attempted to count people who were "gainfully occupied," and beginning in 1940 they attempted to count the numbers of people in the "labour force." The gainfully occupied notion, undefined until 1930, was that of occupational status. It was an attempt to characterize people, according to whether they typically worked for money or in a family business - during an unspecified period. In 1930, gainful occupation became slightly more specific than a vague self-characterization, when the following definition was offered: an "occupation by which the person who pursues it earns money or a money equivalent, or in

which he (sic) assists in the production of marketable goods" (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1933, 29). Even then, the period of time was left unspecified.

Beginning in 1940, people were classified as either in the labour force or not, according to their specific behaviour during the preceding week. People who (a) worked for money, (b) held a job but were not at work because of sickness, vacation or temporary lay-off, or (c) had actively looked for work were all recorded as being in the labour force. These directions for the enumeration of people in the labour force have remained basically unchanged since 1940.

In Censuses before 1940, instructions for enumerating the gainfully occupied changed significantly from one Census to the next. In general, 1910 directions were more inclusive of women than the others, although 1930 was only slightly less inclusive. Because of a desire by many researchers for time series data on women's involvement in wage work, a debate has arisen about how the figures from these early Censuses can be made comparable to those obtained in later Censuses. The traditional position has been that the series through 1930 should be "smoothed," and the "bump" at 1910 removed, to show a steady increase in women's involvement in nondomestic work (Edwards,

1943). (See table 43 for census figures.) But an argument that 1910 was the only Census comparable to later ones has also been made (Jaffe, 1956, Smuts, 1960). This latter position has even involved the argument that because recent Censuses were more inclusive than earlier ones, there is no strong evidence to support the idea that women's participation in the labour force has increased significantly over the twentieth century.

There is no apparent way to make all of the census figures comparable. However, the time series can be marginally improved. The 1890, 1900, 1920, and 1930 Censuses can be made approximately comparable to the 1910 Census. And the problems of comparability of the early Censuses with the later ones can then be considered.

Because occupation was measured as a type of personal characteristic in the concept of gainful occupation, early census enumerators were likely to assume that women were "housewives," and not ask whether they in fact "worked." The distinction between household work for the family and work aimed at the market is, of course, a social distinction which mirrors a reality arising out of the development of capitalism. It is market-oriented work alone that the

Censuses define to be "work." For some women (e.g., those on family farms) the distinction between work for the market and work for family needs is a difficult one to make. But omitting the question would clearly significantly lower estimates of the numbers of women gainfully occupied. And there is evidence that in early Censuses the question was systematically omitted.

In 1910, unlike in the other early census enumerations, census takers were instructed to take no one's status for granted, and to ask everyone - even women and children - whether they were gainfully occupied. Women were classified as gainfully occupied if they regularly earned money, whether through work at home or outside the home, or if they were unpaid farm workers, even if working on a family farm. Because of these careful instructions, there was a large increase between 1900 and 1910 in the numbers of married women counted as gainfully occupied. (The numbers of women agricultural workers appeared to increase 129.5% between 1900 and 1910, while they had increased only 23.3% between 1890 and 1900; women as a percentage of farm workers appeared to have risen from 15.1% in 1900 to 25.3% in 1910.) Instructions for the 1920 Census were more restrictive: enumerators were told not to count as gainfully occupied women who worked

occasionally on the family farm.

Because the need to enumerate women was emphasized in 1910, we assume that estimate of the percentage of gainfully occupied women to be most valid. Compared to Censuses taken after 1930, however, the figure is still low. Smuts (1960) has accumulated substantial evidence that women involved in industrial jobs were significantly underreported even in the 1910 Census. Perhaps offsetting this problem is the fact that intermittent (or casual) workers were apt to be enumerated as gainfully occupied in the 1910 Census, if they were questioned, since the period of reference was vague. In later Censuses, these workers were perhaps more likely to be omitted.

To make the other early Censuses comparable to that taken in 1910, we determined the percentage of farms in 1910 reporting a gainfully occupied woman and, for the other Censuses, obtained the number of married women who would have been similarly gainfully occupied assuming the same percentage of farms had women "working." We replaced the original estimate of married female agricultural workers with this new figure. In table 43, columns 2 and 3 show the revised figures for 1890 through 1930.

These revised figures still suffer from several deficiencies. First, the numbers of women doing manufacturing types of work, especially at home, were underestimated. This underestimation would decrease the comparability of these early figures with later figures. Second, unpaid family workers outside of agriculture were omitted in the early Censuses, unlike in later Censuses. So, again, early figures would be relatively low, although the numbers in question cannot be great. Finally, women taking in boarders or lodgers were not counted as "working" in either early or late Censuses (although those who kept boarders or lodgers in 1910 were counted as gainfully occupied if they did so as a primary source of income).

So, there were two sources of underestimation in the pre-1940 Censuses which cannot be corrected. However, there is also a source of underestimation in the 1940 Census, and those following it. Specifically, since behaviour in the preceding week is what is measured, people who worked intermittently (i.e., part-year) were possibly excluded from the labour force count. Nevertheless, this underestimation would be minimal, especially in comparison with that in the early Censuses. Therefore, we assume that our best estimate of the time series of married women's

involvement in market work is one that uses the figures from the early Censuses, revised on the basis of an estimate of family farm workers, and the unrevised figures from the later Censuses. (See table 43, column 3.)

The series is, at best, an underestimation for all the years. At worst, there is probably greater underestimation for the earlier years. Nevertheless, we shall proceed with the more optimistic of these conclusions, especially since our revisions of the 1950, 1960, and 1970 figures - to correct for underestimation due to intermittent workers being out of work the week of the enumeration - result in substantial increases in the labour force participation rates. (See column 2, table 43.) (These revisions were made by adding onto the estimates of women in the labour force certain percentages (i.e., 25% to 75%) of those numbers of people who were reported in the Current Population Reports as working 49 weeks a year or fewer, part-time, and 26 weeks a year or fewer, full-time. That is, people who were apt to have worked during the year but not during the preceding week were estimated and added onto the total in the labour force.)

It should be noted that Jaffe (1956) made different assumptions than those we made about how the series must be revised. He argued that intermittent workers were omitted in early Censuses (because of the specification that they work "regularly" before they be counted as gainfully occupied). He revised the figures by adjusting the labour force data so as to approximate the data obtained under the 1910 instructions. Using information on peoples' work experience during the previous year, he omitted from the labour force figures people who had not worked 14 weeks or more and unpaid family workers in nonagricultural work. His (1956, 562) revised series showed a greater increase between 1910 and 1950 than did the original census figures.

APPENDIX C

The Construction of the Revised Price Index, Canada, 1935 to 1975

Our revision of the consumer price index consisted of recalculating the food and shelter components of the index. (We also calculated a typical income tax rate, on the estimated median men's incomes (see Appendix D), which we applied to men's and women's weekly wages to estimate real disposable income.)

We derived the food price index as follows: annual gross personal expenditure on food was divided by the number of people in Canada - providing a per capita food expenditure; this dollar figure was transformed into an index; a corresponding index of per capita gross food consumption (in weight) was computed (based on amounts for different food groups) and the former index divided by the latter, to ensure that an inflation in real costs was not confounded with an increase in the amount of food people were consuming. Table 44 gives the figures, and the data sources.

The housing price index constructed by the government was used from 1950 on; before that year, another index which took account of the costs of home ownership was constructed. Thus, the revised index is hopefully internally more consistent than that of the government, which ignores home ownership prior to 1950. The components of the index are listed in table 45. We applied the government's rent index (a component of the "cost of living" index) to the estimated stock of rental units (plus annual additions, up to 1947, the year price controls were removed); we applied the price index for residential building costs to the annual stock of new houses and new rental units built after 1947; we applied Firestone's (1951) index of residential real estate prices to the stock of homes owned each year. The resulting index is shown in table 46, with its extension (1950 on) from the consumer price index.

Table 47 shows all of the components of the revised price index. The indices for clothing, transportation, health, recreation and reading, and tobacco-alcohol are the government's consumer price index components (and some were not computed before 1955). Table 48 gives the weights used for each component and table 49 gives the resulting revised consumer price index.

APPENDIX D

The Time Series Data

The variables, and their construction, are as follows:

1. Women's labour force participation rates:

The number of people working for pay or profit during the survey week, or people working (unpaid) to contribute to the running of a farm or business owned by a related household member, or people with jobs but not at work (due to sickness, vacation, strike, temporary layoff, etc.), or people who looked for work during the survey week (i.e., those employed and those unemployed but looking for work) - divided by the population (cf women 14 and older).

sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1960. The Labour Force. Supplement (catalogue no. 71-001), similar Supplement, 1965, and later annual issues of the Labour Force (same catalogue number).

2. Total fertility rates:

The sum of the fertility rates of women at each age interval. The sum represents the number of

children 1,000 women would have throughout their lifetime, assuming no mortality, if they experienced, at each age, the fertility observed during that year for that age group.

sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1967. Canada Yearbook, p.73; 1972, p.66; 1975, p.177; 1978-79, p.170.

3. and 4. Men's and Women's wages:

Real weekly wages for manufacturing jobs were calculated in the following manner:

A. A time series of weekly wages, by sex, for manufacturing industries, was obtained. Figures for 1940 through 1960 came from Urquhart and Buckley, 1965, p.100; 1961 through 1969 figures came from Statistics Canada, Earnings and Hours of Work in Manufacturing (catalogue no. 72-204) and Canada Yearbook, 1972, p.846. Estimates from 1970 through 1975 were made from data on wages for a broad sample of occupations from every type of industry and every firm (with 15 or more employees) in Canada. The wage figures are given for occupations labelled according to sex composition. These data are provided in Wage Rates and Hours of Labour, a Department of Labour annual publication. We listed the wages for each manufacturing occupation, and industry, for both sexes; we then found a weighted

average wage for each sex.

B. Each wage figure was divided by our revised price index (see Appendix C).

C. This real wage figure for each year was then multiplied by the yearly figures obtained after subtracting the income tax rate for that year from 1. That is, the proportion of income for that year that remained after the income tax is paid was obtained.

The tax rate was figured in the following manner:

(1). The income tax rate schedules and standard deductions were used, as given in the Statutes of Canada from 1932 to the present.

(2). Median incomes of household heads were estimated, based on census data (see table 29) and the price index.

(3). The income tax that would be paid on median household income (after standard deductions) was calculated.

(4). The proportion of income that goes to taxes was calculated - that is, the "tax rate."

5. Consumer debt:

Figures for consumer debt (in millions of dollars) were divided by total Canadians (millions of people), and deflated by the government's consumer price index - to give a per capita consumer debt figure.

sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Retail Credit (catalogue no. 61-004); for 1942 to 1945 these figures were based on department store accounts receivable; the other figures include credit extended by sales finance companies, consumer loan companies (i.e., installment credit and cash loans), chartered bank personal loans, department stores accounts receivable, furniture and appliance stores installment and charge accounts outstanding. In 1971, television and radio dealers were added. Population figures were from Urquhart and Buckley, 1965, and Canada Yearbook, 1965, p.188; 1970, p.242; 1975, p.164.

6. Availability of part-time work:

This figure is the percentage of women and men who are in paid jobs and who work one to 34 hours a week.

source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Labour Force (catalogue no. 71-001).

B30291